Is free-will an illusion?

I have no trouble changing my mind as soon as I see an explanation which is convincing enough.

It's not a dogma since it's falsifiable. All it would take to falsify Darwinism is...

Quote:

I have no trouble changing my mind as soon as I see an explanation which is convincing enough.

Assuming this is true, and assuming I could influence you by presenting a convincing (to you) explanation, then would whatever "influence" I have exerted be a "mechanical" one.

And would your action of "changing your mind" be a random one?

Neo-darwinism may need a face-lift but I would be very surprised if that would change the general sense we have of darwinian evolution.

I well remember how the synthetic theory beguiled me with its unifying power when I was a graduate student in the mid-1960’s. Since then I have been watching it slowly unravel as a universal description of evolution. The molecular assault came first, followed quickly by renewed attention to unorthodox theories of speciation and by challenges at the level of macroevolution itself. I have been reluctant to admit it — since beguiling is often forever — but if Mayr’s characterization of the synthetic theory is accurate, then that theory, as a general proposition, is effectively dead, despite its persistence as textbook orthodoxy.

If it is not random nor deterministic it is what ? Care to elaborate ?

History [of free will]. Early in history it seems to have generally been assumed that everything about humans must ultimately be determined by unchangeable fate - which it was sometimes thought could be foretold by astrology or other forms of divination. Most Greek philosophers seem to have believed that their various mechanical or moral theories implied rigid determination of human actions. But especially with the advent of the Christian religion the notion that humans can at some level make free choices - particularly about whether to do good or not - emerged as a foundational idea. (The idea had also arisen in Persian and Hebrew religions and legal systems, and was supported by Roman lawyers such as Cicero.) How this could be consistent with God having infinite power was not clear, although around 420 AD Augustine suggested that while God might have infinite knowledge of the future we as humans could not - yielding what can be viewed as a very rough analog of my explanation for free will. In the 1500s some early Protestants made theological arguments against free will - and indeed issues of free will remain a feature of controversy between Christian denominations even today.

"Some joys, it's true, are wrong in Heaven's eyes;
Yet Heaven's not averse to compromise;
There is a science, lately formulated,
Whereby one's conscience may be liberated,
And any wrongful act you care to mention
May be redeemed by purity of intention." (4.5.13)

Synthese
July 2014, Volume 191, Issue 10, pp 2215-2238

First online: 17 January 2014


Willusionism, epiphenomenalism, and the feeling of conscious will
Sven Walter

Abstract

While epiphenomenalism—i.e., the claim that the mental is a causally otiose byproduct of physical processes that does not itself cause anything—is hardly ever mentioned in philosophical discussions of free will, it has recently come to play a crucial role in the scientific attack on free will led by neuroscientists and psychologists. This paper is concerned with the connection between epiphenomenalism and the claim that free will is an illusion, in particular with the connection between epiphenomenalism and willusionism, i.e., with the thesis that there is empirical evidence for a thoroughgoing skepticism with regard to free will that is based on the claim that mental states are epiphenomena. The paper discusses four arguments for willusionism that in some form or other appeal to epiphenomenalism and argues that three of them can be discarded relatively easily. The fourth one, based on Daniel Wegner’s theory of apparent mental causation and his claim that free will is an illusion because the feeling of conscious will is epiphenomenal with regard to the corresponding voluntary actions, is dealt with in more detail. The overall verdict is negative: there is no empirical evidence for any kind of epiphenomenalism that would warrant the claim that free will is an illusion. Whatever it is that makes free will the object of contention between neuroscience and philosophy, epiphenomenalism provides no reason to think that free will is an illusion.