@fresco,
Cheers Fresco.
I've never read The Critique of Pure Reason, but I am vaguely aware of some of Kant's idea regarding the relationship of our minds to reality, and I've read nothing of Rorty.
My post was mainly motivated by some of what I've been reading regarding the philosophy of social science. From what I've read, and through some academic experience in psychology, the social sciences seem to more or less ignore the fundamental assumptions they make regarding their approach to science. There is sometimes a tendency to fail to recognise when data from a particular study has been interpreted in a particular way.
For example, study on the automaticity of behaviour concluded that most behaviour can be understood as being "driven" involuntarily by the environment, which automatically trigger cognitive representations. It was pointed out however that the presumed "environment-perception-behaviour" sequence was based on an empiricist view of the mind, whereas the data could have equally well been interpreted on the basis that the mind in fact plays a prior and perhaps more fundamental role in automaticity than environmental cues, by shaping our perceptions and forming representations even as perception occurs.
From this example it seems to me that there is always, perhaps especially so in the social sciences, the issue of the constraints of perspectives which limit what can be said to be known about reality. The best we can seem to do therefore, is acknowledge our assumptions and the role they play in interpreting data.