fresco wrote:Joe,
the difference between "guess" and "predict" lies in their semantic associations...the first implying a laymens generalism, the second implying a paradigmatic history and a level of measurement above the nominal.
No, that's not the difference at all. A prediction is merely an informed guess: I can guess that there is at least one Ethiopian restaurant in London (based upon nothing more than the fact that there is at least one Ethiopian restaurant in Chicago); I can predict that there is at least one Ethiopian restaurant in London (based upon studying immigration patterns, social trends, population statistics, etc.). The difference, then, is not between general and specific (since both have the same level of generality), but of
confidence in the correctness of the guess/prediction.
More importantly, there can be no predicting (and no guessing) without knowing. I can no more guess at a fact than I can predict one if I have no basis for knowing what I am guessing or predicting. As such, any definition of "knowledge" that relies, in part, upon a notion of "predicting" is begging the question: one knows because one can predict, and one can predict because one knows. It's a definition that proves itself, and thus it is no definition at all.
fresco wrote:To equivocate is to ignore such normal semantic contexts. Saying that "knowledge" is concerned with "prediction" also encapsulates our cognitive urge to "control" and it is within such narrow confines that "explanation" is normally evaluated.* As aspiring philosophers we need to make such issues transparent and by doing so it may be that words like "delusion" cease to have general epistemological import. i.e. such "dog bites" may not need a physician...only a band-aid.
I don't know how you can strip "delusion" of any epistemological import and yet load "prediction" with so much epistemological baggage. Frankly, I see no epistemological difference between the two: if one can predict, based upon some sort of "knowledge," then one can also be deluded, based upon a mistake in some sort of "knowledge."
fresco wrote:*(NB At the most trivial level "Knowing" Henry VIII had six wives is "predicting" what you might find in a history book. It is also "controlling" within a hypothetical testing of knowledge situation)
This is a good example of why "prediction" is such a flawed basis for any kind of claim of knowledge. Predicting that the fact of Henry VIII's marriages will be found in a history book presupposes the knowledge of history books. The question, then, would be: how do you know
that? And if one's knowledge of history books is based upon a prediction, then one is quickly faced with an infinite regress of predictions.
In short, a prediction based upon no prior knowledge is not a prediction. It's not even a guess. It's a nothing. Predicting presupposes knowing. Consequently, predicting cannot be the basis of knowing.