6
   

philosophy of science

 
 
TuringEquivalent
 
  1  
Reply Thu 8 Jul, 2010 03:16 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:

TuringEquivalent wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

rosborne979 wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
If everything is a profound delusion, then what is a profound delusion? Why not try the word, "insanity"? Really now, have you any reason at all to think that even what are not profound delusions are profound delusions? If so, can you tell me about it?

What are you talking about?

Are you challenging my terminology, because I already said I don't know what to call it. And I tried to describe what I meant.

Or are you questioning some concept? If so, I don't understand what you are asking. Sorry.


Exactly what I said. It is simply false that everything could be a profound delusion (whatever that might mean) for just the same reason that it is false that all money could be counterfeit money.


It is not justified to think we live in the matrix. This is obvious. It is not obvious to me why you think such possibility must be false. To give another example. We might not be justified in believing Ghosts, but Ghosts might indeed exist. The former deals with the ground of our beliefs, but the latter assert what things actually exist.


So far as I can tell, the Matrix (and similar fantasies) are (at best) just logically possible. That they are logically possible simply means that their supposition is not logically contradictory. That is no reason to think they are true, and, indeed, we have every reason to think that they are false. For any rational purposes, when you have no reason to think that some hypothesis is true, and every reason to think that it is false, that is as close to proof as you need for the falsity of the hypothesis.


I take it that you agree with me that the claim that we might be living in a matrix is very unjustified. This is confusing to me that you would also say " close to proof", and " falsity of the hypothesis". Having a "proof" that the hypothesis is "false" tells me that you are claiming something beyond the fact that the matrix is unjustified, but that it is necessary false. Again, you jump from an epistemic evaluation to a metaphysical claim. This jump is bad reasoning.

I agree with everything you say in your post, but to say, as you do, that some claims are false, you are making a jump from saying that the claim in not justified to the claim being false. This is a mistake. You might think P is unjustified, and thus, false. You are also claiming that -p is true, but -p is true is different from -p is justified.


0 Replies
 
TuringEquivalent
 
  1  
Reply Thu 8 Jul, 2010 03:24 pm
@gungasnake,
gungasnake wrote:

Modern mathematics and much of modern science is at least partly based on an erroneous assumption, i.e. the idea that there is such a thing in the world as proving something.

In real life, there is only such a thing as proving something to somebody's satisfaction. If the intended audience is too thick to comprehend the proof or too ideologically committed to some other idea or paradigm (as in the case of evolution and evolosers) to accept or deal with proofs or disproofs, then they will simply go on changing their pet theories every few years and basically throwing **** at the wall hoping some of it will stick. At that point the question ceases to be scientific and becomes political.



I agree that scientific debates can quickly become political, and this is in fact what the idea of theory laden nature of theories tell us, and agree upon by common consensus by scholars. This is not true in math! Justification isn mathematics is must more tight. If we agree on a set of axioms, definitions, rules, the theorem follows. There is no room for debate.
wandeljw
 
  1  
Reply Thu 8 Jul, 2010 04:18 pm
TuringEquivalent wrote:
...one can always avoid falsification by rejecting some necessary hypothesis for the theory....


I think that Popper would have countered that modifying a theory to escape refutation would destroy its scientific status.
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Thu 8 Jul, 2010 04:39 pm
@wandeljw,
wandeljw wrote:

TuringEquivalent wrote:
...one can always avoid falsification by rejecting some necessary hypothesis for the theory....


I think that Popper would have countered that modifying a theory to escape refutation would destroy its scientific status.


So if our hypothesis was that Mary did not have a fever as shown by the thermometer, but it turned out that there was something wrong with the thermometer so that Mary did not have a fever, then, according to Popper, that would destroy the scientific status of the hypothesis that Mary had a fever? Could that be true.
talk72000
 
  1  
Reply Thu 8 Jul, 2010 04:43 pm
@kennethamy,
It means the doctor's prognosis was wrong. The girl had a hot water bottle under the blanket. Laughing Twisted Evil Mr. Green 2 Cents
0 Replies
 
TuringEquivalent
 
  1  
Reply Thu 8 Jul, 2010 04:58 pm
@wandeljw,
wandeljw wrote:

TuringEquivalent wrote:
...one can always avoid falsification by rejecting some necessary hypothesis for the theory....


I think that Popper would have countered that modifying a theory to escape refutation would destroy its scientific status.


Why? There are many instance where maintaining the theory works when a contradiction with experiment occur. This is precisely how people discover unobservable planets back in the days. They can reject the inverse square law, or reject background assumption.
wandeljw
 
  1  
Reply Thu 8 Jul, 2010 07:50 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:

wandeljw wrote:

TuringEquivalent wrote:
...one can always avoid falsification by rejecting some necessary hypothesis for the theory....


I think that Popper would have countered that modifying a theory to escape refutation would destroy its scientific status.


So if our hypothesis was that Mary did not have a fever as shown by the thermometer, but it turned out that there was something wrong with the thermometer so that Mary did not have a fever, then, according to Popper, that would destroy the scientific status of the hypothesis that Mary had a fever? Could that be true.


There was only an error in how the hypothesis was tested (bad thermometer). The hypothesis that Mary had a fever is scientific because it can be tested by using a good thermometer. Popper equated the terms: testable, falsifiable, and refutable.
0 Replies
 
wandeljw
 
  1  
Reply Thu 8 Jul, 2010 08:03 pm
@TuringEquivalent,
TuringEquivalent wrote:

wandeljw wrote:

TuringEquivalent wrote:
...one can always avoid falsification by rejecting some necessary hypothesis for the theory....


I think that Popper would have countered that modifying a theory to escape refutation would destroy its scientific status.


Why? There are many instance where maintaining the theory works when a contradiction with experiment occur. This is precisely how people discover unobservable planets back in the days. They can reject the inverse square law, or reject background assumption.



I did not mean to imply that any modification would destroy the scientific character of a theory. A theory is no longer scientific if modifications succeed in making refutation impossible.

Popper intended falsifiability to be the characteristic that distinguishes a scientific theory from a non-scientific theory.
Sentience
 
  2  
Reply Thu 8 Jul, 2010 08:12 pm
@kennethamy,
Thousands of alternative realities could exist. What if water was a hallucinogen, and you're really pink elephant, and any evidence to the contrary was caused by the water? It's in more than eighty percent of your body, how could you sober yourself without dying? What if space, energy, and matter is an illusion and your conscious is a spaceless existent thing that has simply conjured this reality?

There are so many things that MIGHT be true it only makes sense to believe the reality we observe.

Essentially, nothing but thought and existence is certain and anything might be true, but it doesn't matter.

TuringEquivalent
 
  2  
Reply Thu 8 Jul, 2010 09:03 pm
@wandeljw,
wandeljw wrote:

TuringEquivalent wrote:

wandeljw wrote:

TuringEquivalent wrote:
...one can always avoid falsification by rejecting some necessary hypothesis for the theory....


I think that Popper would have countered that modifying a theory to escape refutation would destroy its scientific status.


Why? There are many instance where maintaining the theory works when a contradiction with experiment occur. This is precisely how people discover unobservable planets back in the days. They can reject the inverse square law, or reject background assumption.



I did not mean to imply that any modification would destroy the scientific character of a theory. A theory is no longer scientific if modifications succeed in making refutation impossible.


No, you misunderstood. There is no modification of the theory. You can blame it on one of the background assumption necessary in making the prediction from the theory. The theory itself is untouched.
0 Replies
 
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Fri 9 Jul, 2010 01:41 am
@Sentience,
Sentience wrote:

Thousands of alternative realities could exist. What if water was a hallucinogen, and you're really pink elephant, and any evidence to the contrary was caused by the water? It's in more than eighty percent of your body, how could you sober yourself without dying? What if space, energy, and matter is an illusion and your conscious is a spaceless existent thing that has simply conjured this reality?

There are so many things that MIGHT be true it only makes sense to believe the reality we observe.

Essentially, nothing but thought and existence is certain and anything might be true, but it doesn't matter.




But that something might be true is not only no reason to think that it is true, must no reason to think that its truth has any plausibility. That it might be true that there is a Spaghetti Monster flying about does not make it, in the least, plausible (let alone probable or true) that there is a Spaghetti Monster. So, that something might be true is no reason to take the suggestion that it is true, even seriously.

Why should our only criterion for belief be that what we believe is certain in the sense that we could not be mistaken? It seems to me that we ought to believe what we are not mistaken about, not only what we cannot be mistaken about. After all, scientific beliefs are not certain, since they are testable, and that implies that they might not be true. But are you suggesting that on that account we should not believe that Mars is the fourth planet, or that when the temperature of water is lowered to it freezing point it turns to ice?

it only makes sense to believe the reality we observe. That seems to me an empty truism since we have yet to cite a criterion for deciding that what we observe is reality. But what makes sense is that we should believe only that which our evidence makes plausible.
0 Replies
 
SammDickens
 
  1  
Reply Mon 12 Jul, 2010 12:43 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
The reason that all money could not be counterfeit money is that there then could be no real counterfeit money, since you have destroyed the distinction between counterfeit and genuine money; similarly, not everything could be a profound delusion (whatever that means) since if everything were a profound delusion, we would have no idea what a genuine profound delusion would be...

So it would be possible then to say that - "not everything could be reality (whatever that means) since if everything were reality, we would have no idea what a genuine reality would be." If I may borrow your reasoning here.

If everything is not reality, then there must be something that is not reality. How do we determine what is reality and what is not reality? Is there a scientific test for this? Suppose we identify reality as "T", and proof of reality as, say, "p". Do you see where I'm going with this?

Samm
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Mon 12 Jul, 2010 12:50 pm
@SammDickens,
SammDickens wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
The reason that all money could not be counterfeit money is that there then could be no real counterfeit money, since you have destroyed the distinction between counterfeit and genuine money; similarly, not everything could be a profound delusion (whatever that means) since if everything were a profound delusion, we would have no idea what a genuine profound delusion would be...

So it would be possible then to say that - "not everything could be reality (whatever that means) since if everything were reality, we would have no idea what a genuine reality would be." If I may borrow your reasoning here.

If everything is not reality, then there must be something that is not reality. How do we determine what is reality and what is not reality? Is there a scientific test for this? Suppose we identify reality as "T", and proof of reality as, say, "p". Do you see where I'm going with this?

Samm


Well. everything exists, for if it did not exist, it would not be anything. I hope that helps.
0 Replies
 
SammDickens
 
  1  
Reply Mon 12 Jul, 2010 12:58 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
So if our hypothesis was that Mary did not have a fever as shown by the thermometer, but it turned out that there was something wrong with the thermometer so that Mary did not have a fever, then, according to Popper, that would destroy the scientific status of the hypothesis that Mary had a fever? Could that be true.

Our hypothesis is: "Mary did not have a fever as shown by the thermometer."

Findings: "There was something wrong with the thermometer so that Mary did not have a fever."

(Secondary?) hypothesis is: "Mary had a fever."

Is "the scientific status of the" (secondary) "hypothesis" destroyed?

Ken, I hope you can see that this is not making a whole lot of sense.

Samm
SammDickens
 
  1  
Reply Mon 12 Jul, 2010 01:03 pm
@wandeljw,
wandeljw wrote:

I did not mean to imply that any modification would destroy the scientific character of a theory. A theory is no longer scientific if modifications succeed in making refutation impossible.

Popper intended falsifiability to be the characteristic that distinguishes a scientific theory from a non-scientific theory.

I should think that a modified theory must be treated essentially as a separate theory distinct from the theory from which it was modified. The initial theory has proven invalid either because it is false or because it is incomplete. The modified theory supplants its source. Now it must be tested with respect to its own merits.

Samm
0 Replies
 
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Mon 12 Jul, 2010 01:55 pm
@SammDickens,
SammDickens wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
So if our hypothesis was that Mary did not have a fever as shown by the thermometer, but it turned out that there was something wrong with the thermometer so that Mary did not have a fever, then, according to Popper, that would destroy the scientific status of the hypothesis that Mary had a fever? Could that be true.

Our hypothesis is: "Mary did not have a fever as shown by the thermometer."

Findings: "There was something wrong with the thermometer so that Mary did not have a fever."

(Secondary?) hypothesis is: "Mary had a fever."

Is "the scientific status of the" (secondary) "hypothesis" destroyed?

Ken, I hope you can see that this is not making a whole lot of sense.

Samm


So, if Mary has a fever as shown by the thermometer, then either Mary has no fever, or the thermometer is wrong. No scientific status of any hypothesis is being destroyed (whatever that may mean). How did that suddenly show up? The issue is about testing hypotheses. If the thermometer shows 96.8 (or whatever normal is supposed to be" then either Mary has no fever, or there is something wrong with the thermometer. And no scientific status of any hypothesis has even been wounded. Really, it is only logic, and elementary logic at that. If Mary has a fever, then the thermometer is accurate is equivalent to, either Mary does not have a fever or the thermometer is accurate by the inference rule of material equivalence. Consult any elementary logic book.
north
 
  1  
Reply Mon 12 Jul, 2010 02:06 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:

SammDickens wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
So if our hypothesis was that Mary did not have a fever as shown by the thermometer, but it turned out that there was something wrong with the thermometer so that Mary did not have a fever, then, according to Popper, that would destroy the scientific status of the hypothesis that Mary had a fever? Could that be true.

Our hypothesis is: "Mary did not have a fever as shown by the thermometer."

Findings: "There was something wrong with the thermometer so that Mary did not have a fever."

(Secondary?) hypothesis is: "Mary had a fever."

Is "the scientific status of the" (secondary) "hypothesis" destroyed?

Ken, I hope you can see that this is not making a whole lot of sense.

Samm


So, if Mary has a fever as shown by the thermometer, then either Mary has no fever, or the thermometer is wrong. No scientific status of any hypothesis is being destroyed (whatever that may mean). How did that suddenly show up? The issue is about testing hypotheses. If the thermometer shows 96.8 (or whatever normal is supposed to be" then either Mary has no fever, or there is something wrong with the thermometer. And no scientific status of any hypothesis has even been wounded.


kennethamy

the question of science goes on and on , hence my thread on whether reality existed before we Humans existed or not

the making of NO sense continues
talk72000
 
  2  
Reply Mon 12 Jul, 2010 02:10 pm
@north,
I think that philosophy majors not taking science and math courses limit their ability to analyse the real world and go on and on about sematics and build word games that are meaningless. Their recourse in defense is to go into a fantasy word game.
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Mon 12 Jul, 2010 02:12 pm
@north,
north wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

SammDickens wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
So if our hypothesis was that Mary did not have a fever as shown by the thermometer, but it turned out that there was something wrong with the thermometer so that Mary did not have a fever, then, according to Popper, that would destroy the scientific status of the hypothesis that Mary had a fever? Could that be true.

Our hypothesis is: "Mary did not have a fever as shown by the thermometer."

Findings: "There was something wrong with the thermometer so that Mary did not have a fever."

(Secondary?) hypothesis is: "Mary had a fever."

Is "the scientific status of the" (secondary) "hypothesis" destroyed?

Ken, I hope you can see that this is not making a whole lot of sense.

Samm


So, if Mary has a fever as shown by the thermometer, then either Mary has no fever, or the thermometer is wrong. No scientific status of any hypothesis is being destroyed (whatever that may mean). How did that suddenly show up? The issue is about testing hypotheses. If the thermometer shows 96.8 (or whatever normal is supposed to be" then either Mary has no fever, or there is something wrong with the thermometer. And no scientific status of any hypothesis has even been wounded.


kennethamy

the question of science goes on and on , hence my thread on whether reality existed before we Humans existed or not

the making of NO sense continues


Eh, what question of science goes on and on? I think you must have omitted mentioning what question you were talking about in all your excitement.
0 Replies
 
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Mon 12 Jul, 2010 02:13 pm
@talk72000,
talk72000 wrote:

I think that philosophy majors not taking science and math courses limit their ability to analyse the real world and go on and on about sematics and build word games that are meaningless. Their recourse in defense is to go into a fantasy word game.


So, is that your opinion? I was wondering.
 

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