@fresco,
GoshisDead wrote:
Its possible that a thinger things a thing in much the way a stuffer stuffs some stuff.
Aaahhh! The light was behind me the whole time, and the world that I that was was nothing but shadows!
fresco wrote:
Huxley,
As a working hypothesis, we need to take language as an a priori for "thinging". Thus the segmentation of "the world" is usually available to the "observer" for those co-ordinative processes we call "thinking". Heidegger gives the example of a man hammering without any awareness (thinking) of a separation of "self" and "hammer" until he hits his thumb say. At that point the "hammer" and "self" becomes separated with a vocalization (internal or external) of the form "damn Hammer" or "Joe (himself) you idiot be more careful" etc. Thus "thinging" occurs when there is a pause in the flow in which relationships are examined and revised. He might even pick up what would in general terms would be called "a brick" so that it functions as a replacement for "hammer",i.e. it is "thinged" as "hammer". Note that the "properties" of "things" are expectations about functional relationships.
They are not aspects of "objects" per se. Obviously the origins of language are significant to this analysis, and this has lead some to speculate that we must search for those in the social domain, hence a leaning towards the concept of a socially structured reality.
I think that this explication is a good explanatory model for a number of occurrences, but I don't think you can stay within this sphere to explain everything. I'd say that, with such an explanation, you're lacking an ability to account for unexpected discovery (like tripping on a branch, or something of that nature) -- these are moments when objects take over language. Another difficulty would be explaining the origination of new words.
I agree that a large number of concepts are inherited through culture (with existence attached), and I agree that we often loose ourselves in objects and the objects become mentally absorbed into the subject (or ourselves) -- this would explain why people buy
certain things, drive
certain cars, hang
certain paintings. We identify ourselves with the objects we collect, at least within our culture. Even phenomenologically, as you indicate with the hammer example, this is something we do. I recall experiencing such in many circumstances: when utilizing a tool, or when riding a bike. I never felt that I was "good" at something until that something become an extension of what I was.
But I do think that your hypothesis has some apparent (and this is only my first-go interpretation) internal difficulties. Even if you utilize this metaphor to explain unexpected events, newness, and discovery, you may just be substituting words for the same meaning that the world out-there is (though I won't say that the "is" is a fact, myself), and our ideas are approximations of the out-there. In a sense, then, you'd be agreeing with the opposing side in content while rejecting its formal aspect. I'm not sure if that's exactly what you're going for.