from HofT's previous link (or secondary links)
On April 5, 1984, Ronald Reagan issued another presidential directive (NSDD 139),
emphasizing the U.S. objective of ensuring access to military facilities in the Gulf region, and instructing the director of central intelligence and the secretary of defense to upgrade U.S. intelligence gathering capabilities. It codified U.S. determination to develop plans "to avert an Iraqi collapse." Reagan's directive said that U.S. policy required "unambiguous" condemnation of chemical warfare (without naming Iraq), while including the caveat that the U.S. should "place equal stress on the urgent need to dissuade Iran from continuing the ruthless and inhumane tactics which have characterized recent offensives."
The directive does not suggest that "condemning" chemical warfare required any hesitation about or modification of U.S. support for Iraq
Chemical warfare was viewed as a potentially embarrassing public relations problem that complicated efforts to provide assistance.
The Iraqi government's repressive internal policies, though well known to the U.S. government at the time, did not figure at all in the presidential directives that established U.S. policy toward the Iran-Iraq war. The U.S. was concerned with its ability to project military force in the Middle East, and to keep the oil flowing.
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/index.htm
Joyce Battle: I have not personally seen documents that indicate that the Reagan administration supplied Iraq with chemical weapons. However, the documents we recently posted on the Internet demonstrate that the administration had U.S. intelligence reports indicating that Iraq was using chemical weapons, both against Iran and against Iraqi Kurdish insurgents, in the early 1980s, at the same time that it decided to support Iraq in the war.
So U.S. awareness of Iraq's chemical warfare did not deter it from initiating the policy of providing intelligence and military assistance to Iraq. There were shipments of chemical weapons precursors from several U.S. companies to Iraq during the 1980s, but the U.S. government would deny that it was aware that these exports were intended to be used in the production of chemical weapons .
Documentation on Early Cold War
U.S. Propaganda Activities in the Middle East
WASHINGTON, D.C. - The National Security Archive at George Washington University today published on the World Wide Web documents concerned with an early Cold War campaign to win hearts and minds in the Middle East, launched 50 years before current efforts to achieve United States "public diplomacy" goals in the region.
Soon after the events of September 11, the administration of George W. Bush announced a wide-ranging campaign to improve the image of America in Arab countries and in the greater Muslim world. One year later, its results appear unimpressive: a recent Pew Research Center poll found increasingly unfavorable international views of the U.S., "most dramatically, in Muslim societies."
The documents collected here describe an earlier program to expand and revitalize American propaganda directed at the Middle East, and the methods that were utilized, including graphic displays, manipulation of the news, books, movies, cartoons, activities directed at schools and universities, and exchange programs.
U.S. propaganda efforts were assisted by collaborating governments, the news media, academics, publishers, and private associations. The documents show that many of the factors that generated resentment of the U.S. during the 1950s, and that impeded the effectiveness of U.S. propaganda, have persisted into the 21st century.
Topics discussed in the documents include:
The objectives, targets, and methodology of U.S. propaganda.
Propaganda planned to win popular acceptance for the shah of Iran after he was restored to power by a British-American coup.
Propaganda seeking to enhance America's image by demonstrating its "overwhelming and increasing industrial and military strength," including its nuclear capabilities, to Middle Eastern countries, including Iraq.
The U.S. government's identification of religion, including Saudi Arabia's conservative interpretation of Islam, as "an important asset in promoting Western objectives," including anticommunism, in the Middle East.
http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB78/