The Nobel Prize and Tim Russert’s Lies

The Nobel Prize and Russert's Lies
by David Fiderer
10.22.2005

"I mean, that was a critical part of a lot of people who supported this war -- regular people, journalists, et cetera, said, I don't like the idea of going to war, but if they've got nuclear weapons, I guess we have to. And that was a successful trump card and it was a deal maker for a lot of people who supported the war, middle of the road people." Chris Matthews on Hardball, October 19, 2005

"The fact is, all the intelligence sources and elected officials in both parties did believe there was WMD in Iraq. It seems hard to imagine that the press could easily counter that." John F. Harris on washingtonpost.com October 20, 2005

Two-and-a-half years before Mohamed ElBaradei and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) won the Nobel Peace Prize, friends of the Administration were trashing them in the media. Pushing for war with Iraq, these hawks insisted that inspections don't work. In early March 2003, Tim Russert pushed their case further, by repeating lies to "prove" inspections don't work. Those lies speak volumes about media coverage of the WMD story then and now.

Russert's lie: (repeated three times) Inspectors never found any nuclear weapons program in Iraq until 1995, when Saddam's son-in-law defected and revealed secret nuclear program unknown to the inspectors. It was sheer luck, not the inspections, that kept Saddam from building 21 nuclear bombs by 2003.

Russert's message: Today inspectors say they find no evidence of nuclear weapons. But experience shows that Saddam can develop nuclear weapons right under the inspectors' noses. Bombs could still be in Iraq, so the danger - and the justification for war - remains.

The truth: After the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the first intrusive inspections in Iraq led to discovery and destruction Saddam's remaining nuclear weapons program. In 1995, Saddam's son-in-law revealed a second crash nuclear program (using a fatally flawed design) that U.S. bombs smashed during the Persian Gulf War, prior to the inspectors' arrival. Before 1991, Iraq relied on European technicians, equipment and manufacturing expertise for its nuclear weapons program, (which, after seven years, remained unsuccessful.) Lacking foreign assistance thereafter, Iraq remained incapable of building any nuclear device.

"Lying" is an inflammatory charge and tough to prove because it presupposes knowledge of Russert's state of mind. (I only know what I see on TV and in transcripts.) Whatever his motivation - currying favor with The White House, competing with Fox News - Russert's lies are so obvious that no other explanation makes sense.

There are five different reasons to believe that Russert lied instead of misspoke. Add them up, and the results are pretty damning.

Reason 1: The falsehood was blatantly obvious.

Most reporters have a basic knowledge of subjects they cover. When inspections and WMD in Iraq were the hot topic in the news, it's not especially plausible that NBC's Washington Bureau Chief would forget that inspectors, led by David Kay, found and destroyed a nuclear weapons program at one point. Russert was certainly around in 1991, when Kay's and other inspectors' standoff with Saddam made headlines around the word and triggered a diplomatic crisis.

Reason 2: To prove his false assertions, Russert misquoted both himself and his guest on Meet the Press.

"David Kay, who was a United Nations weapons inspector, testified before Congress this past week that but for the Persian Gulf War, when we had an opportunity to go in after the war and look at what he had and destroy much of it, his estimation is that Saddam Hussein would have 12 nuclear bombs today." September 14, 2002, Tim Russert on CNBC

Tim Russert: "[Y]ou were asked if the inspectors had not gone in after the Persian Gulf War [in 1991] and found and destroyed and dismantled what they did, what would be Saddam Hussein's nuclear capability today and you said?

David Kay: I said I think you would find Saddam with at least 20 nuclear weapons today. December 8, 2002, Meet the Press

"[Inspectors] concluded that there probably wasn't [a nuclear weapons program] until Saddam's son-in-law defected. He then was enticed to come back to Iraq when he was shot. David Kay, the chief weapons inspector at that time, has sat at that table six weeks ago and said but for that defector, Saddam would have 20 nuclear bombs today." March 2, 2003 Tim Russert on Meet the Press

Reason 3: The falsehood was repeated on two successive programs.

If you make a factual mistake twice on one network program, somebody out there corrects you. Plenty of people work for Meet the Press and NBC News. So how could Russert mistakenly repeat the same falsehood one week later?

"Secretary Powell just said that the Iraqis had a very well-developed nuclear program in the mid-'90s which no one could find until Saddam's son-in-law defected and was enticed to come back to Iraq and was shot. David Kay, the lead weapons inspector in the mid-'90s, on this program two months ago said that if we had not been lucky to discover that nuclear development program, Saddam would have 20 nuclear bombs today." March 9, 2003 Tim Russert on Meet the Press
Reason 4: The primary falsehood is supported by other falsehoods.

Each time Russert told the central falsehood, he embellished it with other falsehoods to give it a better veneer of plausibility.

Example a. "David Kay, the lead weapons inspector in the mid-'90s…" March 2, 2003 Tim Russert on Meet the Press

Kay was no longer an inspector after early 1992. On March 2, 2003, Russert had more than a passing acquaintance with David Kay, who was NBC News Analyst.

Example b. "[Inspectors] could not find any remnants of a nuclear program. They concluded that there probably wasn't one until Saddam's son-in-law defected." March 2, 2003 Tim Russert on Meet the Press

Inspectors never concluded any such thing.

Reason 5: To convey the false message, a single question was prefaced with a succession of falsehoods. On live television, this puts the respondent at a disadvantage, reducing the odds that Russert would be corrected with facts.

Each of the three times, Russert used an old interviewing stunt, which is to pose a question with a dubious premise, as in:

"Why would Osama bin Laden…come out and virtually try and influence the election today in favor of John Kerry?" Sean Hannity, 10/29/04

Russert took it to the next level, prefacing his bogus question with five specific falsehoods. This put the respondent, in this case former Congressman Tom Andrews, at a disadvantage. With cameras rolling, Andrews couldn't easily backtrack and identify those falsehoods, one by one. Read the following passage, and decide if you think Russert intended to deceive. (The numbered falsehoods have an answer key below. )

After the Persian Gulf War, the inspectors went in and for several years could not find any remnants of a nuclear program (1). They concluded that there probably wasn't one (2) until Saddam's son-in-law defected (3). He then was enticed to come back to Iraq when he was shot. David Kay, the chief weapons inspector at that time (4), has sat at that table six weeks ago and said but for that defector, Saddam would have 20 nuclear bombs today (5). How do you know that over the last four years when there have been no inspectors in Iraq that Saddam has not built up his weapons of mass destruction, put them on mobile carts, as the administration has suggested, and you'll never find him through the inspection process (6)* Since then, Russert and the Washington press corps have pushed the same message - ignore the inspectors' reports - with actions instead of words. With each retracing of our intelligence failures, the media sidesteps the key moment of truth. On March 7, 2003 Mohamed ElBaradei and Hans Blix notified Bush and the world that something was wrong. The IAEA had the most recent on-the-ground intelligence and wrote, "After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapon program in Iraq."

From that point onward, flawed U.S. intelligence no longer afforded Bush any excuse. Just as Ken Lay failed his duty when he ignored warnings about Enron's finances, Bush and the media failed in their duty to seriously consider the evidence presented by the inspectors and they failed to make a serious attempt to reconcile the differences. George Tenet's supposed "It's a slam dunk," remark became irrelevant. After March 7, 2003, Bush's actions thereafter were no longer mistaken, they were reckless.

In the typical media recounting of the WMD debacle, the chronology ends on February 5, 2003, when Colin Powell gave his speech at the U.N. It ignores the follow-up when Blix and ElBaradei informed Powell he didn't know what he was talking about. John Harris' remark above is emblematic. The Washington press corps won't admit that it ignored the warning signs in plain sight, so it gives itself a pass and in so doing gives George Bush a pass.

Again, Tim Russert explained it all to Katie Couric:

[W]e've known now for almost a year, that weapons--large stockpiles of mass destruction do not exist. Saddam may have had the intent, the interest, but they're not there. John Kerry is obviously going to try to take advantage of it. Every time he does you hear George Bush and Dick Cheney saying, `Well, that's interesting senator, because you voted to authorize the war.' … [T]hus far, what President Bush has been able to say is, "Well, I believed they [WMD] were there. Former President Clinton believed they were there. John Kerry believed they were there. If it was a mistake, it was an honest mistake." That's his view." Russert on Today September 17, 2004

Here's how John Kerry really "voted to authorize the war" because he "believed they were there."

Kerry on 10/10/02: "The vote that I will give to the president is for one reason and one reason only, to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction if we cannot accomplish that objective through new, tough weapons inspections."

Kerry on 3/14/03:"Nothing I have seen in the intelligence over the last years suggests to me that in terms of threat to the United States that there is, at this moment, such a compelling rationale that there is a distinction of weeks or months,"

"If it was a mistake it was an honest mistake"? Not on Tim Russert's part.

1. Inspectors discovered and destroyed remnants of Iraq's nuclear programs in the months subsequent to the Persian Gulf War.

2. Inspectors never concluded "there probably wasn't" a program.

3. Since inspectors never made such a conclusion, their minds wouldn't be changed by a defection in 1995.

4. David Kay was never a weapons inspector after the end of 1991.

5. To reiterate, Kay's (debatable) point on the December 8, 2002 Meet the Press was that but for the inspectors' discovery and destruction of the nuclear program in 1991, Iraq would have 20 nuclear weapons.

6. The dissembling question. Russert's question about moving WMD on mobile carts reflects an ignorance of the current technology, which makes inspections far more reliable than they were in when the inspectors left 1998. It's like saying, "How do you know Saddam's agents won't move around in darkness of night, when no one can see them?" A small sample of articles on the subject mentioned, among other tools, the following:

*(6) Correction Key:

∑ Radiation monitoring devices examine the flow of materials between locations.

∑ Radar systems that can penetrate the ground to scan for signs of tunnels and underground bunkers.

∑ Miniature sensors that can constantly monitor the air, water and soil for radioactive materials or other signs of WMD.

∑ Environmental swipe sampling, where dust around any building is analyzed by electron microscope or mass spectrometry to determine the exact nature of any type of an enrichment process.

∑ A portable scope that can detect several different isotopes of radioactive material and display on a screen exactly what fissile material is present.