9/11 report says 2001 terror warnings peaked in July

JURIST EXCLUSIVE ~ 9/11 report says 2001 terror warnings peaked in July; Ashcroft said not to have wanted threat info



A 9/11 Commission staff report not yet officially released by the Commission on it's website but obtained in advance by JURIST's Paper Chase documents the surge in threat reports received by the American intelligence community and shared with policymakers, including President Bush, prior to the September 11 attacks. Key excerpts follow:

In spring 2001, the level of reporting on terrorist threats and planned attacks began to increase dramatically, representing the most significant spike in activity since the Millennium. At the end of March the Intelligence Community disseminated a Terrorist Threat Advisory, indicating there was a heightened threat of Sunni extremist terrorist attacks against U.S. facilities, personnel, and other interests in the coming weeks. In April and May 2001 the drumbeat of reporting increased. Articles presented to top officials contained headlines such as: "Bin Ladin planning multiple operations." "Bin Ladin public profile may presage attack." "Bin Ladin network's plans advancing." By late May there were reports of a hostage plot against Americans to force the release of prisoners, including Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the "Blind Sheikh," who was serving a life sentence for his role in the 1993 plot to blow up sites in New York City. The reporting noted that the operatives may opt to hijack an aircraft or storm a U.S. embassy. The reporting also mentioned that Abu Zubaydah was planning an attack and expected to carry out more if things went well. The U.S. government redoubled efforts, ongoing since late 1999, to capture Abu Zubaydah. National Counterterrorism Coordinator Clarke also called National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice?s attention to possible plots in Yemen and Italy, and by an alleged cell in Canada that might be planning an attack against the United States.

Reports similar to these were made available to President Bush in morning meetings with DCI Tenet, usually attended by Vice President Cheney and National Security Adviser Rice as well. None of these reports mentioned that the attacks might occur in the United States. At the end of May, Counterterrorist Center (CTC) Chief Cofer Black told Rice that the current threat level was a "7" on a scale of 10, as compared to an "8" during the Millennium.

The threat reports surged again in June and July, reaching an even higher peak of urgency. A Terrorist Threat Advisory in late June indicated that there was a high probability of near-term "spectacular" terrorist attacks resulting in numerous casualties. Headlines from intelligence reports were stark: "Bin Ladin threats are real." "Bin Ladin planning high profile attacks." The intelligence reporting consistently described the upcoming attacks as occurring on a catastrophic level, indicating that they would cause the world to be in turmoil, consisting of possible multiple "but not necessarily simultaneous" attacks. A late June report stated that Bin Ladin operatives expect near-term attacks to have dramatic consequences of catastrophic proportion.

Rice told us Clarke and his Counterterrorism and Security Group (CSG) were "the nerve center" in coordinating responses but that principals were also involved. In addition to his daily meetings with President Bush, and weekly meetings to go over other issues with National Security Adviser Rice, Tenet continued his regular meetings with Secretary Powell and Secretary Rumsfeld. The foreign policy principals talked on the phone every day on a variety of subjects, including the threat. The summer threats seemed to be focused on Saudi Arabia, Israel, Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen, and possibly Rome, but the danger could be anywhere - including a possible attack on the G-8 summit in Genoa, where air defense measures were taken. Disruption operations were launched involving twenty countries. Several terrorist operatives were detained by foreign governments, possibly disrupting operations in the Gulf and Italy and perhaps averting attacks against two or three U.S. embassies. U.S. armed forces in at least six countries were placed on higher alert. Units of the Fifth Fleet were redeployed. Embassies were alerted. Vice President Cheney contacted Crown Prince Abdullah to get more Saudi help. DCI Tenet phoned or met with approximately twenty top security officials from other countries. Deputy National Security Adviser Hadley apparently called European counterparts. Clarke worked with senior officials in the Gulf.

At Rice's request, on July 5 the CIA briefed Attorney General John Ashcroft on the al Qaeda threat, warning that a significant terrorist attack was imminent, and a strike could occur at anytime. That same day, officials from domestic agencies, including the FAA, met with Clarke to discuss the current threat. Rice worked directly with Tenet on security issues for the G-8 summit. In addition to the individual reports, on July 11 top officials received a summary recapitulating the mass of al Qaeda-related threat reporting on several continents. Tenet told us that in his world "the system was blinking red," and by late July it could not have been any worse. Tenet told us he felt that President Bush and other officials grasped the urgency of what they were being told.

On July 27 Clarke informed Rice and Hadley that the spike in signals intelligence about a nearterm attack had stopped. He urged keeping readiness high during the August vacation period, warning that another report suggested an attack had just been postponed for a few months. On August 3 the Intelligence Community issued a Threat Advisory warning that the threat of impending al Qaeda attacks would likely continue indefinitely. The advisory cited threats in the Arabian Peninsula, Jordan, Israel, and Europe, and suggested that al Qaeda was lying in wait and searching for gaps in security before moving forward with the planned attacks.

During the spring and summer of 2001, President Bush had occasionally asked his briefers whether any of the threats pointed to the United States. Reflecting on these questions, the CIA decided to write a briefing article summarizing its understanding of this danger. The article, which the President received on August 6, is attached to this staff statement.

Despite the large number of threats received, there were no specifics regarding time, place, method, or target. Disruption efforts continued. An al Qaeda associate from North Africa, connected to Abu Zubaydah, was arrested in the United Arab Emirates on August 13. He had apparently been planning an attack against the U.S. Embassy in Paris.

CIA analysts who have recently reviewed the threat surge of the summer of 2001 told us they believe it may have been related to a separate stream of events. These threats may have been referring to the 9/11 attack, the planned assassination of Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud, or other operations.

In July 2001, the CSG alerted federal law enforcement agencies and asked the FAA to send out security advisories. Beginning on July 27 the FAA issued several security directives to U.S. air carriers prior to September 11. In addition, the FAA issued a number of general warnings about potential threats, primarily overseas, to civil aviation. None of these warnings required the implementation of additional aviation security measures. They urged air carriers to be alert.

Although there was no credible evidence of an attack in the United States, Clarke told us, the CSG arranged for the CIA to brief senior intelligence and security officials from the domestic agencies. The head of counterterrorism at the FBI, Dale Watson, said he had many discussions about possible attacks with Cofer Black at the CIA. They had expected an attack on July 4. Watson said he felt deeply that something was going to happen. But he told us the threat information was "nebulous." He wished he had known more. He wished he had had "500 analysts looking at Usama Bin Ladin threat information instead of two."

Rice and Hadley told us that, before 9/11, they did not feel they had the job of handling domestic security. They felt that Clarke and the CSG were the NSC's bridge between foreign and domestic threats.

In late August, working-level CIA and FBI officials realized that one or more al Qaeda operatives might be in the United States. We have found no evidence that this discovery was ever briefed to the CSG, to principals, or to senior counterterrorism officials at the FBI or the CIA. Nor was the White House told about the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui.

The 9/11 staff report also discusses threat awareness by the FBI and recounts a summer 2001 conversation between Acting FBI Director Thomas Pickard and Attorney General Ashcroft in which Pickard said Ashcroft told him he did not want to hear the threat information anymore:

On April 13 FBI Headquarters alerted field offices to a heightened threat from al Qaeda against U.S. interests. The communication detailed the threats against U.S. interests abroad, but made no mention of any possible threat inside the United States. The field offices were asked to "task all resources to include electronic databases and human sources for any information pertaining to the current operational activities relating to Sunni extremism."

On July 2 the FBI Counterterrorism Division sent a message to federal agencies and state and local law enforcement agencies that summarized information regarding threats against U.S. interests from Bin Ladin. The message reported that there was an increased volume of threat reporting indicating a potential for attacks against U.S. targets abroad from groups "aligned with or sympathetic to Usama bin Ladin." It further stated, "[t]he FBI has no information indicating a credible threat of terrorist attack in the United States." However, it went on to emphasize that the possibility of attack in the United States could not be discounted. It also noted that the July 4
holiday might heighten the threats. The report asked the recipients to "exercise vigilance" and "report suspicious activities" to the FBI.

Acting FBI Director Thomas Pickard...said in late June and through July he met with Attorney General Ashcroft once a week. He told us that although he initially briefed the Attorney General regarding these threats, after two such briefings the Attorney General told him he did not want to hear this information anymore. The Justice Department has informed us that Attorney General Ashcroft, his former deputy, and his chief of staff deny that the Attorney General made any such statement to Pickard.

Ashcroft told us that he asked Pickard whether there was intelligence about attacks in the United States. Pickard said he replied that he could not assure Ashcroft that there would be no attacks in the United States, although the reports of threats were related to overseas targets. Ashcroft said he therefore assumed that the FBI was doing what it needed to do. He acknowledged that, in retrospect, this was a dangerous assumption.

Prior to 9/11 neither Ashcroft nor his predecessors received a copy of the President's Daily Brief. After 9/11 Ashcroft began to receive portions of the brief that relate to ccounterterrorism.

The full staff report as pdf-file HERE