The necessary truth of any truth

Thank you for your post. I think I can sum up your argument as follows:
1. The range of possible truths (subjective realities) about the future includes one actual truth.
2. Objective reality 'selects' an actual truth (the actual truth?) from among the possible truths.
3. An actual truth is still, by definition, a possible truth.
4, But a possible truth is, by definition, not actual.
5. Therefore there is a contradiction.
6. All contradictions are necessarily false; therefore the actual truth is actually false.
7. An actual falsity is, by definition, a possible falsity (compare (3) above).
8. A possible falsity is a possible truth (otherwise it would be a certain falsity, not just a possible one).
9. This possible truth becomes one of the range of possible truths (subjective realities), and we are back to step (1).

I have the following objections to the above argument:

(a) I think (3) and (4) use the word "possible" in two different senses, so a real contradiction does not follow from them. In (3), "possible" just means "could happen", but in (4) it means "could happen but has not yet done so". One definition is more restrictive than the other, and the seeming "contradiction" arises from these inconsistent definitions. So I reject (5), and consequently the subsequent steps also.

(b) In (6), you have slipped from "the contradiction is false" to "the actual truth is false". But the contradiction and the actual truth are two different things.

(c) I also do not accept (8). In logic, "possible" means "not impossible". Therefore "certainty" is a subset of "possibility". Hence a possible falsity may be a certain falsity, and need not be a possible truth.

(d) Finally, I don't see how the actual truth in (2) can be one of the possible truths in (9), since (2) refers to a present or past event, and (9) to a future one.

When you consider the possibility of an actuality, the nexus between them, which lets you consider that possibility for a start, forces actuality into the future.

So I don't regard "possibility" as necessarily forcing actuality into the future. It only does so if you specify "future possibility". The future possibility of event E and the (later) present actuality of event E are two different things, albeit related.

Perhaps "future possibility" is ambiguous. Let me try to clarify:

Let P = a specific place, T = a specific time, and PT = that place at that time. When T is in the future, there are the alternative possibilities of events E1, E2, E3 etc at PT. When T is the present, one of these possibilities (say E1) becomes actual (while remaining "possible" in the logical sense). What I am saying is that the present possibility of the future occurrence of E1 is a distinct entity from the present (actual) occurrence of E1; the two things are in no way identical, although they are of course closely related. They are not identical, because two identical things must have an identical set of properties, and this is clearly not the case for the underlined entities; in the former, E1 is (a) in the future and (b) uncertain, whereas in the latter, E1 is (a) in the present and (b) certain. Quite different properties.

Everything is either true or false (the principle of bivalence) means that nothing can be true while being false (both true and false). Then:

1. Every truth is necessarily not false.
2. Being not false is necessarily being true.
3. Every truth is necessarily true.

guigus wrote:

Everything is either true or false (the principle of bivalence) means that nothing can be true while being false (both true and false). Then:

1. Every truth is necessarily not false.
2. Being not false is necessarily being true.
3. Every truth is necessarily true.

You're committing the modal fallacy.

(a) Every truth is necessarily not false.
(b) Necessarily, Every truth is not false.

The above statements (a) and (b) are not equivalent. They say very different things depending on where you place the word "necessarily". Only the above (b) statement is true but (a) is completely false. To confuse (a) with (b) is to commit the modal fallacy.

http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/swartz/modal_fallacy.htm

guigus wrote:

Everything is either true or false (the principle of bivalence) means that nothing can be true while being false (both true and false). Then:

1. Every truth is necessarily not false.
2. Being not false is necessarily being true.
3. Every truth is necessarily true.

You're committing the modal fallacy.

(a) Every truth is necessarily not false.
(b) Necessarily, Every truth is not false.

The above statements (a) and (b) are not equivalent. They say very different things depending on where you place the word "necessarily". Only the above (b) statement is true but (a) is completely false. To confuse (a) with (b) is to commit the modal fallacy.

http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/swartz/modal_fallacy.htm

Night Ripper wrote:

guigus wrote:

Everything is either true or false (the principle of bivalence) means that nothing can be true while being false (both true and false). Then:

1. Every truth is necessarily not false.
2. Being not false is necessarily being true.
3. Every truth is necessarily true.

You're committing the modal fallacy.

(a) Every truth is necessarily not false.
(b) Necessarily, Every truth is not false.

The above statements (a) and (b) are not equivalent. They say very different things depending on where you place the word "necessarily". Only the above (b) statement is true but (a) is completely false. To confuse (a) with (b) is to commit the modal fallacy.

http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/swartz/modal_fallacy.htm

As has already been explained 12 to the thirteenth power times. But he thinks this is mere logical quibbling. (Why "not false" and not just "true").

First you need to acknowledge that the previous statements (a) and (b) have different meanings. They aren't just a rephrasing of the same meaning but they have completely different meanings. Then you need to understand why one is true and you need to understand why the other is false.

Somethings are contingently true, like that I was born on a Thursday. I could have been born on a Wednesday but I wasn't. There's nothing necessary about the truth of my birthday.

Somethings are necessarily true. Like that all bachelors are unmarried men. That's necessarily true.

Some truths are necessarily true but not all are. However, necessarily, all truths are true and not false. It's quite simple but you don't seem able to comprehend it.

Night Ripper wrote:

First you need to acknowledge that the previous statements (a) and (b) have different meanings. They aren't just a rephrasing of the same meaning but they have completely different meanings. Then you need to understand why one is true and you need to understand why the other is false.

And the reason for that would be... that you are saying so? Like your teacher of logic said you so? So you are trying to reproduce that process?

Night Ripper wrote:

Somethings are contingently true, like that I was born on a Thursday. I could have been born on a Wednesday but I wasn't. There's nothing necessary about the truth of my birthday.

Now tell me something new, please, because this is getting really boring.

Night Ripper wrote:

Somethings are necessarily true. Like that all bachelors are unmarried men. That's necessarily true.

Not if they are lying to you, but let it be, those things do not happen in your world, anyway.

Night Ripper wrote:

Some truths are necessarily true but not all are. However, necessarily, all truths are true and not false. It's quite simple but you don't seem able to comprehend it.

So if I do not agree with you, then it must be because I don't comprehend you. Have you ever considered the possibility that I do comprehend you and still do not agree with you?

I am really tired of knowing that "every truth must be true" and "it must be that every truth is true" have different meanings to you, as also for all those who embrace logical formalisms. What you are failing to realize is that I am not one of those persons. But let us go back to the principle of bivalence. Are you aware of it? It states that either something is true or else it is false. Now something they don't tell you in the school of formal logic: for that to hold - or even make sense - any truth must be inherently not false. Otherwise, the principle of bivalence loses its foundation, so you can either believe it or not at your will. In other words, a truth does not need being false because of the principle of bivalence: on the contrary, it is the principle of bivalence that holds only because every truth must be not false. In the light of this, the circumstance that "it must be that every truth is not false" is just a consequence of the circumstance that "every truth must be not false" (by forgetting this you turn the first sentence into an "absolute principle" that comes from Aristotle the same way the ten commandments come from Moses). But every truth must be not false for no external reason: it must be not false because it is its nature do be so. It is not a consequence of Aristotle having decreed it: a truth must be what it is, which happens to be not being false. However, once the principle of bivalence holds - by which anything is either true or false - being not false must be the same as being true, so "every truth must be true." This does not mean that "no truth is contingent," simply because we are talking about something that is already true, so its necessarily being true does not make it a truth - as if it were not a truth before that - but is rather a consequence of its being - already - a truth. When you read the sentence "every truth must be true," once you arrive at the "must be" part you go back in time to the moment in which that truth was not yet a truth, and apply its necessary truth to that "not-yet-itself" truth, which is why for you the sentence becomes "no truth is contingent." If you just stop doing that, then that sentence will show you its true meaning.

guigus wrote:

Night Ripper wrote:

First you need to acknowledge that the previous statements (a) and (b) have different meanings. They aren't just a rephrasing of the same meaning but they have completely different meanings. Then you need to understand why one is true and you need to understand why the other is false.

And the reason for that would be... that you are saying so? Like your teacher of logic said you so? So you are trying to reproduce that process?

Night Ripper wrote:

Somethings are contingently true, like that I was born on a Thursday. I could have been born on a Wednesday but I wasn't. There's nothing necessary about the truth of my birthday.

Now tell me something new, please, because this is getting really boring.

Night Ripper wrote:

Somethings are necessarily true. Like that all bachelors are unmarried men. That's necessarily true.

Not if they are lying to you, but let it be, those things do not happen in your world, anyway.

Night Ripper wrote:

Some truths are necessarily true but not all are. However, necessarily, all truths are true and not false. It's quite simple but you don't seem able to comprehend it.

So if I do not agree with you, then it must be because I don't comprehend you. Have you ever considered the possibility that I do comprehend you and still do not agree with you?

I am really tired of knowing that "every truth must be true" and "it must be that every truth is true" have different meanings to you, as also for all those who embrace logical formalisms. What you are failing to realize is that I am not one of those persons. But let us go back to the principle of bivalence. Are you aware of it? It states that either something is true or else it is false. Now something they don't tell you in the school of formal logic: for that to hold - or even make sense - any truth must be inherently not false. Otherwise, the principle of bivalence loses its foundation, so you can either believe it or not at your will. In other words, a truth does not need being false because of the principle of bivalence: on the contrary, it is the principle of bivalence that holds only because every truth must be not false. In the light of this, the circumstance that "it must be that every truth is not false" is just a consequence of the circumstance that "every truth must be not false" (by forgetting this you turn the first sentence into an "absolute principle" that comes from Aristotle the same way the ten commandments come from Moses). But every truth must be not false for no external reason: it must be not false because it is its nature do be so. It is not a consequence of Aristotle having decreed it: a truth must be what it is, which happens to be not being false. However, once the principle of bivalence holds - by which anything is either true or false - being not false must be the same as being true, so "every truth must be true." This does not mean that "no truth is contingent," simply because we are talking about something that is already true, so its necessarily being true does not make it a truth - as if it were not a truth before that - but is rather a consequence of its being - already - a truth. When you read the sentence "every truth must be true," once you arrive at the "must be" part you go back in time to the moment in which that truth was not yet a truth, and apply its necessary truth to that "not-yet-itself" truth, which is why for you the sentence becomes "no truth is contingent." If you just stop doing that, then that sentence will show you its true meaning.

I am really tired of knowing that "every truth must be true" and "it must be that every truth is true" have different meanings to you, as also for all those who embrace logical formalismsIf you just stop doing that, then that sentence will show you its true meaning.

If you just stop doing that, then that sentence will show you its true meaning.

Just what makes you think that you know what the "true meaning" of any term is, especially after you have just held that the meaning you assign to a term is different from its ordinary meaning? Just how do you decided what the "true meaning" of a term is. Let's suppose I say that President Obama is deficient because he has not been boiled for 6 minutes. And if you were to comment that what I said was nonsense, suppose I were to reply that your comment is wrong because you don't know that the true meaning of "President Obama" is "hard boiled egg", and that since he is a hard boiled egg, and hard boiled eggs have to be boiled for at least 6 minutes, he is deficient, since he has not been boiled for 6 minutes. There are no "true meanings" of words. Repeat, there are no true meanings of words The meaning of words is the meaning assigned to them by the speakers of the language. And, even if you were right, there is still a distinction between, necessarily if p then q, and if p then necessarily q. The distinction just stares you in the face. Just look at where "necessarily" is placed in the two different sentences. The sentences are different just because of the location of the term, "necessarily".

Here is a (I hope) a helpful comparison:

Consider:

1. Only Joe talked to John.
2. Joe talked only to John.

1 and 2 obviously mean different things. If you can speak or read English, you will know that. If you thought they meant the same thing, it would strongly indicate that you could not speak English (or you were mentally deficient). Why do they mean different things? Please notice that they both contain the very same words. The distinction in meaning is due only to the differences in syntax, and more specifially, the placement of the term "only".

Finally, the principle of bi-valence states that every statement is either true or false. That principle might be stated as, Necessarily, every statement is true or false. But that principle does not state that every statement is necessarily true, or necessarily false. So your inference from the principle of bi-valence, to what you hold, is fallacious. It commits that same old modal fallacy.