@Setanta,
Quote:Philosophy is subjective.
I don't think you understand the content of the subject, then. 'Subjective' is not a terribly useful word, but where it is useful, is as an adjective which describes something peculiar to oneself i.e. 'a subjective judgment' or 'a subjective view of the situation'. But on the other hand, first-person experience or knowledge does not necessarily have to be subjective; there is a sense in which the nature of reality is subjective, in that it has to be experienced by someone. So this leads to the central questions of philosophy, namely, what is the nature of this experience, and the extent to which the supposed objects of experience exist 'in themselves', as distinct from being 'represented in conscious experience'.
Now it is exactly these kinds of questions which evolutionary theorists frequently do not care to address. Why? Because the naturalist worldview assumes that the world of experience is the starting point. It assumes a position of naive realism. (Where this is starting to change is in the very interesting discipline of embodied cognition, which tries to understand consciousness as it is situated in a living organism, in an environment. This approach draws on phenomenology and non-Western models of conscious functioning. A related field is neuro-anthropology.) But the mainstream of evolutionary theory still commences with the assumption that any attribute we might have can only be rationalised by how it has contributed to our survival as a species. And this often translates to guys in white coats from the biology department barging into the philosophy department to tell us all why we think the way we do. But we do perfectly well in understanding this, without their assistance in the matter, thanks (even though they do hit upon the occasional novel insight.)