Re: ...
BlackWatch wrote:Be glad that there was never any plan or means to cross the Channel.
//BW
Oh, there was a plan, Operation Sealion, which called for some 160,000 troops to assault beaches and sieze ports over a 45-mile stretch of Southeast England. A cadre occupation government had been worked out, and some attention had been paid to the matter of locating and transporting back to Germany certain specific British Treasures. Operational planning was carried to the point of designating which units were to be involved, under what command structure, the assault targets, the sequence of steps required to facillitate the invasion, and even the designation of certain existing French medical facilities as primary receipt points for anticipated invasion casualties.
A number of things kept the plan from implementation. First, Germany did not possess the means to mount a Cross-Channel amphibious assault; at the very least, several thousand landing craft would have been required, landing craft for troops and equipment, and simply were not available, nor produceable in any timely manner. Even Hitler acknowledged the notion of using civilian canal barges, the only readily available alternative, was wholly impracticable. Secondly, German airpower and surface maritime combat capability were wholly inadequate to the task of defending a massed invasion fleet from the quite capable, and very present, British Home Fleet and the land based, also very present, RAF, in the first instance, let alone doing so while simultaneously providing naval and air support to an amphibious assault. Third, and perhaps most importantly, Hitler remained convinced The British would at the very least accept terms amounting to withdrawal from the war, thereby allowing Germany a free hand in continental Europe.
Incidentally, Sealion plans resulted in the confiscation of a huge proportion of French, Dutch, and Belgian canal barges, most of which remained idle under military control (though perhaps neglect might be a better word) throughout the remainder of the war, much to the detriment of Germany's war materiel transport capability.
There indeed was a plan ... there were not the means, and such was acknowledged; a year later, a plan without means was implemented, despite vigorous counteradvice, spelling inevitably The Third Reich's doom at the hands of The Soviet Union.