6
   

philosophy of science

 
 
talk72000
 
  1  
Reply Thu 15 Jul, 2010 02:00 pm
@kennethamy,
It is ame with any theory. If it has errors it cannot be true. If it is correctable then it can run on its own. However, even a partially correct can be useful i.e. Newtonian Mechanics works very well with engineering - only in the region of subatomic particles does it fail.
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Thu 15 Jul, 2010 02:05 pm
@talk72000,
talk72000 wrote:

It is ame with any theory. If it has errors it cannot be true. If it is correctable then it can run on its own. However, even a partially correct can be useful i.e. Newtonian Mechanics works very well with engineering - only in the region of subatomic particles does it fail.


Sure. In that way, a theory is a kind of tool. And like a tool, you have to know under what conditions it is useful. But a theory is useful only to the extent that it is true.
talk72000
 
  1  
Reply Thu 15 Jul, 2010 02:22 pm
@kennethamy,
You are right in saying theories are tools but you must understand the tool to use it properly. There have been many accidents from people using the tools incorrectly. A good example was Eugenics by Sir Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin. DNA had not been discovered but it influenced Nietzche 'ubermensch' in 'Thus spoke Zarathustra' and Hitler 'Aryan superiority' in 'Mein Kampf'. It lead to Nazi philosophy. Its improper use led to atrocities.
0 Replies
 
GoshisDead
 
  0  
Reply Thu 15 Jul, 2010 04:32 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

wandeljw wrote:

Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery was first published in 1935.

In a 1963 essay, Popper summarized his ideas on falsifiability:
Quote:

1. It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory — if we look for confirmations.
2. Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions; that is to say, if, unenlightened by the theory in question, we should have expected an event which was incompatible with the theory — an event which would have refuted the theory.
3. Every "good" scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen. The more a theory forbids, the better it is.
4. A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice.
5. Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it. Testability is falsifiability; but there are degrees of testability: some theories are more testable, more exposed to refutation, than others; they take, as it were, greater risks.
6. Confirming evidence should not count except when it is the result of a genuine test of the theory; and this means that it can be presented as a serious but unsuccessful attempt to falsify the theory. (I now speak in such cases of "corroborating evidence.")
7. Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by their admirers — for example by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or by reinterpreting the theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation. Such a procedure is always possible, but it rescues the theory from refutation only at the price of destroying, or at least lowering, its scientific status. (I later described such a rescuing operation as a "conventionalist twist" or a "conventionalist stratagem.")


Popper added that the riskier the theory (the more exposed to refutation) -- the more interesting the theory will be.


Who cares whether a theory is interesting if it is false? What is so wonderful about a risky and false theory. What seems to me important about a theory is that it is true, not whether it is interesting. Interesting, but false does not seem to me to be an recommendation for adopting a theory. Does it to you? Truth is more important than being interesting. By a long shot.


If a theory is not interesting no one will follow it through to the end. Interest is of primary importance to all hypotheses and theories otherwise they escape notice completely. Behavior and motive cannot be distilled to simplistic logic.


But being interesting is, then, only valuable as a means to an end. The intrinsic value of a theory is in whether it is true. Not in whether it is interesting. You don't distinguish between value as a means, and value as an end. And the means has value only in so far as it enables the end to be achieved, namely truth.


The truth value of anything is only as valuable as the interest shown in it.
kennethamy
 
  0  
Reply Thu 15 Jul, 2010 10:54 pm
@GoshisDead,
GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

wandeljw wrote:

Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery was first published in 1935.

In a 1963 essay, Popper summarized his ideas on falsifiability:
Quote:

1. It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory — if we look for confirmations.
2. Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions; that is to say, if, unenlightened by the theory in question, we should have expected an event which was incompatible with the theory — an event which would have refuted the theory.
3. Every "good" scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen. The more a theory forbids, the better it is.
4. A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice.
5. Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it. Testability is falsifiability; but there are degrees of testability: some theories are more testable, more exposed to refutation, than others; they take, as it were, greater risks.
6. Confirming evidence should not count except when it is the result of a genuine test of the theory; and this means that it can be presented as a serious but unsuccessful attempt to falsify the theory. (I now speak in such cases of "corroborating evidence.")
7. Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by their admirers — for example by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or by reinterpreting the theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation. Such a procedure is always possible, but it rescues the theory from refutation only at the price of destroying, or at least lowering, its scientific status. (I later described such a rescuing operation as a "conventionalist twist" or a "conventionalist stratagem.")


Popper added that the riskier the theory (the more exposed to refutation) -- the more interesting the theory will be.


Who cares whether a theory is interesting if it is false? What is so wonderful about a risky and false theory. What seems to me important about a theory is that it is true, not whether it is interesting. Interesting, but false does not seem to me to be an recommendation for adopting a theory. Does it to you? Truth is more important than being interesting. By a long shot.


If a theory is not interesting no one will follow it through to the end. Interest is of primary importance to all hypotheses and theories otherwise they escape notice completely. Behavior and motive cannot be distilled to simplistic logic.


But being interesting is, then, only valuable as a means to an end. The intrinsic value of a theory is in whether it is true. Not in whether it is interesting. You don't distinguish between value as a means, and value as an end. And the means has value only in so far as it enables the end to be achieved, namely truth.


The truth value of anything is only as valuable as the interest shown in it.


You may know (or perhaps you don't) that whatever you might mean by the term, "truth-value" that what logicians mean by that technical term is the truth or falsity (as the case may be) of a proposition. As I said, what you might mean by that term, I have no idea. Not that it matters.
Fil Albuquerque
 
  1  
Reply Thu 15 Jul, 2010 11:04 pm
Propositions do refer or should, to events, even if through meaning...
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Thu 15 Jul, 2010 11:13 pm
@Fil Albuquerque,
Fil Albuquerque wrote:

Propositions do refer or should, to events, even if through meaning...


My customary comment (when I can bring myself to comment) on your post; what has that to do with it?
0 Replies
 
fresco
 
  1  
Reply Thu 15 Jul, 2010 11:32 pm
@GoshisDead,
Quote:
The truth value of anything is only as valuable as the interest shown in it.


Spot on ! "Truth" is "what works" (Richard Rorty).

"What works" for scientists depends on successful predictions within "overall paradigmatic fit". Consider this: the concept of the "ether" as a medium for propagation of e.m. waves was rejected as a result of the Michelson Morley experiment in 1887 which showed no variation in the speed of light with respect to the earth's motion. Yet later at set of successful wave propogation equations was accepted which assumed the elastic properties of the now defunct "ether" ! The word "truth" is an irrelevance when examined with respect to what scientists actually do !

http://webcast.berkeley.edu/course_details.php?seriesid=1906978529






GoshisDead
 
  1  
Reply Fri 16 Jul, 2010 12:30 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

wandeljw wrote:

Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery was first published in 1935.

In a 1963 essay, Popper summarized his ideas on falsifiability:
Quote:

1. It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory — if we look for confirmations.
2. Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions; that is to say, if, unenlightened by the theory in question, we should have expected an event which was incompatible with the theory — an event which would have refuted the theory.
3. Every "good" scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen. The more a theory forbids, the better it is.
4. A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice.
5. Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it. Testability is falsifiability; but there are degrees of testability: some theories are more testable, more exposed to refutation, than others; they take, as it were, greater risks.
6. Confirming evidence should not count except when it is the result of a genuine test of the theory; and this means that it can be presented as a serious but unsuccessful attempt to falsify the theory. (I now speak in such cases of "corroborating evidence.")
7. Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by their admirers — for example by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or by reinterpreting the theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation. Such a procedure is always possible, but it rescues the theory from refutation only at the price of destroying, or at least lowering, its scientific status. (I later described such a rescuing operation as a "conventionalist twist" or a "conventionalist stratagem.")


Popper added that the riskier the theory (the more exposed to refutation) -- the more interesting the theory will be.


Who cares whether a theory is interesting if it is false? What is so wonderful about a risky and false theory. What seems to me important about a theory is that it is true, not whether it is interesting. Interesting, but false does not seem to me to be an recommendation for adopting a theory. Does it to you? Truth is more important than being interesting. By a long shot.


If a theory is not interesting no one will follow it through to the end. Interest is of primary importance to all hypotheses and theories otherwise they escape notice completely. Behavior and motive cannot be distilled to simplistic logic.


But being interesting is, then, only valuable as a means to an end. The intrinsic value of a theory is in whether it is true. Not in whether it is interesting. You don't distinguish between value as a means, and value as an end. And the means has value only in so far as it enables the end to be achieved, namely truth.


The truth value of anything is only as valuable as the interest shown in it.


You may know (or perhaps you don't) that whatever you might mean by the term, "truth-value" that what logicians mean by that technical term is the truth or falsity (as the case may be) of a proposition. As I said, what you might mean by that term, I have no idea. Not that it matters.


I know what logicians mean by truth value, but what do you mean by it?There would be no value truth or otherwise because there would be no theory at all without interest, at this point I'm just seeing how many quotes within quotes I can goad him into.
fresco
 
  1  
Reply Fri 16 Jul, 2010 01:58 am
@fresco,
Quote:
I'm just seeing how many quotes within quotes I can goad him into.

Laughing
A good illustration of "the nonexistence of free will" ? (another thread)
0 Replies
 
wandeljw
 
  1  
Reply Fri 16 Jul, 2010 05:21 am
@GoshisDead,
It looks nice to have the Popper quote framed and kept in the center. Smile

Popper is referring to theories that SURVIVE refutation. These theories are scientific because they are open to falsification. They state the conditions required to prove them false. Theories that RISK more conditions under which they can be falsified BUT STILL SURVIVE are more interesting.
0 Replies
 
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Fri 16 Jul, 2010 06:23 am
@GoshisDead,
GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

wandeljw wrote:


I know what logicians mean by truth value, but what do you mean by it?There would be no value truth or otherwise because there would be no theory at all without interest, at this point I'm just seeing how many quotes within quotes I can goad him into.


I just told you what I meant by "truth-value". I mean what logicians mean by it, namely "the truth or falsity of a proposition, as the case may be". So why do you talk as if you don't have a clue as to what "truth-value" means? Of course, unless the theory exists, it would not have a truth value. Something must exist for it to have any properties and truth is a property. What has that to do with it?
GoshisDead
 
  1  
Reply Fri 16 Jul, 2010 10:37 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

wandeljw wrote:


I know what logicians mean by truth value, but what do you mean by it?There would be no value truth or otherwise because there would be no theory at all without interest, at this point I'm just seeing how many quotes within quotes I can goad him into.


I just told you what I meant by "truth-value". I mean what logicians mean by it, namely "the truth or falsity of a proposition, as the case may be". So why do you talk as if you don't have a clue as to what "truth-value" means? Of course, unless the theory exists, it would not have a truth value. Something must exist for it to have any properties and truth is a property. What has that to do with it?


Awesome I did it!
kennethamy
 
  0  
Reply Fri 16 Jul, 2010 12:30 pm
@GoshisDead,
GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

wandeljw wrote:


I know what logicians mean by truth value, but what do you mean by it?There would be no value truth or otherwise because there would be no theory at all without interest, at this point I'm just seeing how many quotes within quotes I can goad him into.


I just told you what I meant by "truth-value". I mean what logicians mean by it, namely "the truth or falsity of a proposition, as the case may be". So why do you talk as if you don't have a clue as to what "truth-value" means? Of course, unless the theory exists, it would not have a truth value. Something must exist for it to have any properties and truth is a property. What has that to do with it?


Awesome I did it!


What a sad object you are. Who supports you?
GoshisDead
 
  0  
Reply Fri 16 Jul, 2010 12:57 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

wandeljw wrote:


I know what logicians mean by truth value, but what do you mean by it?There would be no value truth or otherwise because there would be no theory at all without interest, at this point I'm just seeing how many quotes within quotes I can goad him into.


I just told you what I meant by "truth-value". I mean what logicians mean by it, namely "the truth or falsity of a proposition, as the case may be". So why do you talk as if you don't have a clue as to what "truth-value" means? Of course, unless the theory exists, it would not have a truth value. Something must exist for it to have any properties and truth is a property. What has that to do with it?


Awesome I did it!


What a sad object you are. Who supports you?


And I did it again!
kennethamy
 
  0  
Reply Fri 16 Jul, 2010 01:43 pm
@GoshisDead,
GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

wandeljw wrote:


I know what logicians mean by truth value, but what do you mean by it?There would be no value truth or otherwise because there would be no theory at all without interest, at this point I'm just seeing how many quotes within quotes I can goad him into.


I just told you what I meant by "truth-value". I mean what logicians mean by it, namely "the truth or falsity of a proposition, as the case may be". So why do you talk as if you don't have a clue as to what "truth-value" means? Of course, unless the theory exists, it would not have a truth value. Something must exist for it to have any properties and truth is a property. What has that to do with it?


Awesome I did it!


What a sad object you are. Who supports you?


And I did it again!


Yes, you made me pity you, and whoever it is who supports you.
GoshisDead
 
  0  
Reply Fri 16 Jul, 2010 02:11 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

wandeljw wrote:


I know what logicians mean by truth value, but what do you mean by it?There would be no value truth or otherwise because there would be no theory at all without interest, at this point I'm just seeing how many quotes within quotes I can goad him into.


I just told you what I meant by "truth-value". I mean what logicians mean by it, namely "the truth or falsity of a proposition, as the case may be". So why do you talk as if you don't have a clue as to what "truth-value" means? Of course, unless the theory exists, it would not have a truth value. Something must exist for it to have any properties and truth is a property. What has that to do with it?


Awesome I did it!


What a sad object you are. Who supports you?


And I did it again!


Yes, you made me pity you, and whoever it is who supports you.

This could go on for a while
kennethamy
 
  0  
Reply Fri 16 Jul, 2010 03:01 pm
@GoshisDead,
GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

wandeljw wrote:


I know what logicians mean by truth value, but what do you mean by it?There would be no value truth or otherwise because there would be no theory at all without interest, at this point I'm just seeing how many quotes within quotes I can goad him into.


I just told you what I meant by "truth-value". I mean what logicians mean by it, namely "the truth or falsity of a proposition, as the case may be". So why do you talk as if you don't have a clue as to what "truth-value" means? Of course, unless the theory exists, it would not have a truth value. Something must exist for it to have any properties and truth is a property. What has that to do with it?


Awesome I did it!


What a sad object you are. Who supports you?


And I did it again!


Yes, you made me pity you, and whoever it is who supports you.

This could go on for a while


Indeed it can, if you think that my pointing out how silly you are is something you goad me into doing. Do you know what the word "goad" means?
GoshisDead
 
  0  
Reply Fri 16 Jul, 2010 03:06 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

wandeljw wrote:


I know what logicians mean by truth value, but what do you mean by it?There would be no value truth or otherwise because there would be no theory at all without interest, at this point I'm just seeing how many quotes within quotes I can goad him into.


I just told you what I meant by "truth-value". I mean what logicians mean by it, namely "the truth or falsity of a proposition, as the case may be". So why do you talk as if you don't have a clue as to what "truth-value" means? Of course, unless the theory exists, it would not have a truth value. Something must exist for it to have any properties and truth is a property. What has that to do with it?


Awesome I did it!


What a sad object you are. Who supports you?


And I did it again!


Yes, you made me pity you, and whoever it is who supports you.

This could go on for a while


Indeed it can, if you think that my pointing out how silly you are is something you goad me into doing. Do you know what the word "goad" means?

Okay I concede, you are much better at using the quote function than I
kennethamy
 
  0  
Reply Fri 16 Jul, 2010 03:13 pm
@GoshisDead,
GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

GoshisDead wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

wandeljw wrote:


I know what logicians mean by truth value, but what do you mean by it?There would be no value truth or otherwise because there would be no theory at all without interest, at this point I'm just seeing how many quotes within quotes I can goad him into.


I just told you what I meant by "truth-value". I mean what logicians mean by it, namely "the truth or falsity of a proposition, as the case may be". So why do you talk as if you don't have a clue as to what "truth-value" means? Of course, unless the theory exists, it would not have a truth value. Something must exist for it to have any properties and truth is a property. What has that to do with it?


Awesome I did it!


What a sad object you are. Who supports you?


And I did it again!


Yes, you made me pity you, and whoever it is who supports you.

This could go on for a while


Indeed it can, if you think that my pointing out how silly you are is something you goad me into doing. Do you know what the word "goad" means?

Okay I concede, you are much better at using the quote function than I


i don't know what "the quote function" is, but how about I can think better than you?
 

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