Satt, according to the one of the links you posted, Anselm said that the possibility of God's existence implies the necessity of God's existence.
The argument makes no sense. Am I missing something?
From the article on Gödel's ontological argument:
Quote:Gödel suggested that a property could be said to be positive in a moral-aesthetic sense or in a sense of pure attribution.
From previous discussions, I doubt that a consensus could ever be reached on positive properties. How can we determine whether a being is god-like if no one can define the necessary attributes?
Quote:I cannot help but feel that the idea of Axiom G2 in Gödel's proof owes something to Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716), with his idea that God, conceived of as the greatest good, has created the best of all possible worlds. Axiom G2 is not quite as radical as this. It does not deny the existence of evil, but only asserts that it can never be entailed by pure goodness. Thus Axiom G2 is far from a trivial observation. If God, whose essence is "independent of the accidental structure of the world", can have created a world of good and evil, then the evil of this world can only be accidental and never necessary. To say otherwise would contradict Axiom G2.
We can imagine a best possible world such that a better possible world cannot be imagined. But it would be even better if it existed in reality. Therefore the best possible world that we can imagine must necessarily exist.
But the only world that we know exists is NOT the best of all possible worlds we can imagine. God could easily have done better. So if God made a less-than-perfect world with unnecessary pain and suffering, then God must not be perfectly good.
Quote:An individual x will be said to be God-like, that is, Gx will be said to be true, if every essential property of x is positive and if x has every positive property as an essential property.
Why should a god have only positive properties? What prevents a god from having negative and/or evil properties?
Quote:Our final conclusion is that necessarily a God-like individual exists.
Proof: If Gx were true, then by Definition G1, x has every positive property necesarily. But Axiom G4 tells us that necessary existence is a positive property. So it follows that NE(x) is true, i.e., that x would exist necessarily. But by Theorem G2, if Gx were true, then G Ess x would be true. Using Definition G3 we deduce that if any individual x is God-like, then the property of being God-like is necessarily exemplified.
A conclusion based on dubious premises is not proof of God's existence, no matter how impressive the logic.