Any British Naval History experts?

iduru

I don't know where you study/studied history, especially naval history.

But actually it is quite well known that in any naval force (and most armies as well) soldiers didn't join 'most voluntarily', dersertation was high and education low.

This isn't Britain specific at all.

I believe it was William "Gentleman Billy" Burgoyne who first referred to the common foot soldier in his army as "the scum of the earth." The expression was likely apt in describing how naval officers felt about the common "jacks" aboard a man-of-war, but the expression was originally applied to the English Foot.

It would take pages to explain why the Royal Navy enjoyed such long dominance. The key ingredient, however, after the English overcame the Dutch in the 17th Century in three naval wars, was that England, a wealthy nation, devote the lion's share of their military expenditure to their navy, the situation in an island obviating the need to maintain a large standing army. It was commonly said that England was defended by wooden walls, meaning the ships of the Royal Navy.

Press gangs were commonly used everywhere in history and in the world to supply troops to armies, and common seamen to navies. The material of the crews of Royal Navy warships was no better, and no worse, than the crews of their opponents. The Dutch designed the ships which England eventually used to defeat them. French naval architects reigned supreme in the 18th century to the point that many English naval officers considered themselves fortunate indeed to be given command of a captured French ship. The American Navy in its infancy showed more professionalism and dedication to the training and welfare of it's crews.

It all comes down to money. The English spent more on their navy than on any other public resource. The wealthy merchants in London and Bristol, Plymouth and Liverpool, all gladly paid their "ship money," because that navy protected their livelihoods, the source of their wealth. England has often in its history been bereft of an army. When Oliver Cromwell died in 1658, George Monck eventually marched south from Coldstream in Scotland with the Parliamentary Guard, and it was his decision to restore the monarchy. Monck command that power because he commanded the only armed force on land in England, there was not even an armed militia in the country. Henry Cromwell and Parliament's navy were off taking Jamaica from the Spaniard--there was no one to oppose or gainsay Monck.

It would help to understand all of this if you would read the classic work of an American naval officer--Alfred Thayer Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. If you can understand what Mahan is saying about the basis of a successful naval power, then you will understand why England was uniquely placed to asssume the role of world naval power. Only Japan has ever been in the same situation, and they had turned to the English to teach them how to build and maintain a successful navy. The Japanese were a much poorer nation than the English, and their accomplishment was much the more remarkable.

To know what the life of a common seaman on shipboard at sea was like, i recommend another American author, Richard Henry Dana. His Two Years Before the Mast is now a classic, and you should be able to get it through any good library. His work is about merchant seaman, but it differs from the lot of the "jack-tar" only in that the latter faced sudden violent death, and was constantly under the eye of the Royal Marines.

<Did I tell you that the German navy even in the 70's of last century pressed scum of the earth like me? [Which, however, surely is a reason that we didn't rule the waves!]>

No, no, Walter. Germany didn't rule the waves in spite of the fact that it had the foresight to enlist the help of Walter Hinteler.

British Navy?
The cop of the 19 century's world right?

A great book you should pick up is:

To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World, Arthur Heman.

The seamen of the Royal Navy did not always take it lying down. In 1797 the Northern Fleet anchored at Spithead and the Channel Fleet anchored at the Nore mutinied and nearly defected to the French. The demands of the Northern Fleet (better pay and food) were met, the mutiny of the channel Fleet was crushed and it's leaders hanged.

I vaguely recall that Bligh was involved in that one, don't I?

I remembered having read that recently:
Source

I'm glad, I didn't sing Irish rebel songs in 1970.

But I wasn't in the Royal Navy.

[When you guess now, Walter
a) made drunken protests
b) outside the officer's wardroom
you are not so far away from truth.
(I've liked to do dog-watches and clean the toilettes! :wink: )]

Fairly decent movie about the Spithead mutiny was Damn the Defiant starring Alec Guiness.

There is a history of these mutinies, published I think in the 1970's the title of which is something like The Great Muinty. I read it many years ago and can not recall the authors name. Nor could I find it on Amazon. It was however, if I recall correctly, the definitive study of the event.

Thank-you all for the great responses. : )

William McNeill has a good discussion of what enabled the British to rule the seas for so long in "The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since AD 1000", U Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982.

Although Setanta is quite right to say that available finances had much to do with British dominance of the seas, I think to say that it "all came down to money" is overstating the case a bit.

For example, despite putting the balance of their substantial revenues into maintaining their fleet, the Republic of Venice lost their dominance over the seas after the League of Cambria. Similarly, the Dutch lost their predominance--which Setanta noted--despite a similar overwhelming concern with naval issues. Also, the Spanish--despite having monetary resources matched by none in Europe--famously lost to the English with their Armada and forever after.

The reasons for each are various. One linking difference might be that the English were more comfortable with outsourcing their military needs--including financing--to private sources than any of the other states mentioned.

My history books used to say that it was not the Anglo-Dutch wars (1656, 1666, 1672) that caused the decline of the Netherlands as a naval power (because the Dutch continued to spend money on their navy as long as the British posed a threat), but rather the peace and alliance after the Glorious Revolution (1688), which saw a Dutch prince ascend the throne of England. Feeling safe under the umbrella of a united Dutch-British fleet, the burghers, stingy as always, neglected the navy in favour of the pursuit of more money, making the country wealthy, but powerless (as became very clear in during the American war of independence when the British used Dutch support for the rebels as an excuse to crush the Dutch navy). Whatever, naval resources were left after that were efficiently destroyed during the French occupation of the Netherlands.