Lightwizard wrote:You're attributing perfection to a document the authors did not consider perfect.
No, I'm simply attributing to it the WEIGHT OF LAW, which is precisely what the authors intended. Those authors were clear about their intent. They EXPLICITLY denounce the notion that they intended to give broad powers through the "general welfare" (
Federalist 41) and "necessary and proper" (
Federalist 33) clauses. To argue otherwise is to stand in opposition to the express intent of the framers, not hand-in-hand with it. This isn't grey area stuff; Hamilton and Madison each wrote, in response to states that feared the newly proposed Constitution gave such broad powers and was open to the kind of "interpretation" you claim, that no such broad interpretation of the government's powers was intended.
Here are the salient sections from the above citations:
Hamilton in Federalist 33:
Quote:The last clause of the eighth section of the first article of the plan under consideration authorizes the national legislature "to make all laws which shall be NECESSARY and PROPER for carrying into execution THE POWERS by that Constitution vested in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof''...
This simple train of inquiry furnishes us at once with a test by which to judge of the true nature of the clause complained of. It conducts us to this palpable truth, that a power to lay and collect taxes must be a power to pass all laws NECESSARY and PROPER for the execution of that power; and what does the unfortunate and culumniated provision in question do more than declare the same truth, to wit, that the national legislature, to whom the power of laying and collecting taxes had been previously given, might, in the execution of that power, pass all laws NECESSARY and PROPER to carry it into effect? I have applied these observations thus particularly to the power of taxation, because it is the immediate subject under consideration, and because it is the most important of the authorities proposed to be conferred upon the Union. But the same process will lead to the same result, in relation to all other powers declared in the Constitution. And it is EXPRESSLY to execute these powers that the sweeping clause, as it has been affectedly called, authorizes the national legislature to pass all NECESSARY and PROPER laws. If there is any thing exceptionable, it must be sought for in the specific powers upon which this general declaration is predicated.
Here, Hamilton is putting to rest the states' fears that the "necessary and proper" clause is a catch-all. Hamilton strongly decries this notion, stating emphatically that the clause refers specifically and only to a power to pass any laws necessary and proper to carrying out the powers specifically granted the government by the Constitution. Period.
Madison in Federalist 41:
Quote:Some, who have not denied the necessity of the power of taxation, have grounded a very fierce attack against the Constitution, on the language in which it is defined. It has been urged and echoed, that the power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States,'' amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to be necessary for the common defense or general welfare." No stronger proof could be given of the distress under which these writers labor for objections, than their stooping to such a misconstruction. Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers of the Congress been found in the Constitution, than the general expressions just cited, the authors of the objection might have had some color for it; though it would have been difficult to find a reason for so awkward a form of describing an authority to legislate in all possible cases.
...
But what color can the objection have, when a specification of the objects alluded to by these general terms immediately follows, and is not even separated by a longer pause than a semicolon? If the different parts of the same instrument ought to be so expounded, as to give meaning to every part which will bear it, shall one part of the same sentence be excluded altogether from a share in the meaning; and shall the more doubtful and indefinite terms be retained in their full extent, and the clear and precise expressions be denied any signification whatsoever? For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general power? Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use a general phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars.
Madison could not more clearly or eloquently quash the notion that the general welfare clause allows government the flexibility to take on powers not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution. To think otherwise is either to be ignorant of the facts of what Madison intended, or to simply care more for one's own personal opinion of how our federal government should work than one cares what form the Constitution allows that government to take.
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So you see, the primary difference between my view of the Constitution and yours, is that mine is derived directly from what the framers tell us they meant, whereas yours is derived from what others have told you the Constitution means or from your own personal desires related thereto.