Thomas wrote:
Debra_Law wrote:When looking at a typical state statute that defines marriage, it cannot be denied that the state discriminates based on the gender of an individual's intended spouse. At one time, state statutes discriminated on the basis of the race of an individual's intended spouse-- and those state statutes were declared unconstitutional because they infringed on the fundamental right to marry.
You are implying, without actually making the case, that gender-based discrimination is as suspect in the eyes of the Supreme Court as race-based discrimination. According to Jay Feinman's
Law 101, that is not the case. Feinman, a liberal law professor at Rutgers, sums up the Supreme Court's gender discrimination jurisprudence as not involving one of the "suspect classes" of discrimination that requires a strict scrutiny test. According to him, the Supreme Court requires intermediate scrutiny -- meaning "intermediate" between "being narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest" and "having a rational relation to a legitimate state interest". Of course, Feinman also says that nothing in the constitution says it is supreme law, and you easily debunked that. I am prepared to be debunked again.
Thomas:
I merely pointed out that both gender discrimination and race discrimination result in the infringement of the
fundamental right to marry.
Gender is a quasi-suspect class. Race is a suspect class. Laws that discriminate based on gender are usually reviewed using an intermediate level of scrutiny. Laws that discriminate based on race are usually reviewed using strict scrutiny. But don't forget Constitutional Law 101: laws that infringe upon fundamental rights are also reviewed using strict scrutiny. Regardless of whether the discrimination is based on gender or race, the discrimination results in an infringement of the individual's
fundamental right to marry.
But for fun, look at manner in which the Massachusetts Supreme Court reviewed its state marriage laws. The state argued that the marriage laws neither discriminated on the basis of gender nor infringed upon a fundamental right; but the Court said the argument didn't matter because the state marriage laws could not even pass the most deferential rational basis test. State laws that prohibit same-sex couples from getting married are not rationally related to any possible legitimate state interest.
Debra_Law wrote:The Massachusetts Supreme Court considered this argument rejected it under the most deferential standard applied to state laws: the rational basis test.
Thomas wrote:The federal Supreme Court is not legally bound by the opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Court's as to whether the proscription of gay marriage fails the rational basis test. And as you said yourself in an earlier post, the federal constitution sets a floor as to how strictly a test is applied. This suggests that the federal Supreme Court, even if it agrees with the Massachusetts court's interpretation of the Massachusetts constitution, may well be less strict in the tests it requires -- and legitimately so. But the federal Supreme Court may well not agree with the reasoning of the Massachusetts Supreme Court. And for what it's worth, I don't either. I think the Massachusetts Supreme Court has been overbearing in its decision.
Thomas:
You appear to be laboring under some confusion with respect to tests the United States Supreme Court applies when reviewing the constitutionality of laws.
If the law targets a suspect class (race) or infringes upon a fundamental right (e.g., the right to marry), then the Court applies strict scrutiny: Does the state have a compelling interest, and if so, is the regulation necessary and narrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest?
The strict scrutiny test is the most difficult test for a statute to pass.
If the law targets a quasi-suspect class (gender or illegitimacy), then the court applies intermediate review: Does the state have an important interest, and if so, is the regulation substantially related to serve that important interest?
For all other laws, the Court applies the rational basis test: Does the state have a legitimate interest, and if so, is the regulation rationally related to serve that legitimate interest?
The rational basis test is the easiest test for a statute to pass. The rational basis test is the most deferential test that a court can apply to a state statute. Any regulation that can possibly be rationally related to some legitimate governmental interest will be upheld as constitutional. Only laws that are deemed arbitrary or capricious (having no rational basis) will be struck down as unconstitutional.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court based its decision on its own state constitution--not the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment is the FLOOR meaning the state may not interpret its own constitution to offer LESS protection than Fourteenth Amendment but it may interpret its own constitution to offer MORE protection. The Massachusetts Supreme Court decision -- even though it was applying its own constitution -- quoted extensively from United States Supreme Court cases as authority.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court used the rational basis test to declare its marriage laws unconstitutional. This is the most deferential test that can possibly be applied. Therefore, I don't understand your following statement:
"This suggests that the federal Supreme Court, even if it agrees with the Massachusetts court's interpretation of the Massachusetts constitution,
may well be less strict in the tests it requires -- and legitimately so."
There is no test "less strict" than the rational basis test. If a statute cannot pass the rational basis test -- it cannot possibly pass the stricter tests of intermediate review or strict scrutiny.
It is possible for the United States Supreme Court to apply a test that is MORE strict than the rational basis test, but it impossible for the Court to apply a test that is "less strict" than the rational basis test (because no such test exists). Understand?
And with that in mind, take another look at Lawrence v. Texas. The Court stated, "The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual."
It appears that the Supreme Court found that the Texas statute could not even pass a rational basis test. If the statute cannot pass the least strict, most deferential test that can be applied to a law -- then the Texas statute most certainly could not pass the strict scrutiny test. When a same-sex marriage case finally finds its way to the United States Supreme Court, the Court might follow the example of the Massachusetts Supreme Court and find the ban on same sex marriages furthers no legitimate state interest.
From now on, when considering tests that are applied during the course of judicial review of a statute, remember the following key phrases:
STRICT SCRUTINY (Strictest Test) (suspect classes & fundamental rights): Compelling Interest / necessary and narrowly tailored means.
INTERMEDIATE (quasi-suspect classes): Important Interest / substantially related means
RATIONAL BASIS (Not Strict at all test--just about any law will survive judicial review test): Legitimate Interest / rationally related means