Counterbattery
By Captain Will Rogers, US Navy (Retired)
No one involved, certainly including me, denies or shrinks from the responsibility for the tragic destruction of Iran Air Flight 655, but there are no hidden agendas or explosive facts awaiting revelation.
Subsequent to the downing of Flight 655, many issues have been put forth that are not based on fact. The genesis of these range from simple misunderstanding to deliberate presentation of misinformation. Since in the main they have been and continue to be presented in a sensational fashion, the themes tend to cloud accurate perception of what is most certainly a complex matrix of events. These issues and their counterpoints are offered to lend first-hand perspective to this event.
Issue: The Navy has failed to take advantage of the lessons learned from the VINCENNES incident.
Counter: To date, thousands of hours have been expended in analyzing every facet of the events of 3 July 1988. Tactical, operational, and human factors, plus equipment and training issues have been examined and numerous changes and modifications have been implemented. Pertinent lessons-learned files have been incorporated into the Navy Lessons Learned Data Base (NLLDB), and the actual VINCENNES war diary tapes have been incorporated into the Aegis Training Center prospective commanding and executive officer team-training curriculum. The results of much of this effort were incorporated into procedures employed during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and the effort continues.
Issue: The Department of Defense and the Navy should declassify the report of the Board of Investigation in its entirety.
Counter: This drumbeat is normally couched so as to leave the impression that the classifying authorities have some sinister and/or conspiratorial rationale for maintaining the report under a classified umbrella. Not so. Portions of the report address capabilities, sensitive procedures, and intelligence information which, for the foreseeable future, must remain classified and accessible only to those with need to know. These restrictions, I might add, apply even to the parties to the investigation. There is simply no hidden "blockbuster" information. To the contrary, the convening and classifying authorities moved quickly to provide public access to the basic report and findings.
Issue: The crewmembers of the VINCENNES were less than fully prepared for their mission.
Counter: Statements of this ilk are not supported by fact. The states of training and readiness of the ship were the subject of a thorough review during the course of the formal investigation, and both domains were found to be at the highest levels. These findings were supported by in-depth documentation obtained from Commanders Third Fleet, Seventh Fleet, and Naval Surface Forces Pacific, as well as sworn testimony of the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet and Commander Middle East Force representatives to the investigative board, and are a matter of public record.
Issue: The VINCENNES was overly aggressive and charged into the situation hoping to prove herself...the aircraft was not a threat, etc.
Counter: In the main, the genesis of this theme emanates from Captain David Carlson, the former commanding officer of USS SIDES (FFG-14) [Editor's Note: See D. R. Carlson, pp. 87-92. September 1989 Proceedings] whose clarity of hindsight concerning the events in which he was only indirectly involved appears to have improved with the passage of time. The facts are:
>He was provided an opportunity in a legally constituted forum to voice his view and provide information supportive of his subsequent public comments. He did not do this.
>No testimony presented during the course of the hearings support his contentions.
>If in fact his grasp of the developing tactical situation was as complete as he has indicated, then he must assume responsibility for failing to pass this insight to his officer in tactical command (ie., the VINCENNES's commanding officer--me).
Issue: The rules of engagement (ROES) were murky and contributed to a "hair-trigger" atmosphere.
Counter: To the contrary, the ROEs were and are succinct and clear in both intent and latitude. They provide useful guidance and a framework for measured response in the ambiguous atmosphere of low-intensity conflict. Following missile attack on the USS Stark (FFG-31), the ROEs were modified to underscore the responsibility of the on-scene commander to exercise the inherent right of self-defense in a timely fashion.
The appropriate question should be: Are the ROEs weighted to protect American lives and property?
The answer: Absolutely!
Issue: In violation of international law, the VINCENNES and the Montgomery entered Iranian waters.
Counter: The presence of the VINCENNES and/or the Montgomery in Iranian territorial waters during the course of the engagement did not constitute a violation of international law. When the determination of hostile intent on the part of the Iranian small craft was made, both U.S. ships were in international waters. During the course of the following surface action while maneuvering at high speed both the VINCENNES and the Montgomery exercised their right of self-defense pursuant to international law reflected in Article 51 of the U.N. charter and entered Iranian waters. Under the law of self-defense, warships and military aircraft may enter foreign territory whenever military exigencies dictate. Navigational positioning data pertinent to the entire engagement track were automatically recorded on the war diary tapes and provided to both the investigative board and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) representatives. Readers interested in a broader examination of this--as well as other issues related to the events of 3 July 1988--may wish to obtain a copy of the 18 September 1992 Naval War College Memorandum, subject, "USS VINCENNES (CG-49) and the shoot-down of Iranian Airbus Flt 655" prepared for the Center for Naval Warfare Studies by Professor R. J. Grunawalt.
Issue: The Iran Air pilot could not have heard the radioed warnings; his radio bands were full of air control information.
Counter: Annex 10 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, to which Iran is a party, provides that commercial aircraft "shall continuously guard the VHF emergency frequency 121.5 MHZ in areas or over routes where the possibility of interception of aircraft or other hazardous situations exist, and a requirement has been established by the appropriate authority." The International Civil Aviation Organization confirmed that the Strait of Hormuz in 1988 was such an area and that a Notice to Aviators Class I warning had been promulgated in September 1987 advising that "failure to respond to warnings could place aircraft at risk by U.S. defensive measures. ICAO confirmed that "since 16 September 1986, Iran Air flight crews operating in the Gulf area...required to monitor frequency 121.5 MHZ...at all times."
Issue: The crew of the VINCENNES reported the aircraft as descending when in fact it was climbing.
Counter: The probable root cause of this important discrepancy required extensive analysis by large numbers of people before a satisfactory explanation was determined and agreed upon. The results of this effort reveal that the problem lay neither with the Aegis system nor directly with the console operators but rather within the Navy Tactical Data System Link 11 network and the assignment of track numbers (TNs) to the contact.
On lift off, the Airbus was assigned TN 4474 by the VINCENNES from her assigned track block. Shortly thereafter TN 4131 was assigned to the same contact by the SIDES. The Aegis system, recognizing that the two track numbers applied to the same contact, dropped the number assigned by the VINCENNES (TN 4474) and adopted the number assigned by the SIDES (TN 4131). The investigative report documents that this save track number feature was an automatic function of the Aegis system and notes that TN 4474 was also available for assignment by U.S. and allied warships operating in the North Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman. The investigation and subsequent analysis established that TN 4474 was hooked by a watchstander in the VINCENNES after 4131 became the identifier for the Airbus. Should one or more watchstanders--operating in a time- compressed situation and unaware of the track number switch--have interrogated the system for contact parameter information, the system would have responded with current data on TN 4474. This number now was assigned by a unit in the Gulf of Oman to an accelerating and descending aircraft of a surface combat air patrol (SUCAP) operating from the carrier USS Forrestal (CV-59) package. In fact, such a system query did occur when the Airbus was approximately 20 nautical miles from the VINCENNES.
This greatly simplified causal analysis has been included in the Aegis Training Center incident- training syllabus. A thorough treatment of this particular event chain is contained in a masters thesis submitted to the Naval Postgraduate School by Captain K. A. Dotterway, U. S. Air Force, titled "Systematic Analysis of Complex Dynamic Systems: The Case of the USS VINCENNES."
Issue: In the case of the VINCENNES, the Navy abrogated the ethical standards inherent to the traditions of command at sea.
Counter: The principals in the incident were party to a complete, thorough and formal investigation which contained in its convening precept a statement to the effect that should testimony or findings so warrant, the investigation would be halted and proceedings under Article 32 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice initiated. During the course of the formal investigation all details of the events in question were completely examined. Time lines and decision streams down to 1/1,000 of a second were subjected to intense scrutiny. The president of the investigative board was empowered to obtain any information he saw fit and use any subject matter expertise available. Both options were widely employed. The findings of the board were reviewed by both the Navy and the convening authority chains and included Commander-in-Chief, Central Command, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense.
The results of the investigation were briefed to the Armed Services Committees of the House and Senate and provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs to the media for publication. Throughout, all parties, which certainly included the commanding officer, were held fully and completely accountable, as they should have been.
There are other published flights of ill-informed fancy. Perhaps the most bizarre alleges that the VINCENNES, other forces operating in the Gulf, and higher Department of Defense authorities were parties to a secret conspiracy to force conflict with Iranian forces. This particular misrepresentation is compounded by claims that the true events of 3 July 1988 were "covered up" and "whitewashed" to preclude the revelation of a "secret war."
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