Every truth must be true

Water must n´t be just possibly liquid, but it certainly must be able to be also liquid given that is one of its intrinsic property´s...what you fail to prove on the fallacy is how could it be otherwise once given the actual state of affairs if such portion of water in such space/time frame is liquid then by fact it could not be a solid or a gas in that given moment...it is what it is is quite simple to get. Or it should be...

Either you break the deeper meaning of causality, or all Truths (in context) are NECESSARY Truths...

Now I can just imagine what you are going to say next...
I read it, I get it, and I still don´t agree.

(...I have this impression that tautology´s are precisely what you don´t understand...)

Hi Ken!

If I state this: Water is liquid. Then water is liquid - I have provided no room for manouvreability. If I state: Water is, amongst other things, liquid - Then we can negotiate. But, if the statement is restricted to the parameters set therein - End of.

Don't you think?

Kind regards.
Mark...

mark noble wrote:

Hi Ken!

If I state this: Water is liquid. Then water is liquid - I have provided no room for manouvreability. If I state: Water is, amongst other things, liquid - Then we can negotiate. But, if the statement is restricted to the parameters set therein - End of.

Don't you think?

Kind regards.
Mark...

I am interested in whether it is true that if water is liquid then it is liquid, or whether it is true that if water is liquid, then it must be liquid. It is clear that the first is true, but that the second is false. My interest here in maneuver is nil. I will add that to say that water is a liquid, I am not in any way saying the water is the only liquid. You seem to be confusing the two sentences: all water is liquid, with all liquid is water. In logic that is called the fallacy of false conversion.

A little logic can go a long way. Only, you do need a little logic.

Fil Albuquerque wrote:

Water must n´t be just possibly liquid, but it certainly must be able to be also liquid given that is one of its intrinsic property´s...what you fail to prove on the fallacy is how could it be otherwise once given the actual state of affairs if such portion of water in such space/time frame is liquid then by fact it could not be a solid or a gas in that given moment...it is what it is is quite simple to get. Or it should be...

Either you break the deeper meaning of causality, or all Truths (in context) are NECESSARY Truths...

Now I can just imagine what you are going to say next...
I read it, I get it, and I still don´t agree.

(...I have this impression that tautology´s are precisely what you don´t understand...)

The issue is whether it is true that if water is liquid, then water must be liquid. The issue is not whether water must be liquid, which is what you seem to believe. That has nothing whatever to do with the issue.

Perhaps you mean that by the sentence. If you say you do, then I will take your word for it. But that is certainly not what that sentence means. But, in any case, it is not true that for analytic truths that there is some state of affairs that makes an analytic statement true.
Lt me add that it is just false that for water to be liquid, water must be liquid. What is true, and what you are confusing what you said with, is that it must be true that for water to be liquid, water is liquid. What is false is that for water to be liquid, water must be liquid. You are committing the same modal fallacy now that you have committed from your very first post.

kennethamy wrote:

Perhaps you mean that by the sentence. If you say you do, then I will take your word for it. But that is certainly not what that sentence means. But, in any case, it is not true that for analytic truths that there is some state of affairs that makes an analytic statement true.
Lt me add that it is just false that for water to be liquid, water must be liquid. What is true, and what you are confusing what you said with, is that it must be true that for water to be liquid, water is liquid. What is false is that for water to be liquid, water must be liquid. You are committing the same modal fallacy now that you have committed from your very first post.

I know that the sentence "every truth must be true" reads for you as "every true state of affairs must be true," resulting in "no truth is contingent", which is false. By writing "it is just false that for water to be liquid, water must be liquid," in which the words "for water to be liquid" anticipate a state of affairs, you show that you are talking only about states of affairs. However, in the sentence "every truth must be true," the word "truth" means a true statement, rather than the state of affairs that makes that statement a truth. If it meant a state of affairs in itself, then we would have again that "no truth is contingent." Truth is an expression agent: there is no truth "out there": out there there is a state of affairs, which becomes a truth by means of a statement (or something else) that expresses it. You take the word "truth" for a state of affairs, when you should take it for a true statement. By taking truth for such an expression agent, you get a totally different concept of necessity: a relation between that expression agent and its expressed state of affairs, in which the former needs the latter, rather than the absolute necessity of a state of affairs in itself, as if it needed no expression or were its own expression. What is actually false is the idea of a state of affairs that is in itself already a truth.

I am not talking about states of affairs which are what make true sentences true. I am talking about sentences. And I am saying that although it must be that all true sentences are true, it is false that all true sentences must be true. It is the distinction between: it must be that all true sentences are true, and all true sentences must be true, that you constantly fail to see. The first is necessarily true. The second is simply false. When you see the distinction between the two you will not continue to make the same mistake. Do you see the distinction between those two propositions or not? If you do not, then please try to notice where the word, "must" appears in each of the propositions. The word "must" appears as at the beginning of the first sentence, but it appears in the end of the second sentence. That difference makes a difference in the meaning of the two sentences, and makes the first sentence (trivially true) and the second sentence simply false. You really ought to try to see the distinction. Simply note the location of the term "must". That will help you. I have now done my best to help you to see the difference between those two propositions which you are constantly confusing. I can do only so much. But I am afraid that I cannot give you understanding. So if you persist in not seeing the distinction, then I am afraid I must close.

kennethamy wrote:

I am not talking about states of affairs which are what make true sentences true. I am talking about sentences. And I am saying that although it must be that all true sentences are true, it is false that all true sentences must be true. It is the distinction between: it must be that all true sentences are true, and all true sentences must be true, that you constantly fail to see. The first is necessarily true. The second is simply false. When you see the distinction between the two you will not continue to make the same mistake. Do you see the distinction between those two propositions or not? If you do not, then please try to notice where the word, "must" appears in each of the propositions. The word "must" appears as at the beginning of the first sentence, but it appears in the end of the second sentence. That difference makes a difference in the meaning of the two sentences, and makes the first sentence (trivially true) and the second sentence simply false. You really ought to try to see the distinction. Simply note the location of the term "must". That will help you. I have now done my best to help you to see the difference between those two propositions which you are constantly confusing. I can do only so much. But I am afraid that I cannot give you understanding. So if you persist in not seeing the distinction, then I am afraid I must close.

I see you are sincerely trying to make me see something you believe I do not see, but which I am already seeing. I understand you point of view. From your perspective, you have all reasons to believe yourself to be correct. I am only trying to show you there is another place from where to see this. And once you are able to see things from this other point of view, you will understand what I am saying. So I urge you to consider my point of view for one instant. For just one moment, consider the possibility of a different perspective. Then, take a truth neither as a pure statement nor as a pure state of affairs, but as a true statement getting its truth from a state of affairs. Give a third dimension to your two-dimensional truth: depth. In other words, take a truth not as just a statement, but as a true statement. If you do that, you will see that not only the meaning of “every truth is necessarily true” is changed, but also the meaning of “necessarily every truth is true,” which you repute as true, is changed: once you take a truth as a true statement, by not forgetting the state of affairs that gives that statement its truth, necessity ceases to be a property applying to a flat statement, and becomes a relation between a true statement and whatever state of affairs is its truth - a relation of necessity, precisely.

Thank you for putting it so clearly !
True statements on actual state of affairs, depend on they're causes to be necessarily true...Same is to say that the facts are contingent to they´re causes, the resulting Truth it is n´t, and it has a retroactive value !
Nevertheless it matters to say that Truth is a question of correspondence between the length of what the concept demands with, for all that I know, just so much length of the actual fact...

Fil Albuquerque wrote:

Thank you for putting it so clearly !
True statements on actual state of affairs, depend on they're causes to be necessarily true...Same is to say that the facts are contingent to they´re causes, the resulting Truth it is n´t, and it has a retroactive value !
Nevertheless it matters to say that Truth is a question of correspondence between the length of what the concept demands with, for all that I know, just so much length of the actual fact...

I would say it a little differently: true statements depend on states of affairs to be true. It is only this dependency that constitutes the necessary truth of any truth: a true statement necessitates a state of affairs making it a truth - every truth must be true.

But my Obama example shows that is false. It is true that Obama is president, but it is not true that it must be true that Obama is president, for he might not have been president. Or, if you like, the state of affairs in virtue of which Obama is president might not have existed. Therefore, the statement that every truth must be true is false. As I have been saying, what is true is that if a statement is true, then that statement is true. Or, to put it into your language. If a particular state of affairs exists, then that particular state of affairs exists. Which is true enough. But trivially true, and is simply an instance of the law of identity that A is A. The same modal confusion, repeated. How could it both be true that Obama must be president, and also true that Obama might not have been president? Answer, those cannot both be true.

If Obama is president in 2010, there is no longer a possibility that he is not president in 2010.

ACB wrote:

If Obama is president in 2010, there is no longer a possibility that he is not president in 2010.

That is not true. I think you are once more confusing epistemic possibility with modal possibility. It is surely logically possible that Obama is not president in 2010 even if he is president in 2010 since the proposition that Obama is not president in 2010 is not self-contradictory although it is true that Obama is president in 2010.

Water must n´t be just possibly liquid, but it certainly must be able to be also liquid given that is one of its intrinsic property´s...what you fail to prove on the fallacy is how could it be otherwise once given the actual state of affairs if such portion of water in such space/time frame is liquid then by fact it could not be a solid or a gas in that given moment...it is what it is is quite simple to get. Or it should be...

Either you break the deeper meaning of causality, or all Truths (in context) are NECESSARY Truths...

Now I can just imagine what you are going to say next...
I read it, I get it, and I still don´t agree.

(...I have this impression that tautology´s are precisely what you don´t understand...)

If Obama is president in 2010, it is possible that he might not have been president in 2010. In ordinary English, if we want to express a counterfactual possibility, we use "might have" or "could have" plus the main verb, not the main verb on its own.

1. It is possible that Germany won World War II.
2. [It is possible that] Germany might have won World War II.

Most people would say (2) is true, but only a philosopher would say (1) is true. Philosophers use verbs and tenses in their own special way.

Fil Albuquerque wrote:

Water must n´t be just possibly liquid, but it certainly must be able to be also liquid given that is one of its intrinsic property´s...what you fail to prove on the fallacy is how could it be otherwise once given the actual state of affairs if such portion of water in such space/time frame is liquid then by fact it could not be a solid or a gas in that given moment...it is what it is is quite simple to get. Or it should be...

Either you break the deeper meaning of causality, or all Truths (in context) are NECESSARY Truths...

Now I can just imagine what you are going to say next...
I read it, I get it, and I still don´t agree.

(...I have this impression that tautology´s are precisely what you don´t understand...)

I don't know what an intrinsic property is supposed to be. But what is clear is that water need not be a liquid since water can take the form of either a solid (ice) or a gas (steam). That is simply a fact.