Thanks James Morrison, for picking up on my post there. Appreciate it.
You write:
JamesMorrison wrote:As regards the UN it obviously cannot handle situations with such desperados as the former Iraq, Syria, and DPRK.
I wonder. It seems to have precious few avenues to use in tackling a state like Syria, at first sight, though I really don't know enough about it yet. Concerning the DPRK, one could indeed say little has at least been achieved thus far, even in the matters of disarmament and the neighbour countries' military security - and nothing, of course, on the matter of brutal dictatorship. Yet the little that has been achieved on the former has been taken in gratitude by South Korea, and the chilly reaction of South Korea's government to the new, no-nonsense line Bush Jr seemed to propagate at least suggests that the "Iraq doctrine" might not necessarily be seen to yield better results than the cautious UN-mechanisms, by those who'd know best - who apparently mostly seem to fear it could escalate matters instead.
Concerning Iraq - in terms, again, of disarmament and of guaranteeing neighbouring countries' security, the UN, I believe, didnt do badly at all these past twelve years. In fact, the US didnt think so either, until just about a year or two ago. It's only been a few years since the US was boasting about the 80% disarmament achieved thus far. We have now, in this war, been able to see that the Saddam regime apparently did
not have ready-to-use Scud missiles anymore, which meant that Israel turned out to be safe this time, in glaring contrast with 1991. Such contrasts plead for the partial UN success of this past decade. The no-fly zones and Kurdish autonomy had at least ended the very worst of the regime's human rights excesses - the attempted genocide against the Kurdish minority. No, in terms of the goals originally set by the UN, the US included, one can not say the UN has proven itself to be unable to handle such matters. The few examples used before the war started to suggest it was - the proposed matter of Iraq's nuclear programme, the suggested harboring of Al-Qaeda terrorists - thus far seem to have been proven unfounded.
You have got to remember, however hard it is in today's heady time, that until the very advent of this war, the argument of the Iraqi's plight under brutal dictatorship was almost wholly absent in the US case for war. It just didnt figure. The US had shown no particular concern for their plight in any of the earlier phases of this protracted crisis - not when the Kurds were gassed, not when the Shi'ites were persecuted, not when Powell was preaching to the UN about the risk Saddam posed to the US and the world. We were supposed to go to war about terrorism, about WMD. Only when the first argument wasnt bought and the second was disclaimed by those "in charge" of the resolutions in the matter, did the US turn to its present tagline of "Iraqi Freedom".
Its turned out, thus far, a tremendously successful tagline. If the war had dragged on into a new Vietnam, it would have looked ridiculous. But it didnt, and no matter what anarchy currently prevails and what risks loom for the regional and national stability of the future, the liberation from Saddam must be like manna from heaven to many Iraqis. It is all the more succesful a tagline when you consider that it is exactly this - tackling the harm dictatorships do to their own citizens - that the UN has thus far turned out to be mostly impotent about. It can mediate in civil wars, keep cease-fires, control atomic programmes and development and use of banned weapons, it can reconstruct countries after wars, but the principle of national sovereignty still is overriding to such an extent that the UN can not do all that much about the harm a dictatorship does at home.
Not that no progress hadnt been made. Kosovo: the first war waged against a country for its persecution of its own citizens (in casu the Kosovar minority). The UN legitimized it, be it afterwards. That was a very first step, but not a precedent the Iraqis could have profited much from: no escalation of persecution of the kind the Kosovars seemed to be facing (i.e., imminent attempted genocide) was on the agenda, just the depressing continuation of three decades of totalitarianism.
It is
that part that I was writing about where you quoted my frustration: "why are we only ever talking about what Rumsfeld wants or means or what really behind what Powell wants or thinks - have they robbed us of our ability to formulate our own analyses of Middle East problems, on what would be good policy responses to what clearly are situations that could do with change?"
I do want to note that it
was about that, specifically - in casu, concerning finding alternatives on what to do about the Syria type of dictatorship, when one rejects the Rumsfeld strategies. Thats the part where I feel the pacifist case is lacking arguments.
You call it
JamesMorrison wrote:an astute observation of this particular thread. [..] To those that say given more time Saddam would have come around and done the "right thing" I might suggest they consult Saddam's historical actions.
but I disagree that the observation would hold for the debate we had here on Iraq. I have seen people on this board clearly argue their case for a mix of UN actions on Iraq, falling short of war but still having been proven sufficiently succesful in containing the matters at hand in the debate at the time: WMD, terrorism, danger to other countries and the outside world. Yes, they pleaded - we pleaded - for a form of containment. Not because we believed Saddam would have ended up spontaneously "doing the right thing". But because we saw enough evidence that he might be forced to do enough of the good thing in those matters, without us having to go to outright war about it, to safeguard world security. Enough evidence to grant those in charge of the matter - the UN weapon inspectors - the extra time they asked for, at least. The war seemed - still seems - too fraught with risks to justify for something that would merely speed up a process we saw as already being underway and having been largely successful.
But of course that was a 'is the glass half-full or half-empty' debate. The 'still half-full' part would refer to how this policy of containment, though in our eyes succesful enough in world security matters, involved continued repression for those remaining in the core Iraq, though a repression robbed of the fighter jets and chemical weapons used in earlier times. It's that part that now deserves discussion, in my view. This war has, to my eyes, shown that a dictatorship can be toppled with considerably less time of war than was foreseen by war critics. We have to wait a while now to see what costs additional to that of these three or four weeks of war are involved. But
should it work to even any minimal degree, then the Rumsfeld clan has a powerful enough argument about
being able to overturn dictatorships and restore basic human rights at a cost less than had been expected - whether that was really a sincere goal in their original plans or not (I believe not). Its argument will be all the stronger the longer the war opponents fail to come up with convincing notions on alternative equally succesful, but less damaging ways to achieve the same.