philosophy of science

Next !

Hemlock is in the post !

Yes, I find many who locked philosophy into a liberal arts discipline and not include the tough courses like sciences and mathematics are deluding themselves if they think they can adequately address serious issues but instead focus on 'is time real ?' which is asinine.

talk72000 wrote:

Yes, I find many who locked philosophy into a liberal arts discipline and not include the tough courses like sciences and mathematics are deluding themselves if they think they can adequately address serious issues but instead focus on 'is time real ?' which is asinine.

Isn't the question, "Is time real" a serious issue? Are you saying that philosophical issues are not serious issue, or just what are you saying? Many people think that whether God exists is a serious issue. According to you, it doesn't seem to be. Some philosophers think that whether there is free will is a serious issue. You don't seem to think so. It may be that you are not the arbiter of the seriousness of issues. Have you ever seriously considered that possibility? Take the issue, for example, of whether only science deals with serious issues: is that a serious issue, in your view, and, if it is, is it one that can be settled by science? Actually, I have taken courses in both science and philosophy, and I have found both equally tough. As John Stuart Mill (who knew science as well as philosophy) writes, "Those who know only one side of an issue know little about that". I hope you don't find that too asinine.

Yea rah, Ken! I finally get to agree with you on something. Relevance is a subjective thing. I am not interested in cloning or the ethics of cloning, except as it applies to Sci-Fi and imagination. Let the people who know that crap discuss its ethics. I'm a little interested in eugenics because I also raise chickens. (That's a joke.)

Now I am interested in whether the idea of God is a realistic concept. I have read a good bit about cosmology, avoiding the deep math which makes no sense to me. I philosophize about cosmology. I ask where or what the big bang may have "come from". I ask what is the nature of space and time, matter and energy. Screw anyone who thinks I should not ponder such issues simply because I'm not a cosmologist. I can't not ponder such wonderful issues. And I'll freely post my opinions about them whether anyone cares for them or not.

You and I, Ken have discussed metaphysical and epistemological issues on these forums. We disagree a lot and get right mean about it at times. But I think we both enjoy the spirit of our battles and the challenge of communicating ideas effectively.

The world is not a science lab. Out here, we don't have to be qualified. We don't have to avoid error. We can say stupid things, and believe stupid things. And I doubt that Able2Know or any other forum would set its standards so high as to lock regular old working class people apart from the scholars.

So right on, Ken! I'm glad we can share a bit of common ground here.

Samm

Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery was first published in 1935.

In a 1963 essay, Popper summarized his ideas on falsifiability:

Quote:

1. It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory — if we look for confirmations.
2. Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions; that is to say, if, unenlightened by the theory in question, we should have expected an event which was incompatible with the theory — an event which would have refuted the theory.
3. Every "good" scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen. The more a theory forbids, the better it is.
4. A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice.
5. Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it. Testability is falsifiability; but there are degrees of testability: some theories are more testable, more exposed to refutation, than others; they take, as it were, greater risks.
6. Confirming evidence should not count except when it is the result of a genuine test of the theory; and this means that it can be presented as a serious but unsuccessful attempt to falsify the theory. (I now speak in such cases of "corroborating evidence.")
7. Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by their admirers — for example by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or by reinterpreting the theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation. Such a procedure is always possible, but it rescues the theory from refutation only at the price of destroying, or at least lowering, its scientific status. (I later described such a rescuing operation as a "conventionalist twist" or a "conventionalist stratagem.")

Popper added that the riskier the theory (the more exposed to refutation) -- the more interesting the theory will be.

gungasnake wrote:

Modern mathematics and much of modern science is at least partly based on an erroneous assumption, i.e. the idea that there is such a thing in the world as proving something.

In real life, there is only such a thing as proving something to somebody's satisfaction. If the intended audience is too thick to comprehend the proof or too ideologically committed to some other idea or paradigm (as in the case of evolution and evolosers) to accept or deal with proofs or disproofs, then they will simply go on changing their pet theories every few years and basically throwing **** at the wall hoping some of it will stick. At that point the question ceases to be scientific and becomes political.

I agree that scientific debates can quickly become political, and this is in fact what the idea of theory laden nature of theories tell us, and agree upon by common consensus by scholars. This is not true in math! Justification isn mathematics is must more tight. If we agree on a set of axioms, definitions, rules, the theorem follows. There is no room for debate.

TuringEquivalent wrote:

gungasnake wrote:

Modern mathematics and much of modern science is at least partly based on an erroneous assumption, i.e. the idea that there is such a thing in the world as proving something.

In real life, there is only such a thing as proving something to somebody's satisfaction. If the intended audience is too thick to comprehend the proof or too ideologically committed to some other idea or paradigm (as in the case of evolution and evolosers) to accept or deal with proofs or disproofs, then they will simply go on changing their pet theories every few years and basically throwing **** at the wall hoping some of it will stick. At that point the question ceases to be scientific and becomes political.

I agree that scientific debates can quickly become political, and this is in fact what the idea of theory laden nature of theories tell us, and agree upon by common consensus by scholars. This is not true in math! Justification isn mathematics is must more tight. If we agree on a set of axioms, definitions, rules, the theorem follows. There is no room for debate.

I've been following this thread with great interest. Although I don't have the necessary foundations (in mathematics, physics, logic or hard philosophy) to contribute, I have certainly appreciated reading the content.

I do have a layman's curiosity about how this seemingly unquestioning reliance on mathematical certainty correlates with the von Neumann calculations which stood for, how many decades was it, until Bohm found a problem with von Neumann's initial presumptions? And did not Hawking also, early in his career, discover a longstanding error in the math supporting steady state theory?

rebecca

rebecca

wandeljw wrote:

Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery was first published in 1935.

In a 1963 essay, Popper summarized his ideas on falsifiability:

Quote:

1. It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory — if we look for confirmations.
2. Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions; that is to say, if, unenlightened by the theory in question, we should have expected an event which was incompatible with the theory — an event which would have refuted the theory.
3. Every "good" scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen. The more a theory forbids, the better it is.
4. A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice.
5. Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it. Testability is falsifiability; but there are degrees of testability: some theories are more testable, more exposed to refutation, than others; they take, as it were, greater risks.
6. Confirming evidence should not count except when it is the result of a genuine test of the theory; and this means that it can be presented as a serious but unsuccessful attempt to falsify the theory. (I now speak in such cases of "corroborating evidence.")
7. Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by their admirers — for example by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or by reinterpreting the theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation. Such a procedure is always possible, but it rescues the theory from refutation only at the price of destroying, or at least lowering, its scientific status. (I later described such a rescuing operation as a "conventionalist twist" or a "conventionalist stratagem.")

Popper added that the riskier the theory (the more exposed to refutation) -- the more interesting the theory will be.

Who cares whether a theory is interesting if it is false? What is so wonderful about a risky and false theory. What seems to me important about a theory is that it is true, not whether it is interesting. Interesting, but false does not seem to me to be an recommendation for adopting a theory. Does it to you? Truth is more important than being interesting. By a long shot.

kennethamy wrote:

wandeljw wrote:

Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery was first published in 1935.

In a 1963 essay, Popper summarized his ideas on falsifiability:

Quote:

1. It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory — if we look for confirmations.
2. Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions; that is to say, if, unenlightened by the theory in question, we should have expected an event which was incompatible with the theory — an event which would have refuted the theory.
3. Every "good" scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen. The more a theory forbids, the better it is.
4. A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice.
5. Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it. Testability is falsifiability; but there are degrees of testability: some theories are more testable, more exposed to refutation, than others; they take, as it were, greater risks.
6. Confirming evidence should not count except when it is the result of a genuine test of the theory; and this means that it can be presented as a serious but unsuccessful attempt to falsify the theory. (I now speak in such cases of "corroborating evidence.")
7. Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by their admirers — for example by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or by reinterpreting the theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation. Such a procedure is always possible, but it rescues the theory from refutation only at the price of destroying, or at least lowering, its scientific status. (I later described such a rescuing operation as a "conventionalist twist" or a "conventionalist stratagem.")

Popper added that the riskier the theory (the more exposed to refutation) -- the more interesting the theory will be.

Who cares whether a theory is interesting if it is false? What is so wonderful about a risky and false theory. What seems to me important about a theory is that it is true, not whether it is interesting. Interesting, but false does not seem to me to be an recommendation for adopting a theory. Does it to you? Truth is more important than being interesting. By a long shot.

If a theory is not interesting no one will follow it through to the end. Interest is of primary importance to all hypotheses and theories otherwise they escape notice completely. Behavior and motive cannot be distilled to simplistic logic.

The point of theory is not the curiosity factor but its implication. The theory that mental illnesses could be solved by drill into the head as practised in the Middle Ages in Europe was wrong. As a theory it is not interesting unless you happen to have your skull drilled.