It's the WMD, Stupid
George Bush and Judy Miller will now forever be linked in the weakest argument: On Saddam Hussein's WMD, they both want us to believe that they just couldn't have done better.
Speaking at Tobyhanna Army Depot on Veteran's Day, the President assailed the swarm that he claims is rewriting history. "Intelligence agencies from around the world agreed with our assessment of Saddam Hussein," the President said. Congress members, a bipartisan Senate investigation, the United Nations, all agreed that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction, the President said.
Miller wrote a letter to the public editor of The New York Times yesterday with another installment of her soap opera. What struck me was the throwaway line in her letter that "like many others in the press, I reported intelligence that proved faulty."
Why is it that WMD seems to make us so stupid?
I agree with the President on much of his selective defense: I don't think that the administration "manipulated" intelligence with regard to Iraq's WMD. The bipartisan Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, the so-called Robb-Silberman commission, found no evidence of political pressure by the White House to get the intelligence community to reach the conclusions it did. Much of the worst criticism of the administration did come during the 2004 Presidential election and thus did have a political tinge.
But these are empty arguments when it comes to the central issue: The United States government, which is the world leader in "intelligence," just got it wrong when it came to assessing the state of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. And despite significant intelligence community reorganization and numerous sage commissions reconstructing the miserable story, the weaknesses associated with the U.S. government failure persist.
Judy Miller is also dead wrong. I have suggested here that the media could have done better, and have been asked by numerous readers to explain how. Ms. Miller, I'll point out, wasn't a cub reporter covering WMD. I remember assisting Judy on nuclear weapons stories during the Carter administration. As the Iraq war loomed, Miller was coming off of just finishing Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War, a scare mongering book written with two Times colleagues.
All of which is to say that well before the 9/11 attacks, EVERYONE was seemingly united in the argument that the threat of weapons of mass destruction was getting inexorably worse. In the pre-blog world, mainstream discourse demanded adherence to the WMD dogma: The problem of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons was getting worse; more countries were proliferating with their bombs; "loose nukes" and other unsecured weapons and technologies were accumulating in the wrong hands.
All voices from all sides -- if they could be called sides -- echoed the same conclusion. Governments and militarists argued that the Iraq's and Iran's and North Korea's and China's were ever more frightening and potent threats and that nothing should be spared to fight the threat and the spread. Peaceniks and professional arms controllers and United Nations do-gooders argued that not enough was being done: that government commitment wasn't strong enough, that budgets weren't big enough, that intelligence wasn't good enough, that action wasn't strong enough. This was the universal truth. When bombs hit Baghdad on the night of March 19, 2003, they rode on a non-partisan midless WMD beam.
The real truth about WMD is far more difficult for all of these parties: The threat of nuclear war today, or biological war, or chemical war, is no where near what it has been in our lifetimes. The worldwide arsenals of nuclear weapons have declined by more than two-thirds since the late-1960's peak of the Cold War. The likelihood of accidental or unintentional war has virtually diminished. The spread of nuclear weapons -- particularly U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons, which were once deployed in scores of countries at hundreds of sites -- has significantly declined. The roster of countries out of the WMD business far exceeds the numbers who have "gone nuclear" in the past 20 years.
I'm not arguing for a minute that much more doesn't have to be done to rid the world of the WMD menace. And I'm not confident that the countries that actually possess real nuclear arsenals -- specifically the United States, China, Russia, Israel, Pakistan, and India -- won't use their WMD in their perceived vital interest. What I do think though is that the controlling opinion in the world today, even by many in the disarmament community, is that continued actual disarmament by the actual WMD powers is a waste of time. This is not some lefty explanation for why North Korea and Iran feel justified in pursuing WMD; it is just an argument that says we long ago gave up on the notion that pursuit of a universal solution to the WMD problem was an essential pressure point in dealing with the new WMD powers.
If you want to understand how WMD became the justification for war with Iraq, then understand that throughout the 1990's, WMD served so many so well. Saddam's pursuit provided the first Bush administration great Cold War-ish comfort. The massive failure to understand the extent of Iraq's program prior to Desert Storm led to a high point for United Nations inspection and disarmament work and mobilized the minds of an intelligence community otherwise completely bereft in a post-Cold War desert. Disintegration of the Soviet Union kindled a gentleman's non-proliferation salon. The Clinton administration discovered Anthrax and could appear actually forward looking on national security. The domestic WMD consequence management business was born, paving the way for the post 9/11 homeland security industry. An even larger ballistic missile defense industry got its boost. Nuclear weapons stayed alive ready to fight another day. Clocks were constantly reset for minutes to midnight. WMD was always good for a front page story.
After 9/11, the Bush administration didn't concoct Iraq's WMD -- they inherited it. There is no question that the White House decided cynically to pound on Saddam's supposed WMD pursuits to justify a war it wanted anyway. But Bush and Company, like Miller and her ilk had already lost their critical faculties on WMD; they had long ago stopped considering whether WMD was really as great of a threat as say, straight old fashioned terrorism without a spore or a toxin or a radioactive isotope in sight.
The constant drone on weapons of mass destruction, from Greenpeace to the White House, from the Nobel peace-prize winning International Atomic Energy Agency to Strategic Command, conveys the same sorry message: Nothing is as important, no war isn't justified…
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