The report of the September 11 Commission is continually bandied about in this thread with regard to Iraqi connections to al Qaeda. Therefore, with no small amout of trouble, i have transcribed the relevant section. I have ommitted two paragraphs which discuss speculation on the attitudes of Rumsfeld to Iraq, which are not germane to a question of whether or not the President thought Iraq had such ties. Those who doubt the matter are free to consult the report itself. If you find typos in here, keep in mind that i've transcribed it from a PDF file which i did not produce, and therefore had to type the entire thing out--you cannot highlight and copy from a PDF file which you have not yourself produced.
10.3 "PHASE TWO" AND THE QUESTION OF IRAQ[/size]
(see pages 334,
et sequitur)
President Bush had wondered immediately after the attack whether Saddam Hussein's regime might have had a hand in it. Iraq had been an ememy of the United States for 11 years, and was the only place in the world where the United States was engaged in ongoing combat operations. As a former pilot, the President was struck by the apparent sophistication of the operation and of some of the piloting, expeically Hanjour's high-speed dive into the Pentagon. He told us he recalled Iraqi support for Palestinian suicide terrorists as well. Speculating about other possible states that could be involved, the President told us he also htought about Iran. (footnoted with reference to note 59)
Clarke has written that on the evening of September 12, President Bush told him and some of his staff to explore possible Iraqi links to 9/11. "See if Saddam did this," Clarke recalls the President telling them. "See if he's linked in any way." (footnoted with reference to note 60) While he believed the details of Clarke's account to be incorrect, President Bush acknowledged that he might well have spoken to Clarke at some point, asking him about Iraq. (footnoted with reference to note 61)
Responding to a presidential tasking, Clarke's office sent a memo to Rice on September 18, titled "Survey of Intelligence Information on Any Iraq Involvement in the September 11 Attacks." Rice's chief staffer on Aghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, concurred in its conclusion that only some anecdotal evidence linked Iraq to al Qaeda. The memo found no "compelling case" that Iraq had either planned or perpetrated the attacks. It passed along a few foreign intelligence reports, including the Czech report allegeing an April, 2001 Prague meeting between Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer (discussed in chapter 7) and a Polish report that personnel at the headquarters of Iraqi intelligence in Baghdad were told before September 11 to go on the streets to guage crowd reaction to an unspecified edent. Arguing that the case for links between Iraq and al Qaeda was weak, the memo pointed out that Bin Ladin resented the secularism of Saddam Hussein's regime. Finally, the memo said, there was no confirmed reporting on Saddam cooperating with Bin Ladin on unconventional weapons. (footnoted with reference to note 62)
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A Defense Department paper for the Camp David briefing book on the strategic concpet for the war on terrorism specified three priority targets for initial action: al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Iraq. It argued that of the three, al Qaeda and Iraq posed a strategic threat to the United States. Iraq's long-standing involvement with terrorism was cited, along with its interest in weapons of mass destruction. (footnoted with reference to note number 65)
Secretary Powerll recalled that Wolfowitz--not Rumsfeld--argued that Iraq was ultimately the source of the terrorist problem and should therefore be attacked. (footnoted with reference to note number 66) Powell said that Wolfowitz was not able to justify his belief that Iraq was behind 9/11. "Paul was always of the view that Iraq was a problem that had to be dealt with," Powell told us. "And he saw this as one way of using this event as a way to deal with the Iraq problem." Powell said that President Bush did not give Wolfowitz's argument "much weight." (footnoted with reference to note number 67) Though continuing to worry about Iraq in the following week, Powell said, President Bush saw Afghanistan as the priority. (footnoted with reference to note number 68)
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From the Notes to Chapter 10:
Note 59: President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). On Iran, see Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004.
Note 60: Richard A. Clarke,
Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (Free Press, 2004), p. 32. According to Clarke, he repsonded that "al Qaeda did this." When the President pressed Clarke to check if Saddam was involved and said that he wanted to learn of any shred of evidence, Clarke promised to look at the question again, but added that the NSC and the intelligence community had looked in the past for linkages between al Qaeda and Iraq and never found any real linkages. Ibid.
Note 61: President Bush told us that Clarke had mischaracterized this exchange. On the evening of September 12, the President was at the Pentagon and then went to the White House residence. He dismissed the idea that he had been wandering around the Situation Room alone, saying: "I don't do that." He said that he did not think that any president woudl roam around looking for something to do. While Clarke said he found the President's tone "very intimidating," ("Clarke's Take on Terror," CBSnews.com, Mar. 21, 2004, online at
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/03/19/60minutes/printable607356.shtml ), President Bush doubted thaq anyone would ahve found his manner intimidating. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29,2004). Roger Cressey, Clarke's deputy, recalls this exchange with the President and Clarke concerning Iraq shorty after 9/11, but did not believe the President's manner was intimidating. Roger Cressey interview (June 23, 2004).
Note 62: NSC memo, Kurtz to Rice, Survey of Intelligence information on any Iraq Involvement in the September 11 Attacks, Sept. 18, 2001. On
60 Minutes (CBS, Mar. 21, 2004), Clarke said that the first draft of this memo was returned to the NSC Front Office because it did not find a tie between Iraq and al Qaeda; Rice and Hadley deny that they asked to have the memo redone for this reason.
Note 65: DOD memo, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "War no Terrorism: Strategic Concept," Sept. 14, 2001.
Note 66: Colin Powell interview (Jan. 21, 2004). Rumsfeld told Bob Woodward that he had no recollection of Wolfowitz's remarks at Camp David. DOD transcript, "Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with the Washington Post," Jan. 9, 2002 (online at
www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t02052002_50109wp.html ).
Note 67: Colin Powell interview (Jan. 21, 2004). Powell raised concerns that a focus on Iraq might negate progress made with the international coalition the administration was putting together for Afghanistan. Taking on Iraq at this time could destroy the International coalition. Ibid.
Note 68: Colin Powell interview (Jan. 21, 2004).