ughaibu wrote:Or a matter of practicality. I think the Pragmatic Theory of Truth would make truth an empirical matter. I can't back that up, though.But the nature of truth isn't an empirical matter, it's a matter of definition.
Fil Albuquerque wrote:
kennethamy wrote:
Fil Albuquerque wrote:
kennethamy wrote:
Fil Albuquerque wrote:
kennethamy wrote:
Fil Albuquerque wrote:
Truth is that which cannot but be.
Well that is certainly not true, since it is true, for example that Barack Obama is president of the United States, but if he had not been elected, then he would not have been the president of the United States. You are saying that all truths are necessary truths, and that is clearly false.
Hi Ken ! How are you ?
If a true is true then it is true and cannot but be true given it is already true...
Same is to say if Barack is the President then he is the president...Of course, someone else could have been the president if something else did happen.
But it did n´t did it ?
Of course, if it is true then it is true. That is just a trivial truism. Like, if it is a duck, it is a duck. What is news about that? But what is false is that if it is true then it had to be true. That is obviously false. It is true that Obama is president, but it is not true that he had to be president. It is true that Obama is president, and if it is true that Obama is president, then Obama is president, but just because Obama is president, that does not mean that he might not have been president. If his opponent, John McCain had been elected then he not only might not have been president, he would not have been president, and you would have said that if John McCain is president, then John McCain is president. which would have also been true, but noting to shout to the philosophical world either! You are committing the same modal fallacy that is a disease on this forum. It is trivially true that if Obama is president, then Obama is president; and it is obviously false that if Obama is president then Obama had to be president. So, you can choose between trivial truth and obvious falsity. Your choice.
Sometimes I have the impression that you don´t read what I write...
If True, Necessarily True given it is, factual, True...
It is what it is, is trivial, but you are the one who don´t seam to get it, otherwise I would n´t be debating it...
If it could have been otherwise it would n´t, by definition, be True...hence, once true necessarily true...of course before that becomes an actuality many things can be, but how does that has anything to do with true ?
But of course it is a trivial truth that if p is true, then p is true. That is simply a tautology. If something is a duck, then it is a duck. If something is a mouse, then it is a mouse. And, equally, if a proposition is true, then it is true. Big deal! But that is different from saying that if something is true, then it is necessarily true. For example, it Obama is president, then he isn't necessarily president. For he might not have been president. And if he might have not been president, then, even if he is president, he is not necessarily president. Surely you can see that. Don't you agree that Obama might not have been president? If you do, then you have to agree that even it it is true that he is president, he is not necessarily president. Again, you are confusing: (a) If Obama is president then Obama is president (which is true, but trivial) with, (b) If Obama is president, then he must be president which is not trivial, but is certainly false, since Obama is president, but he need not be the president. So, again, you have to choose between: true but trivial, and significant but false.
In what possible fruitful sense would I apply the Logic that if causes were different results also would be different...
No, No ! Please don´t tell me again, I save you from that burden...allow me.
For instance you would say something like:
To make a fire, wood may be a condition yet not a necessary condition since I can make a fire without wood can´t I ?
And my answer to you would be that such fire is different in nature although quite similar to any other fire...you see I don´t think to have enough proof on the ultimate nature on what is around me while you do...and that and that alone seams to be the problem...to me Identity (in the sense of identicalness) is mainly in concepts and they're degree of accuracy against other concepts on what we observe !
What in the world are you talking about? How does any of this to do with the issue, or with my post?
kennethamy wrote:
Fil Albuquerque wrote:
kennethamy wrote:
Fil Albuquerque wrote:
kennethamy wrote:
Fil Albuquerque wrote:
kennethamy wrote:
Fil Albuquerque wrote:
Truth is that which cannot but be.
Well that is certainly not true, since it is true, for example that Barack Obama is president of the United States, but if he had not been elected, then he would not have been the president of the United States. You are saying that all truths are necessary truths, and that is clearly false.
Hi Ken ! How are you ?
If a true is true then it is true and cannot but be true given it is already true...
Same is to say if Barack is the President then he is the president...Of course, someone else could have been the president if something else did happen.
But it did n´t did it ?
Of course, if it is true then it is true. That is just a trivial truism. Like, if it is a duck, it is a duck. What is news about that? But what is false is that if it is true then it had to be true. That is obviously false. It is true that Obama is president, but it is not true that he had to be president. It is true that Obama is president, and if it is true that Obama is president, then Obama is president, but just because Obama is president, that does not mean that he might not have been president. If his opponent, John McCain had been elected then he not only might not have been president, he would not have been president, and you would have said that if John McCain is president, then John McCain is president. which would have also been true, but noting to shout to the philosophical world either! You are committing the same modal fallacy that is a disease on this forum. It is trivially true that if Obama is president, then Obama is president; and it is obviously false that if Obama is president then Obama had to be president. So, you can choose between trivial truth and obvious falsity. Your choice.
Sometimes I have the impression that you don´t read what I write...
If True, Necessarily True given it is, factual, True...
It is what it is, is trivial, but you are the one who don´t seam to get it, otherwise I would n´t be debating it...
If it could have been otherwise it would n´t, by definition, be True...hence, once true necessarily true...of course before that becomes an actuality many things can be, but how does that has anything to do with true ?
But of course it is a trivial truth that if p is true, then p is true. That is simply a tautology. If something is a duck, then it is a duck. If something is a mouse, then it is a mouse. And, equally, if a proposition is true, then it is true. Big deal! But that is different from saying that if something is true, then it is necessarily true. For example, it Obama is president, then he isn't necessarily president. For he might not have been president. And if he might have not been president, then, even if he is president, he is not necessarily president. Surely you can see that. Don't you agree that Obama might not have been president? If you do, then you have to agree that even it it is true that he is president, he is not necessarily president. Again, you are confusing: (a) If Obama is president then Obama is president (which is true, but trivial) with, (b) If Obama is president, then he must be president which is not trivial, but is certainly false, since Obama is president, but he need not be the president. So, again, you have to choose between: true but trivial, and significant but false.
In what possible fruitful sense would I apply the Logic that if causes were different results also would be different...
No, No ! Please don´t tell me again, I save you from that burden...allow me.
For instance you would say something like:
To make a fire, wood may be a condition yet not a necessary condition since I can make a fire without wood can´t I ?
And my answer to you would be that such fire is different in nature although quite similar to any other fire...you see I don´t think to have enough proof on the ultimate nature on what is around me while you do...and that and that alone seams to be the problem...to me Identity (in the sense of identicalness) is mainly in concepts and they're degree of accuracy against other concepts on what we observe !
What in the world are you talking about? How does any of this to do with the issue, or with my post?
What exactly was it that you did n´t get ??? eeh ? I am criticizing the damn Modal Fallacy which is itself a big fallacy I tell you...How can you check that some FACT, (Truth) is n´t Necessary given you cannot compare it but through CONCEPTS and their limits on what we observe ??? At best you would n´t be able to tell...
For all that I know Necessity goes with the fact being a fact, and I would n´t dare to go any further...
Do me a favour and don´t mock me no more !
kennethamy wrote:
Some theories are only theories, which is to say mere speculations supported by little or no evidence. But it is hardly true that all theories are unsupported by evidence. Germ theory has masses of evidence to support it, and so does the theory of Relativity, and atomic theory. So it is simply false that all theories are only theories.
The correspondence theory of truth is a theory that is supported by a good deal of evidence, and you yourself say, since it seems to explain pretty well how we talk and think about truth. And that fact gives it a good deal of support so that although it is a theory, it is not only a theory.
Many theories have had relatively good evidence and turned out to be just plain wrong. Perhaps I was too vague in saying that all theories are just theories, but they are. Some are more viable than others and some serve higher purposes than others, but they are all limited in that they are just possible explanations.
So, should we have a different name for theories that are supported by a good amount of evidence and theories that are not? It would seem so, because then theories wouldn't be both i) supported by evidence and ii) not supported by evidence.
Perhaps we should call i) bullshit and ii) theories. But then we have to ask at what point do we delineate when we have enough evidence for an explanation to be a theory and not bullshit.
But the nature of truth isn't an empirical matter, it's a matter of definition.
ughaibu wrote:
But the nature of truth isn't an empirical matter, it's a matter of definition.
Or a matter of practicality. I think the Pragmatic Theory of Truth would make truth an empirical matter. I can't back that up, though.
de Silentio wrote:If "truth is any pronouncement by the oracle at Delphi" is a pronouncement of the oracle at Delphi, then it's true. But there is an infinite number of such definitions, and for any definition, we can only show the truth of that definition by using that same definition. So, no definition can be backed up in any way which would satisfactorily show it to be the truth about truth.ughaibu wrote:Or a matter of practicality. I think the Pragmatic Theory of Truth would make truth an empirical matter. I can't back that up, though.But the nature of truth isn't an empirical matter, it's a matter of definition.
ughaibu wrote:Could you possibly put this is a way that is not so confusing?If "truth is any pronouncement by the oracle at Delphi" is a pronouncement of the oracle at Delphi, then it's true. But there is an infinite number of such definitions, and for any definition, we can only show the truth of that definition by using that same definition. So, no definition can be backed up in any way which would satisfactorily show it to be the truth about truth.
Well, of course, some theories are well supported by evidence, and then turn out to be false. (And not only theories, but any statements we make). But who denies that? We are fallible, and science, being a human enterprise is a fallible enterprise. We do have a name for a theory that is well supported by evidence, like germ theory. We say it is not only a theory, but it is a fact. (I don't know what you mean by a theory that is both supported and not supported by evidence. Do you mean, perhaps, a theory that is only partly supported, but which also has some disconfirming evidence as well? I suppose there are some such, and, in that case, I suppose that we are in the position of not knowing whether or not that theory is true). I don't think there is some precise cut-off point when a theory is found acceptable by experts in the field. I imagine that it is a gradual thing. Topic of the the acceptability of theories is a major topic in the philosophy of science.
But I don't think I quite get your point. What is it that you are arguing?
We say it is not only a theory, but it is a fact. (I don't know what you mean by a theory that is both supported and not supported by evidence. Do you mean, perhaps, a theory that is only partly supported, but which also has some disconfirming evidence as well?
kennethamy wrote:
Well, of course, some theories are well supported by evidence, and then turn out to be false. (And not only theories, but any statements we make). But who denies that? We are fallible, and science, being a human enterprise is a fallible enterprise. We do have a name for a theory that is well supported by evidence, like germ theory. We say it is not only a theory, but it is a fact. (I don't know what you mean by a theory that is both supported and not supported by evidence. Do you mean, perhaps, a theory that is only partly supported, but which also has some disconfirming evidence as well? I suppose there are some such, and, in that case, I suppose that we are in the position of not knowing whether or not that theory is true). I don't think there is some precise cut-off point when a theory is found acceptable by experts in the field. I imagine that it is a gradual thing. Topic of the the acceptability of theories is a major topic in the philosophy of science.
But I don't think I quite get your point. What is it that you are arguing?
My point is that a theory is not a fact... It is a theory. To use your example of the theory of relativity (TOR), TOR is a possible explanation for our observations of nature. Before Einstein, there was another theory. Perhaps the TOR is wrong and makes a fatal error somwhere but still looks right (like some of Newton's theories).
Quote:We say it is not only a theory, but it is a fact. (I don't know what you mean by a theory that is both supported and not supported by evidence. Do you mean, perhaps, a theory that is only partly supported, but which also has some disconfirming evidence as well?
What I mean is that you were using the word "theory" to mean two different things. In one sense you wanted to call a theory a fact and not a theory, which is nonsensical (you didn't use the word fact, but it seems by your last post that is what you meant) - this is (ii) in my delineation. In the other sense you wanted to call a theory just a theory - this would be (i) in my delineation.
A theory is a theory, that's a tautology. Are you going to tell me that that tautology is false? Let me change it now: A theory is just a theory. When I use the word "theory" in both the former and the latter sentances, I mean a possible explanation, throwing the word "just" in there doesn't seem to change the tautological nature of the proposition.
Furthermore, we were discussing theories of truth. Are you going to tell me you can sufficiently defend a theory of truth to call it a "fact" in the way you call Germ Theory a fact? Because, I would like to see you try.
To say that germ theory is a fact, is not to deny that it is also a theory. Theory and fact are not incompatible. They are complementary. And, of course, a theory is a theory.
Now, as I have said, I am not at all clear just what the pragmatic theory of truth is (and I don't think I am alone in this) but if it is epitomized by the slogan, "truth is what works" then I believe there are serious difficulties with that idea, one of which is that it leads to a vicious infinite regress.
My biggest problem is that truth becomes consequential to action or practical thought.
Why is that a problem ? I suggest you are in denial of the concept of thought as a dynamic proces
My biggest problem is that truth becomes consequential to action or practical thought.
My biggest problem is that truth becomes consequential to action or practical thought.
Quote:My biggest problem is that truth becomes consequential to action or practical thought.
Why is that a problem ? I suggest you are in denial of the concept of thought as a dynamic process which constructs relative permanencies. The abstract permanence of "the word" does not "describe" the dynamic world....in imposes order on the world in accordance with our evolutionary motivation" to control."
The abstract permanence of "the word" does not "describe" the dynamic world....in imposes order on the world in accordance with our evolutionary motivation" to control."
Quote:My biggest problem is that truth becomes consequential to action or practical thought.
Why is that a problem ?
fresco wrote:
Why is that a problem ? I suggest you are in denial of the concept of thought as a dynamic proces
I don't think I'm in denial of anything. Please provide me with some evidence that supports your suggestion.
Let me rephrase what I said in my former post:
Quote:My biggest problem is that truth becomes consequential to action or practical thought.
Should read: My biggest problem is that truth MERELY becomes conscequential to action or practical thought.
kennethamy wrote:
To say that germ theory is a fact, is not to deny that it is also a theory. Theory and fact are not incompatible. They are complementary. And, of course, a theory is a theory.
Good reply. I've haven't had the chance to study the philosophy of science, so this whole "theory"/"fact" thing is quite new to me. More or less, I'm shooting from the hip.
I do, however, have a problem with calling a theory a fact. The problem lies in the fallability, as you mentioned. Perhaps I can't sufficiently define what a fact is, though.
Quote:Now, as I have said, I am not at all clear just what the pragmatic theory of truth is (and I don't think I am alone in this) but if it is epitomized by the slogan, "truth is what works" then I believe there are serious difficulties with that idea, one of which is that it leads to a vicious infinite regress.
As I mentioned when I made the comment about the Pragmatic Theory of Truth, I cannot defend what I said. I'm unclear on the Pragmatic Theory of Truth also, but it is something like what you said. Here, this is copied from Wikipedia (I know.. shudder), but it hits home:
William James's version of pragmatic theory, while complex, is often summarized by his statement that "the 'true' is only the expedient in our way of thinking, just as the 'right' is only the expedient in our way of behaving."[27] By this, James meant that truth is a quality the value of which is confirmed by its effectiveness when applying concepts to actual practice (thus, "pragmatic").
Now, I have serious problems with the Pragmatic Theory of Truth just as you do. My biggest problem is that truth becomes consequential to action or practical thought. Did you think I was trying to defend this theory?
Should read: My biggest problem is that truth MERELY becomes conscequential to action or practical thought.
Pontius Pilate allegedly didn't know. Do you ?
