The necessary truth of any truth

@fresco,

fresco wrote:

"Truth lies in the eye of the beholder"means there is no such thing as "objective reality". Truth is "what works" and "belief" is the degree of confidence is "what works". The fact that there is much statistical agreement in this matter has already been discussed. As for the status of propositional logic in all this, that is a mere mathematical exercise in set theory only occasionally involved in "confidence levels".

Question: Is "what works" in the eye of the beholder too? If it is, then it isn't much of an improvement on truth, now is it?

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@Mad Mike,

Mad Mike wrote:

Sorry, I have to reject all of this. "Statistical agreement?" Please. How about: We're all looking at the same reality, so is it really a surprise that we draw similar conclusions?

Relativity and quantum mechanics are not philosophy, though one's attitude toward them may constitute a philosophical position. And even if "concepts of 'reality' have been forced to shift somewhat since 1905," I don't think reality has changed. The fact that you put scare quotes around "reality" says a lot.

Yes, indeed. What is true is not true because we agree. On the contrary, we agree because what is true is true. It isn't as if the cat is on the mat because we agree the cat is on the may. Rather, we agree that the cat is on the mat because the cat is on the mat.

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@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper wrote:

ACB wrote:
But if a tree were not a tree, what residual property would it have? What is the difference between (a) a tree that is not a tree, and (b) a non-tree that is not a tree? It doesn't make sense to me.

The lump of matter it was composed of.

OK. Then my earlier objection to "my father isn't necessarily my father" applies equally to "a tree isn't necessarily a tree". The same term is being used in two different senses in the same sentence, resulting in confusion.

In fact, the situation is worse in the "tree" example. If, as you say, a tree could be a person or an ice cream or anything else, then the lump of matter that comprises the tree-that-is-not-a-tree would not even require the same chemical elements (i.e. the same types of atom) as a tree. Would it need to have any properties in common with an actual tree? Could a volume of air be a tree? Could a light wave? Could a volume of empty space? There is a reductio ad absurdum here. This is why I think there is a conceptual, as well as a linguistic, problem with the de re interpretation of "A is A".

1 Reply

@ACB,

It could be an artificial tree.

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@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper wrote:

(1) The time is 10:00 PM.

(2) The time has become 10:00 PM.

Either is acceptable. Calling one of these bad English just means you have a poor grasp of English.

This is no matter, though. In your haste to salvage your argument, you have admitted defeat already. Your original claim was that all truths are necessary but you have just acknowledged that "my father is my father" (or in your words "my father has become my father") is contingent. So therefore you've lost the argument. Some truths are necessary, others are not. This is the standard belief that most people hold. You've proven nothing new at all. QED.

You are committing a twofold mistake:

1. Of course "my father is my father" and "my father has become my father" are both acceptable (an assertion that was originally mine, by the way), despite the first being misleading: the point is that neither one is an instance of the principle of identity, which is our actual point of contention (remember?).

2. My claim was never that "all truths are necessary," it was rather that "all truths are necessarily true" (A is A).

Once again, please pay attention - and I am by no means acknowledging my "defeat," although my patience is almost there.

1 Reply

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

The question is what would be a sound, or even a plausibly sound, argument for the conclusion that all truths are necessary truths, since the burden of proof lies heavily on anyone who claims that, for all the evidence is contrary to that. And no, even plausible argument, has been offered. Thus, there is no reason to suppose it is true, and every reason to suppose it is false.

That all truths are necessarily truths has no more a "burden of proof" than "A is A." Can you prove that "A is A"? Likewise, no one can (or needs to) prove that "every truth must be true": it necessarily results from a truth being what it is: a truth. You are essentially committing the same mistake as Night Ripper, by taking "every truth must be true" to mean "every truth must have been true," a sentence in which the first "A" (truth) has a different meaning then the second one: in "every truth must have been true," the first "A" means a possible truth, while the second one means an actual one. Conversely, "every truth must be true" means the identity between an already actual truth and itself (A is A).

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@ACB,

ACB wrote:

[...] shouldn't the sentence read "James isn't necessarily my father" or "This person (James) isn't necessarily my father"? Making "my father" the grammatical subject of the sentence here is very misleading, since it gives the term "my father" two different senses in the same sentence. In "my father isn't necessarily my father", the first "my father" means "this particular person (James)", but the second means "whoever my father is". To my mind this is a misuse of English. [Note: I am not referring to guigus's objection here - that is a separate issue.]

The first "my father" being James while the second is whoever my father is has three possible results:

1. My father is not necessarily my father, inadequately meaning that my father has not necessarily become my father.

2. My father is not necessarily my father, adequately meaning that I am not sure if my father is indeed my father or not.

3. My father has not necessarily become my father, adequately meaning precisely that.

The main point is that in all three sentences the first "my father" is a possible father (either in the past or in the present), while the second is an actual one (either in the present or in the future):

1. My (once possible) father is not necessarily my (now actual) father, inadequately meaning that my father has not necessarily become my father.

2. My (now possible) father is not necessarily my (now actual or then future) father, adequately meaning that I am not sure if my father is indeed my father or not.

3. My (once possible) father has not necessarily become my (now actual) father, adequately meaning precisely that.

Conversely, the first "my father" being whoever my father is has only one possible result, which is the statement "my father is necessarily my father," in which both the first "my father" and the second one are present actualities: the meaning of the first "my father" (as either a possibility or an actuality) determines the temporal structure of the sentence, as also its being or not an instance of the so-called "principle" of identity (A is A: my father is necessarily my father).

1 Reply

@guigus,

guigus wrote:

2. My claim was never that "all truths are necessary," it was rather that "all truths are necessarily true" (A is A).

Oh my mistake, but that doesn't change anything. Let me state it again in your terms...

Your original claim was that all truths are necessarily true but you have just acknowledged that "my father is my father" (or in your words "my father has become my father") is contingently true. So therefore you've lost the argument. Some truths are necessarily true, others are not. This is the standard belief that most people hold. You've proven nothing new at all.

Happy now?

1 Reply

@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper wrote:

guigus wrote:

2. My claim was never that "all truths are necessary," it was rather that "all truths are necessarily true" (A is A).

Oh my mistake, but that doesn't change anything. Let me state it again in your terms...

Your original claim was that all truths are necessarily true but you have just acknowledged that "my father is my father" (or in your words "my father has become my father") is contingently true.

Careful there: what I acknowledged is that:

1. My once possible father having become my actual father can be regarded as contingent.

2. The statement "my father is my father" can improperly mean "my father has become my father," by which it can be regarded as contingent.

There is yet another way in which "my father is my father" can be regarded as contingent, which is by (still improperly) meaning "James is my father." However, the proper meaning of "my father is my father" is either:

1. Whoever is my father is whoever is my father.
2. James is James.

None of which is contingent.

Night Ripper wrote:

So therefore you've lost the argument.

Not yet: life is tough.

Night Ripper wrote:

Some truths are necessarily true, others are not.

You mean some truths are necessary, others are not.

Night Ripper wrote:

This is the standard belief that most people hold.

If properly written, yes.

Night Ripper wrote:

You've proven nothing new at all.

I hope so.

Night Ripper wrote:

Happy now?

Why shouldn't I be? And you?

1 Reply

This thread has become agonizing to read. Imagine what it is like for Night Ripper.

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@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

This thread has become agonizing to read. Imagine what it is like for Night Ripper.

I am sure it is for you, and I perfectly understand why. Besides, that was always your problem: reading.

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@guigus,

guigus wrote:

The statement "my father is my father" can improperly mean "my father has become my father," by which it can be regarded as contingent.

So, to summarize, the proposition "my father has become my father" is a contingently true truth which directly refutes your claim that all truths are necessarily true. QED.

2 Replies

@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper wrote:

guigus wrote:
The statement "my father is my father" can improperly mean "my father has become my father," by which it can be regarded as contingent.

So, to summarize, the proposition "my father has become my father" is a contingently true truth which directly refutes your claim that all truths are necessarily true. QED.

Are you even reading what I write?

1. The statement "all truths are necessarily true" means all truths are necessarily truths, which is an instance of "A is necessarily A," all this being a consequence of anything being (necessarily) identical to itself (the so-called "principle" of identity).

2. The statement "all truths are necessary" means all now actual truths were once possible truths that have necessarily become actually true, which is by no means what I am saying.

At least you have the merit of making me explain that so even a baby can understand it.

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This is tautology.

A = A;
A =/= ~A

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@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper wrote:

guigus wrote:
The statement "my father is my father" can improperly mean "my father has become my father," by which it can be regarded as contingent.

So, to summarize, the proposition "my father has become my father" is a contingently true truth which directly refutes your claim that all truths are necessarily true. QED.

Cant't you really see that "my father has become my father" has a different meaning than the very being of my father being identical to itself?

And can't you really see that "all truths are necessarily true" means not that all truths have become true by necessity, but rather that the very being of all truths necessarily consists in their being true?

Finally, can't you see the difference between "all truths are true by necessity" and "all truths have become true by necessity"? In the first case, the expression "all truths" refers to actual truths (are true), while in the second case that expression refers to possible truths (have become true). Hence, the first case is an instance of "A (all actual truths) is (are) A (actual truths)," while the second is an instance of "A (possible truths) is (have necessarily become) B (all actual truths)."

1 Reply

@RealEyes,

RealEyes wrote:

This is tautology.

A = A;
A =/= ~A

Tautology or not, do you agree that "every truth must be true" is an instance of "A is A", so it means the necessary identity between a truth and itself?

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@guigus,

guigus wrote:

my father has not necessarily become my father

As I pointed out to Night Ripper, this is a misuse of English, since you are using "my father" in two different senses in the same sentence.

guigus wrote:

The main point is that in all three sentences the first "my father" is a possible father (either in the past or in the present), while the second is an actual one (either in the present or in the future)

The meaning of "possible father" is obscure. What is the difference between (a) being a possible but not an actual father, and (b) being neither a possible nor an actual father? What is the minimum requirement for something to be a possible father? Must a possible father be an actual man? Or can it be any old lump of matter that might in time recombine into the form of a man? Must it have an equal mass? Etc, etc. The whole idea is hopelessly vague so far.

Unless the term "possible father" is carefully defined, this whole discussion is just empty wordplay.

1 Reply

@ACB,

ACB wrote:

guigus wrote:
my father has not necessarily become my father

As I pointed out to Night Ripper, this is a misuse of English, since you are using "my father" in two different senses in the same sentence.
guigus wrote:
The main point is that in all three sentences the first "my father" is a possible father (either in the past or in the present), while the second is an actual one (either in the present or in the future)

The meaning of "possible father" is obscure. What is the difference between (a) being a possible but not an actual father, and (b) being neither a possible nor an actual father? What is the minimum requirement for something to be a possible father? Must a possible father be an actual man? Or can it be any old lump of matter that might in time recombine into the form of a man? Must it have an equal mass? Etc, etc. The whole idea is hopelessly vague so far.

Unless the term "possible father" is carefully defined, this whole discussion is just empty wordplay.

Just replace "possible father" by "father candidate." I hope this helps you.

1 Reply

@RealEyes,

RealEyes wrote:

This is tautology.

A = A;
A =/= ~A

I can imagine people saying to Aristotle, when he uttered that A is A: "this is tautology, man."

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@guigus,

guigus wrote:

Just replace "possible father" by "father candidate." I hope this helps you.

But "father candidate" is just as vague as "possible father". Until we are clear about what father candidates are and what they're not, we can't make any meaningful statements about them.

And whatever possible fathers or father candidates are, we should not use the plain term "father" as a shorthand way of referring to them (as in "My father has not necessarily become my father"), as this causes unnecessary confusion.

1 Reply

The necessary truth of any truth

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