@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:Yes I agree. And it was there that you committed the modal fallacy of confusing: (1) necessarily, if a proposition is true, then that proposition is true with, if a proposition is true then that proposition is necessarily true. But, after that fallacy was pointed out, there was no further point to this thread, and the thread continued only because you did not (and for all I know, still do not) recognize the fallacy you committed at the start.
It seems to me that you did not read my original post. Even so, your post about Quito as the capital of Ecuador gave me the occasion to rewrite my first post in the following manner, to address the timing issue you raised:
If any truth were untrue, then it would not be a truth: every truth must be true. However, we must know how to read this right.
As generally agreed, for the statement “
water is liquid” to be true
water must be liquid. By which we must call that statement a truth
inasmuch as water is liquid:
as water ceases to be liquid we must
inasmuch cease calling the statement “
water is liquid” a truth. Hence, what we call “truth” is a true statement (or true idea, true memory, and so on): one that expresses a state of affairs – an expression
agent –
inasmuch as that expression remains actual. If truth has this meaning, then the statement “every truth must be true” reads as “truthness must be true,” so:
1. It becomes true, rather than redundant or false.
2. The necessary truth of any truth becomes the state of affairs that makes a truth actually true while still doing so.
For that necessary truth to be redundant or false, a truth must be taken as meaning, respectively:
1. The expression itself of a state of affairs – rather than its actual agent – hence an absolute, unary truth, by which our statement “every truth must be true” reads as “every expression of a state of affairs must be the expression of a state of affairs.”
2. The state of affairs that possibly makes a statement a truth – rather than that statement as actually true – by which our statement “every truth must be true” reads as “no truth is contingent.”
Indeed:
1. A true statement and a state of affairs that are indistinguishable as an absolutely true, unary expression become both necessarily true, making no truth possibly false, or then possibly true, and so actually true. Possible truth is inconceivable without possible falsehood and actual truth is inconceivable without possible truth.
2. A state of affairs that makes a statement a truth by being itself already true becomes itself an equivalent statement. Any state of affairs can only make a statement a truth by being itself truth-indeterminate.
Finally, when a truth refers to an expression agent, necessity becomes a relation instead of a property – a relation between a true statement and a state of affairs, in which the former
needs the latter – so the statement “every truth must be true” reads as “necessarily (needfully) every truth is true.” Which, in the other two senses, becomes two new tautologies:
1. Once a truth is the expression itself of a state of affairs, the statement “necessarily every truth is true” reads as “necessarily every expression of a state of affairs is the expression of a state of affairs.”
2. Once a truth is the state of affairs that possibly makes a statement a truth – rather than that statement as actually true – such a state of affairs itself must be a statement so as to be already true, by which our statement “necessarily every truth is true” reads as “necessarily every self-expressing state of affairs is its own expression.”
Hence, the statement “every truth must be true” correctly reads as “every true statement must have a state of affairs making that statement a truth.”