@Robert Gentel,
Robert Gentel wrote: What I'd like to express is that what I'd most like to maximize is happiness (and thusly minimize suffering) and I wonder if there is a point at which economic productivity might be maximized while not maximizing happiness and minimizing suffering.
Well, there are areas of the law that profoundly affect people's happiness, but are hard to assess in terms of economic efficiency. Marriages come to mind. I can't vouch for those. But in areas like tax law, areas that are explicitly about economics, I don't see any happiness-maximizing policy that doesn't come down to some compromise between productivity and equality.
Robert Gentel wrote: I'd like to clarify if you consider things such as sentimental value or purely economic value.
Sentimental value is value.
Robert Gentel wrote:I am finding that my "maximizing happiness" criterion is perhaps too simplistic because I am not willing to compromise individualism to collectivism too much (perhaps because of how deeply I cherish being able to be individualistic).
Or in other words, being bossed around by meddlesome legislators makes you unhappy. Many if not most people feel this way. This means to me that it's wrong for legislators to boss people around, other things being equal.
Robert Gentel wrote:I think the last line is the main qualifier for what I'm asking. Maybe this is a good question: if there were a society that had a social contract wherein any property that is not being utilized maximally can be used by those who can demonstrably show they are better able to use it.
Does that run into your libertarian streak at all? It positively rubs mine the wrong way.
That's what our social contract does with the
eminent-domain power of the state. I'm philosophically fine with that. (Practically, I think "just compensation" should be something more than market value: The fact that the condemnees haven't sold at market value proves that the property is worth more to them.)
Robert Gentel wrote:I was very unclear, what I meant was if there is any kind of property redistribution other than the most obvious ones (such as violent robbery) that you disapprove of I would love to know what basis you do that on.
Actually, robbery is a good starting point because it nicely illustrates the underlying principle. Robbery brings about property redistribution, which is a wash between the thief and the victim. But in addition, the thief invests time and effort into the robbery. This is what makes robbery a loss to society in general, and that's why I as a utilitarian morally disapprove of it.
Robert Gentel wrote: Would you approve, for example, of a society in which someone who demonstrates a greater ability to utilize my watch would be able to successfully prosecute a claim for it, for example?
Same principle. Proving that your watch is more useful in my hands than in yours costs even more effort than stealing it outright. Therefore I disapprove of it even more than I disapprove of theft. Besides, proving my case to our city's property-redistribution board would cost so many man-hours that even just from my own point of view, I might as well just buy the watch. But if we're talking about big chunks of property---like your hacienda in Costa Rica. Now the property value is much bigger than the cost of the property-redistribution process. Now if I prove to Costa Rica's government that your land has greater social value with my railroad rather than your hacienda on it, we're back to the case of eminent domain. And as I said, I approve of that.