Truth and Language

JLNobody wrote:

Tautologies are all "true" but trivially so.

"Tautologies are all true" is a tautology. :wink:

Nevertheless, some tautologies are profoundly true. The principle of identity (A=A) is a tautology, but it is not trivial.

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Joe, "Tautologies are all true" IS a tautology because it is true BY DEFINITION--as in all triangles are three sided. Three-sidedness (or three angled) is what mean by "triangle". "By definition" is what I meant by "trivial." A=A is a redundancy: a hyper-triviality. I see nothing profound in it.

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JLNobody wrote:

A=A is a redundancy: a hyper-triviality. I see nothing profound in it.

And what you find profound I view as merely banal. Chacun a son gout.

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Joe, when I read your assertion that "...some tautologies are profoundly true. The principle of identity (A=A) is a tautology, but it is not trivial." and "...what you find profound I view as merely banal."
I thought to myself, "Yes, it's a question of value judgement." And, of course, values are about us (about human ranking), not about the so-called objective world (a world that excludes us, hypothetically).

BYW, what do I find to be profoundly true? My assertions about the nature of the world and my relationship to it are not presented as "profound"; they are merely presented as "so."

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JLNobody wrote:

BYW, what do I find to be profoundly true? My assertions about the nature of the world and my relationship to it are not presented as "profound"; they are merely presented as so."

You find twyvel to be profound. What could be more banal than that?

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Picky.

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Re: Truth and Language

val wrote:

I am repeating myself, but I insist that we must consider the difference between the concept of Truth and the consideration of a true proposition.
I'ill give an example: to Aristotle, the sun moved around the earth. Today we believe that is the earth that moves around the sun.
In both cases, the concept of truth is similar. Truth, to Aristotle and to Newton was the adequation between a statement and verifiable facts. They both wanted to give a plausible explanation of the universe. Aristotle was wrong not because of his conception of truth but because his explanation was not adequate to verifiable facts. So his geocentric theory was not true. But that had nothing to do with his notion of truth.

So you're saying that I could be wrong about something even if my notion of truth is right on? I agree. Also, I think that Aristotle's correspondence notion of truth is true because it corresponds. It accounts for itself and for the rest of reality as we know it (truth is that which corresponds to what is really there). While we are on the correspondence page, how have you arrived at a system of ethics which corresponds to your view of reality? Perhaps I should clarify what I mean because the issue of ethics has led to misunderstanding between theists and atheists in the past.
First, I propose the question of morals because the biblical view clearly is that everyone is fallen or "bad" enough to be separated from God. The question to you is, how do you as an atheist decide what is right and what is wrong.
Second, by asking you about ethics, I do not assume you have no ethics. Of course pretty much everyone does. But I think, as philosophers, we need to explain why people everywhere seem to think ethics are so important, especially when bad behavior is so often rewarding. And, once that goal is met, we need to explain why people do not, in fact, behave "good" all the time. Why do we choose evil over good? So that is my reasoning behing the question. Comments?

Baffman

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Truth and Language
Yello everyone

I was wondering if anyone on this page is familliar with the classical philosophical arguments for the existence of God. I'm talking about the moral, ontological, teleological, and especially the cosmological argument. What did you think about any of these? Personally, I have found that the cosmological is the foundation, the root of the tree and that the other three are, primarily, the branches. The cosmological argument basically, proposes an answer to Jean Paul Sartre's challenge. He said that every philosophy must give an answer to the question, why is something there rather than nothing? And I think that, by "something" he meant the whole of the universe. The Cosmological argument proposes an uncaused cause to the universe. That is, God who has always existed, made the universe and everything else.
Obviously, there are people who believe the universe explains itself completely and I'm sure there are some on this web page. I was reading a book called, "Does God Exist?" which transcribes a debate on that very topic that took place in the late 1980s at the University of Mississippi between a Christian J.P. Moreland and an atheist Kai Nielson. J.P. Moreland began with something called an "infinite series" and moved, eventually to the existence of God. Both sides were very learned, published thinkers. Has anyone read that book?

Baffman

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Baffman, the question of God's existence rests on assumptions that I do not find reasonable. I see the issue as a totally artificial product of human thinking. It is not a problem with which we are confronted empirically; it is an artificial problem created and maintained by people with "religious" interests. Is that clear? Can you understand the perspective of someone who asks "what's the problem?" ?

Similarly, to say that people sometimes choose evil over good, is simply a religious way of asking why the values of people sometime differ or why do people sometimes make choices that reflect their INTERESTS rather than their VALUES.

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JLNobody wrote:

Baffman, the question of God's existence rests on assumptions that I do not find reasonable....

Something does not compute in this sentence.

There are (at least) two possible things you are trying to say here, JL...and it really is not clear to me which of the two, if either, it is.

You may be saying the existence of some particular god (for instance, the god of the Bible)...or notion of Godness (once again, for instance, the notion behind the god of the Bible)...rests on assumptions you do not find reasonable...

...or...

...you may be saying that the notion of gods, in general, rests on assumption you do not find reasonable...which is essentially saying that you do not find it reasonable to consider the possibility of hgher beingness as a component of REALITY.

(On a personal note...if the former is your intention...I certainly agree with you. If the latter...I disagree.)

Which is it...or is there some third choice I've not noticed?

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Frank, good for you for jumping on my ambiguity. I was alluding to the general tenor of the question of God's existence. I have no idea what the subject of the question is like. What in the world could one mean by a God? And what kind of phenomena could point to its existence? All "proofs" for the existence of God have been, as far as I know, logical ones. This points to the darker side of logic; it can be applied to unrealities. If someone has a "mystical" experience in which he intuits something very significant, but generally unnoticed, in human experience, we have a kind of "empirical"--in the generic sense of "experiential"--basis for the mystic's assertion. But this basis is private rather than public in nature. This is central to the nature of mystical insight. Because of its private and essentially ineffable nature it cannot be objectively proven. We cannot accuse a mystic of not having his perspective or insight. We can only say that it seems unreasonable because it contrasts with our perspective. But the question of the "existence" of God refers to something, to some kind of object, in external reality. This, it seems to me, calls for objective or public evidence, and I cannot imagine what could count for such an evidence.

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JLNobody wrote:

Frank, good for you for jumping on my ambiguity. I was alluding to the general tenor of the question of God's existence. I have no idea what the subject of the question is like. What in the world could one mean by a God? And what kind of phenomena could point to its existence? All "proofs" for the existence of God have been, as far as I know, logical ones. This points to the darker side of logic; it can be applied to unrealities. If someone has a "mystical" experience in which he intuits something very significant, but generally unnoticed, in human experience, we have a kind of "empirical"--in the generic sense of "experiential"--basis for the mystic's assertion. But this basis is private rather than public in nature. This is central to the nature of mystical insight. Because of its private and essentially ineffable nature it cannot be objectively proven. We cannot accuse a mystic of not having his perspective or insight. We can only say that it seems unreasonable because it contrasts with our perspective. But the question of the "existence" of God refers to something, to some kind of object, in external reality. This, it seems to me, calls for objective or public evidence, and I cannot imagine what could count for such an evidence.

Neither do I.

But I go one step further and mention that I also cannot imagine what could count for such evidence that there are no gods.

In order to assert one way or the other on the question: What is the nature of REALITY...one must know what the REALITY is.

Short of KNOWING the nature of REALITY...to assert definitively that "x" exists as a part of REALITY or that "x" does not exist as a part of REALITY...is gratuitous and presumptuous.

As regards REALITY...the only logical, ethical course for me is agnosticism.

I understand that intelligent individuals can strongly disagree with me...and I respect that. But I truly don't understand it.

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Frank, you stated that:
"In order to assert one way or the other on the question: What is the nature of REALITY...one must know what the REALITY is."

I thought the topic was the existence of God, not the nature of Reality. I thought you already decided that reality is "whatever is the case" (something like that).

You also stated that "... I go one step further and mention that I also cannot imagine what could count for such evidence that there are no gods." I'll take it another step further and claim that I cannot imagine what could count for evidence that are no transendental cosmic pimples in Reality.

Smile

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JLNobody wrote:

Frank, you stated that:
"In order to assert one way or the other on the question: What is the nature of REALITY...one must know what the REALITY is."

I thought the topic was the existence of God, not the nature of Reality.

A mistake on your part...an understandable mistake.

If one is answering the question "Is there a God?"...one is actually commenting upon the question: "What is the nature of REALITY?"

To assert "there is a God" or "there are no gods" is to assert something about the nature of REALITY.

Quote:

I thought you already decided that reality is "whatever is the case" (something like that).

Yes...whatever IS....IS.

But I do not know that that IS...IS.

I have no idea, for instance, of what the Ultimate REALITY is with regard to whether or not there are gods or a god.

I do not know what the nature of Ultimate REALITY is.

Quote:

You also stated that "... I go one step further and mention that I also cannot imagine what could count for such evidence that there are no gods." I'll take it another step further and claim that I cannot imagine what could count for evidence that are no transendental cosmic pimples in Reality.

And that is an excellent reason not to assert definitely that there are no transendental cosmic pimples in REALITY.

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Frank, you state that"
"If one is answering the question "Is there a God?"...one is actually commenting upon the question: 'What is the nature of REALITY?' "
[and]
"To assert "there is a God" or "there are no gods" is to assert something about the nature of REALITY."

But that is a trivial perspective: To say anything about anything is to talk about reality. Beyond assuming it and affirming its "existence", Reality itself is beyond verbal-conceptual analysis.

You say that my inability to imagine what could count for evidence for or against the existence of transcendental Cosmic Pimples, should make me agnostic regarding that ridiculous non-phenomena. Are you serious?

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JLNobody wrote:

Frank, you state that"
"If one is answering the question "Is there a God?"...one is actually commenting upon the question: 'What is the nature of REALITY?' "
[and]
"To assert "there is a God" or "there are no gods" is to assert something about the nature of REALITY."

But that is a trivial perspective:

No it isn't!

Quote:

To say anything about anything is to talk about reality. Beyond assuming it and affirming its "existence", Reality itself is beyond verbal-conceptual analysis.

Okay...but so what?

If you make specific assertions regarding whether or not there is a God as part of REALITY...either you KNOW what the reality is...or you are guessing.

Quote:

You say that my inability to imagine what could count for evidence for or against the existence of transcendental Cosmic Pimples, should make me agnostic regarding that ridiculous non-phenomena. Are you serious?

I'm as serious as a heart attack!

And in any case, at least as serious as you were in proposing the comment.

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JLNobody wrote:

Baffman, the question of God's existence rests on assumptions that I do not find reasonable. I see the issue as a totally artificial product of human thinking. It is not a problem with which we are confronted empirically; it is an artificial problem created and maintained by people with "religious" interests. Is that clear? Can you understand the perspective of someone who asks "what's the problem?" ?

Similarly, to say that people sometimes choose evil over good, is simply a religious way of asking why the values of people sometime differ or why do people sometimes make choices that reflect their INTERESTS rather than their VALUES.

Do you think, then, that Sarte's question "Why is something there rather than nothing" is unnecessary? I really think it is a good question that everyone, especially people who consider themselves good thinkers, should ask. I completely disagree that the issue "is not a problem with which we are confronted empirically," as you say because empirical evidence implies that something is there to stimulate the senses. Why is it there? is a very good question as I see it. Jean Paul Sartre, by the way, was an atheist in general and an existentialist in particular. I find it strange that you would disagree with him on something he saw so basic. Would you frame his question differently?

Baffman

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Frank, such responses from you as "No it isnt! and "Okay but so what?"
You may be as serious as a heart attack, but your responses are equally constructive and intersting.

Baffman, your question is constructively provocative. I'll address it shortly.

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JLNobody wrote:

Frank, such responses from you as "No it isnt! and "Okay but so what?"
You may be as serious as a heart attack, but your responses are equally constructive and intersting.

Huh???

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Baffman to JLN: "Do you think, then, that Sarte's question "Why is something there rather than nothing" is unnecessary? I really think it is a good question that everyone, especially people who consider themselves good thinkers, should ask. I completely disagree that the issue "is not a problem with which we are confronted empirically," as you say because empirical evidence implies that something is there to stimulate the senses. Why is it there? is a very good question as I see it. Jean Paul Sartre, by the way, was an atheist in general and an existentialist in particular. I find it strange that you would disagree with him on something he saw so basic. Would you frame his question differently? "

JLN's response to Baffman: The question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" reflects a dualistic perspective I do not share. To me, there is no objective or absolute difference between something and nothing, there is only the subjective distinction between the plus and minus conception. In reality, as I see it, the idea of a fixed and pure nothingness is ontologically groundless. "Nothingness" is an aspect of "somethingness", and this applies equally to a fixed and pure somethingness: all "things" (somethings) are in process, such that they are both coming into and out of existence simultaneously and continually--as I suggested elsewhere. The Sartrian question reflects his mentality, but, as far as I can tell, it opens no doors to the reality I experience.

-edited

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