rosborne979 wrote:That's pretty close, but I would add the word "reasonable" to your summary, for example: "the state is justified in regulating an activity that either infringes on someone else's freedom or that has the reasonable potential to infringe on someone else's freedom. Is that a fair inference?"
Whether the potential for a particular right-infringement is "reasonable" or not is something for legislators to ponder. Since we are engaged in a more intellectual pursuit, I don't think we need to concern ourselves with the degree of potential risk as long as we understand that, at its foundation, we are justifying state regulation of an activity based upon the mere fact that there is some potential (and unacceptable) risk. If it makes you more comfortable, however, I have no problem with adding "reasonable."
But once you've crossed that threshold, from justifying state regulation of conduct that causes harm to justifying state regulation of conduct that
has the potential to cause harm, you need to explain why you seemingly want that regulation to end at a person's front door. If the drunk driver on the deserted road presents a potential risk, what are those risks? Certainly he doesn't pose a risk to others, since there's no one else around. Does he pose a risk to himself? If so, does the state have any legitimate interest in keeping him from harming himself? Does his example pose a potential risk that others will emulate his example, or that others will hold the drunk driving laws in lower regard? If so, is it the state's job to prevent him from being a bad example?
Another hypothetical: suppose Buyer is approached on the street by a stranger who offers to sell him a genuine Rolex watch for $50. Buyer happens to be an expert on Rolex watches, and, after examining the watch thoroughly, he determines that it is a genuine Rolex, with a retail value of $7,000. Buyer asks the stranger why he is selling the watch at such a low price, and the stranger replies: "I stole this watch and I need the money." Buyer then purchases the watch. Later, he is arrested and charged with
receiving stolen goods. Buyer argues that the law is unjust. He notes that he has not infringed on anyone's rights: it was, after all, the stranger, and not Buyer, that stole the watch in the first place. As between the thief and Buyer, it was a simple and fair commercial transaction and no one's rights were affected. The state responds that the law is intended to inhibit thefts by dissuading others from emulating Buyer's conduct. Who is right?
rosborne979 wrote:Based on your questioning, is seems like you're trying to nail down my view on personal freedom versus public responsibility to some clearcut fine line. But I think the best I can do for you is to say that I lean strongly in the favor of personal freedom's until those freedoms (under reasonable circumstances) begin to conflict with another person's rights. As with all things in the law, there will always be particular circumstances which straddle the fence of any general value system, but I think those must be dealt with as they occur.
If you are offering a purely
ad hoc rationale for state regulation of private conduct, then I must conclude, regrettably, that we have nothing left to discuss.
rosborne979 wrote:My general opinion on the war on drugs is that it's a fundamentally flawed activity. Not only do I feel that people are entitled to do drugs if they want to (see previous restrictions), but that attempts
My general feeling on the "war on drugs" is that it is a fundamentally flawed approach to solving a problem which would barely exist if we weren't trying to restrict it in the first place. Not only are we undermining personal freedom by restricting drugs, but the restrictions themselves are fueling the value of drugs which gives economic power to the cartels who produce them. Either of those two conditions is sufficient to argue to curtail drug restriction.
I have no interest in discussing the war on drugs. That is a policy issue. I'm interested in the philosophical and theoretical aspects of state regulation, not on its practical applications.