Philosophers think they know it all - they are never wrong.

The qualities of an object are dependent upon an observer.
The properties of an object are independent of an observer.

But what would make you think I was talking about that sort of spoon and that sort of knife. I was talking about a normal spoon and a normal knife, and what I was saying was that a normal soon is (far) less useful than a normal knife for cutting a roast. Why would you think I was saying anything else?

kennethamy wrote:

But what would make you think I was talking about that sort of spoon and that sort of knife. I was talking about a normal spoon and a normal knife, and what I was saying was that a normal soon is (far) less useful than a normal knife for cutting a roast. Why would you think I was saying anything else?

What is a normal spoon? What is a normal knife?

Surely, it is extremelly unlikely that there is someone who would think you were talking about that sort of spoon and that sort of knife, but it is not impossible.

wayne wrote:

The qualities of an object are dependent upon an observer.
The properties of an object are independent of an observer.

If I understood the difference you had in mind between properties and qualities I might agree. When I say the fire-engine is red, am I ascribing a quality or a property?

kennethamy wrote:

wayne wrote:

The qualities of an object are dependent upon an observer.
The properties of an object are independent of an observer.

If I understood the difference you had in mind between properties and qualities I might agree. When I say the fire-engine is red, am I ascribing a quality or a property?

I would say you are ascribing a quality.
This is because you are an observer, and you have ascribed the quality of redness.
Apart from the observer, the object possesses the properties that reflect light in the manner you, as the observer, ascribe to be redness.

manored wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

But what would make you think I was talking about that sort of spoon and that sort of knife. I was talking about a normal spoon and a normal knife, and what I was saying was that a normal soon is (far) less useful than a normal knife for cutting a roast. Why would you think I was saying anything else?

What is a normal spoon? What is a normal knife?

Surely, it is extremelly unlikely that there is someone who would think you were talking about that sort of spoon and that sort of knife, but it is not impossible.

Go the the cutlery drawer in your kitchen. You will find an several normal spoons and knives.

kennethamy wrote:

manored wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

But what would make you think I was talking about that sort of spoon and that sort of knife. I was talking about a normal spoon and a normal knife, and what I was saying was that a normal soon is (far) less useful than a normal knife for cutting a roast. Why would you think I was saying anything else?

What is a normal spoon? What is a normal knife?

Surely, it is extremelly unlikely that there is someone who would think you were talking about that sort of spoon and that sort of knife, but it is not impossible.

Go the the cutlery drawer in your kitchen. You will find an several normal spoons and knives.

which are certainly different from the normal spoons and knives you would find in yours.

So different that your spoons would be useful in carving a roast, and your knives not so useful? That they would be different from my spoons and knives has nothing to do with it, as you well know. Why argue just for the sake of argument?

wayne wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

wayne wrote:

The qualities of an object are dependent upon an observer.
The properties of an object are independent of an observer.

If I understood the difference you had in mind between properties and qualities I might agree. When I say the fire-engine is red, am I ascribing a quality or a property?

I would say you are ascribing a quality.
This is because you are an observer, and you have ascribed the quality of redness.
Apart from the observer, the object possesses the properties that reflect light in the manner you, as the observer, ascribe to be redness.

Galileo, then Descartes, and then Locke, distinguished between primary and secondary qualities, which is the same distinction you have made. And there is, of course a distinction between what are (perhaps) more illuminatingly called interactive and non-interactive properties. It is true that being red is a result of the interaction between human faculties of vision and the object, as physiologists tell us. And emitting light in a certain range is not. But just what conclusions we should draw from that are not clear. It is nevertheless true that fire-engines are red whatever the explanation is for why we say they are. And what we mean by that is that a normal observer in normal conditions of observation would ascribe the color red to fire-engines.

kennethamy wrote:

wayne wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

wayne wrote:

The qualities of an object are dependent upon an observer.
The properties of an object are independent of an observer.

If I understood the difference you had in mind between properties and qualities I might agree. When I say the fire-engine is red, am I ascribing a quality or a property?

I would say you are ascribing a quality.
This is because you are an observer, and you have ascribed the quality of redness.
Apart from the observer, the object possesses the properties that reflect light in the manner you, as the observer, ascribe to be redness.

Galileo, then Descartes, and then Locke, distinguished between primary and secondary qualities, which is the same distinction you have made. And there is, of course a distinction between what are (perhaps) more illuminatingly called interactive and non-interactive properties. It is true that being red is a result of the interaction between human faculties of vision and the object, as physiologists tell us. And emitting light in a certain range is not. But just what conclusions we should draw from that are not clear. It is nevertheless true that fire-engines are red whatever the explanation is for why we say they are. And what we mean by that is that a normal observer in normal conditions of observation would ascribe the color red to fire-engines.

What I'm not clear on here, are they making the distinction between qualities and properties, then distinguishing types of each?

If that is so, I think I see the difference as far as properties go.
Hardness would be an interactive property , the property of molecular form would be non-interactive.

I can't, however, think of an example of primary and secondary quality.

Also, I can't help but think , it would work better the other way.
That there are interactive and non-interactive qualities
That there are primary and secondary properties

If that is so, I think I see the difference as far as properties go.
Hardness would be an interactive property , the property of molecular form would be non-interactive.

I can't, however, think of an example of primary and secondary quality.

Also, I can't help but think , it would work better the other way.
That there are interactive and non-interactive qualities
That there are primary and secondary properties

wayne wrote:

If that is so, I think I see the difference as far as properties go.
Hardness would be an interactive property , the property of molecular form would be non-interactive.

I can't, however, think of an example of primary and secondary quality.

Also, I can't help but think , it would work better the other way.
That there are interactive and non-interactive qualities
That there are primary and secondary properties

They did not distinguish between qualities and properties at all. And your distinction between property and quality was made by them in terms of the primary, secondary, quality distinction. So what you call "a property" , they called a "primary quality", and what you call a quality, they called "a secondary quality". It is only a notational difference between you and them.

kennethamy wrote:

wayne wrote:

If that is so, I think I see the difference as far as properties go.
Hardness would be an interactive property , the property of molecular form would be non-interactive.

I can't, however, think of an example of primary and secondary quality.

Also, I can't help but think , it would work better the other way.
That there are interactive and non-interactive qualities
That there are primary and secondary properties

They did not distinguish between qualities and properties at all. And your distinction between property and quality was made by them in terms of the primary, secondary, quality distinction. So what you call "a property" , they called a "primary quality", and what you call a quality, they called "a secondary quality". It is only a notational difference between you and them.

Ok, that's the clarification I needed.
I'd like to stick with quality and property for now, to avoid confusion.

My next question; By what criteria do we designate a feature* as a quality or a property? *( for this purpose allow feature to denote the category containing quality and property)

For example; We could designate qualities as those features displaying Quale.
Designate properties as those features not displaying Quale.

Under this criteria, color, flavor, scent, would be categorized as qualities.
Pigmentation, odor, texture, would be categorized as properties.

Under this criteria, we could reasonably categorize usefulness as a property.
Thus usefulness is, in fact, objective. The problem then becomes apparent as one of latency. Usefulness may be a latent property of an object, which should not be confused with usefulness being subjective.

wayne wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

wayne wrote:

If that is so, I think I see the difference as far as properties go.
Hardness would be an interactive property , the property of molecular form would be non-interactive.

I can't, however, think of an example of primary and secondary quality.

Also, I can't help but think , it would work better the other way.
That there are interactive and non-interactive qualities
That there are primary and secondary properties

They did not distinguish between qualities and properties at all. And your distinction between property and quality was made by them in terms of the primary, secondary, quality distinction. So what you call "a property" , they called a "primary quality", and what you call a quality, they called "a secondary quality". It is only a notational difference between you and them.

Ok, that's the clarification I needed.
I'd like to stick with quality and property for now, to avoid confusion.

My next question; By what criteria do we designate a feature* as a quality or a property? *( for this purpose allow feature to denote the category containing quality and property)

For example; We could designate qualities as those features displaying Quale.
Designate properties as those features not displaying Quale.

Under this criteria, color, flavor, scent, would be categorized as qualities.
Pigmentation, odor, texture, would be categorized as properties.

Under this criteria, we could reasonably categorize usefulness as a property.
Thus usefulness is, in fact, objective. The problem then becomes apparent as one of latency. Usefulness may be a latent property of an object, which should not be confused with usefulness being subjective.

My next question; By what criteria do we designate a feature* as a quality or a property? *( for this purpose allow feature to denote the category containing quality and property)

That is a hard, complex question. Would the object have this feature "anyway". That is, even if there were no observers? But what does that mean? If to say of something that it is red is to say that if a normal observer observed the object under normal conditions, it would appear red to that observer, then even if there are no observers present, on that criterion, an apple would be red, for that criterion does not require that there actually be any observers. But if the criterion of having a quality is whether it would have that quality "anyway" then of course, if it is a necessary condition of having a quality that the object actually be observed to that quality, then it follows that nothing can have a quality "anyway". But then, would that imply that an apple cannot be red it the apple is in pitch darkness? I would reject that, since I don't believe that things lose their color simply because they are in the dark. Do you? The philosopher, Berkeley thought the distinction between qualities and properties (to use your language) was bogus, because he believed that any reason one had for saying that something was a quality could be had for saying that something was a property. But Berkeley concluded from that that every feature was actually a quality, and that there were no properties.

I am not sure what a quale is. But to identify qualities with qualia would appear to imply that qualities were mental, and "in the mind". But I would hold that when we say of an apple it is red, we are describing the apple, and not our minds.

In the widest sense, whatever is true of something is a feature of that thing. So usefulness is a feature of a sharp knife. It is not clear what it means to say of a feature that it is subjective. That word has so many problems of its own. Of course, it is true that something cannot be useful unless it is found useful by people. So, if the feature of usefulness is somehow essentially related to there being people, then usefulness is subjective. On the other hand, subjective often means something like, it is up to individuals whether something has the feature or not, and that is certainly not true when we say that sharp knives are more useful than dull knives for cutting steak. That is, it is better to use a sharp than a dull knife if you want to cut steak. It is not up to some particular individual whether that is true or not. It is clear that a using a sharp knife is better than using a dull knife to cut steak. That judgment is not subjective.

So different that your spoons would be useful in carving a roast, and your knives not so useful? That they would be different from my spoons and knives has nothing to do with it, as you well know. Why argue just for the sake of argument?

What he is not understanding is that to say that two spoons are normal is not to say that two spoons are identical. He seems to believe that because your spoon and his spoon are not identical, it is impossible to tell that they are both normal spoons. But that's of course not true. We can consider any number of spoons to have a normal design, even if they are not identical.

kennethamy wrote:

So different that your spoons would be useful in carving a roast, and your knives not so useful? That they would be different from my spoons and knives has nothing to do with it, as you well know. Why argue just for the sake of argument?

It does.

Zetherin wrote:

What he is not understanding is that to say that two spoons are normal is not to say that two spoons are identical. He seems to believe that because your spoon and his spoon are not identical, it is impossible to tell that they are both normal spoons. But that's of course not true. We can consider any number of spoons to have a normal design, even if they are not identical.

There is a difference between looking at a spoon and judging whenever it is normal or not, an imagining a normal spoon. we are talking about information transmission here, so the spoon is imagined. There arent two people in the world who will imagine the same spoon.

We are not talking of imagined spoons, but of spoons. Normal spoons are simply average, run of the mill, spoons. They are not special or defective spoons. They are not rusty or bent. A normal spoon is simply a spoon, and to call it "normal" is to deny that it is in anyway not a standard spoon. "Normal" is not a property of anything. To say of an X that it is a normal X is just to deny that it is, in any way, special or defective.

We arent looking at a specific spoons, pointing at it and saying: "This is the spoon we are talking about". We are just talking about normal spoons, what means that in our minds we form the mental image of a normal spoon.

A spoon that is special to me may not be special to you. Normality is relative.