@hue-man,
hue-man;137204 wrote:And why don't you think that qualia can be reduced to the functional properties of perception?
I don't mind you thinking differently, but that doesn't mean that I approve of or respect your views. Idealism and conceptualism just don't hold enough water.
In my opinion, all of our distinctions are contingent, accidental. Mind/matter, self/other, etc. For practical reasons we must maintain these distinctions, but I don't think they are logically grounded. So philosophically I agree w/ Hegel, that a master concept subsuming all of these is necessary. And this concept must be self-negating, else it also becomes a superstition.
I feel that we organize qualia by means of concept, but this concept can only
refer to qualia. For instance: "a rose is a rose is a rose." That sentence isn't red.
Hegel had no use for Kant's noumena. Although Hegel's system is called Absolute Idealism, this name is deceptive, for the mind-matter distinction is paradoxical. "No finite thing has genuine being," for all that is finite is mind-imposed, and the mind/matter can change.