@Amperage,
Amperage;154998 wrote:Do you think I don't realize that is the ''standard'' definition? Why don't you believe me that that definition is not good?
Kennethamy is correct to the extent that hard determinists are realists about determinism and incompatibilism, whereas soft determinists are realists about determinism and compatibilism, but he's incorrect about almost everything else, concerning this subject.
First, Kennethamy maintains that realism about determinism doesn't conflict with realism about micro-indeterminism, this is nonsense. The basic claim of determinism is that
everything is fixed, there are no exceptions for quantum events, any more than there are exceptions for biological events, such as acts of free will. If this weren't the case, and Kennethamy was correct, then there wouldn't be any hidden variables theories, as the only function of hidden variables theories is to allow determinists to claim that no-go theorems don't definitively show determinism to be false.
Second, about Kennethamy's claim that determinism is a thesis about cause; the only group of scientists who have any pretensions to deciding whether or not the world is determined, is physicists. All deterministic laws of physics are reversible, and for determinism to be true, laws of nature too must be reversible, because to exactly fix an outcome requires an equation. But cause is not reversible, dropping the piano on the egg causes the egg to break, but breaking the egg doesn't cause the piano to drop onto it. In a determined world the notion of cause is as meaningless as stating that two plus two causes four and four causes two plus two.
Historically, the post-Newton modern determinism first started falling apart with the irreversibility of Loschmidt's paradox.
In any case, on this thread Kennethamy writes "determinism is the view that every event and state of affairs can be explained by subsuming it under a universal causal law together with initial conditions. It is codified in the covering law theory of explanation", which is full blown rubbish. It's a claim of explanatory completeness, and it should be obvious at a glance that explanations dont determine. How could determinism be the thesis of explanatory completeness when there are phenomena which are explained by quantum
indeterminancy? And Kennethamy is a realist about quantum indeterminancy. Further, the coving law theory of explanation is a thesis about scientific explanations, given the present best theories of science, the probability of any event having such an explanation, and thus, according to Kennethamy, being determined, is zero, so quite obviously this is not what anyone, at all familiar with the matter, means by determinism.
Kennethamy is great if you want to know the opinions of almost any leading philosopher up till the middle of the twentieth century, but his ideas about the philosophical positions themselves, are confused and unreliable.