Definition of Reality

First of all, it is not necessary that a proof convince others. A sound proof that there was a Holocaust may not convince the president of Iran. But, so what? There are those who believe that the Earth is flat. No proof that the Earth is round will convince them. What does that prove? That there is no proof that the Earth is round? Of course not. You have to distinguish between proving, and proving to. I can prove without proving to; and I can prove to without proving. Some people are impossible to convince about somethings, and it is often easy to convince some people about some things. That has more to do with the people than with the proof.

Second of all: why do you say that there is no proof that the Moon and stars existed before people? There is overwhelming evidence that they did. The fact that there was no one to see them does not show that they did not, and does not show that we cannot prove that they did. No one alive now saw Julius Caesar. But don't we know that Julius Caesar lived? It is just not true that someone has actually to witness something for us to know that it happened. Where did you ever get that idea, I wonder.

Isn't this debate about whether the reality of ordinary experience can be questioned? Isn't contemplating the extent to which the mind itself generates experience, one of the actual starting points for philosophy? I think this is what 'doing philosophy' consists of.

I am bemused, Kenneth. If there is a difference between proving and proving to what exactly is the difference? If you don't have to prove to then who is the proof for? Yourself? How can you prove without proving to? It seems a tad pointless. Some people are difficult to prove to because the proof they need might simply not exist in some cases, or is at least difficult to find. Those who are easy to convince may just be more gullible.
Secondly:could you please provide a small part of this overwhelming evidence for the existence of anything prior to anyone witnessing it? You keep refering to it but you have yet to come up with anything that doesn't fall apart on analysis.

Whenever we get into an airplane, make a contribution to this Forum through our PC, or take a headache tablet, we are relying on the veracity of the scientific discoveries that have been made in the last several centuries. And stories don't keep airplanes aloft, or make microprocessors work, or make medicines effective.

I don't really have any problems with science, except for when it is treated as a religion or a philosophy. And if that is the sense in which you mean that science 'only tells stories' then I agree. But in any other sense, I cannot.

I don't think a definition is possible, as said in my first post in this thread, to define is to explain one thing in terms of another, which in the case of 'reality' is obviously impossible. But I will say that the existence of material objects with no consciousness constitute a different (and lesser) order of reality to a living being - especially one who is capable of a conversation.

Reality is my life, your life, the individual lives of each of us. There's my definition, which is Ortega's. I have explained one thing in terms of another.


:flowers:

I don't think a definition is possible, as said in my first post in this thread, to define is to explain one thing in terms of another, which in the case of 'reality' is obviously impossible.

But I will say that the existence of material objects with no consciousness constitute a different (and lesser) order of reality to a living being - especially one who is capable of a conversation.

Of course, the discovery that so-called "material" objects are nothing but energy has thrown doubt on that story, er ... theory. But that's another matter.

Reality is my life, your life, the individual lives of each of us. There's my definition, which is Ortega's

I guess I don't understand what you mean by "lesser order of reality." Is a rock less real somehow than my hand?

I guess I don't understand what you mean by "lesser order of reality." Is a rock less real somehow than my hand?

To us stones are solid and impenetrable. To a neutrino a stone does not exist. To an electron a stone is mostly empty space. What is a stone then? do not the properties of the "stone" depend on the method and type of perception or observation. What is the "reality" of stone?

By this same logic, we wouldn't exist to a neutrino or an electron either. So what does that prove about the reality of anything?

What it shows is the reality is a construction. The world which we presume is real takes its particular form due to our conception of it and the way in which the brain integrates the information arising from it into a coherent picture, very much as Prothero says in the post above. This is not to say that it is non-existent or phantasmagorical. We are part of it and must observe its laws. But it is not absolute or ultimately real. Questioning the nature of reality is surely one of the fundamentals of philosophy. Of course the physical sciences do that also, but they must, presumably, pre-suppose that material phenomena, or the 'natural realm', is real and then proceed to determine the most fundamental unit of reality. But they are in a spot of bother in this regard, don't know whether you have noticed that. There are serious questions about whether photons and electrons really do exist outside the explicative theories and measuring devices within which they can be described.

Reality is a construct, a perception, a relationship. To say that something is "real" is to say that it has certain perceived or observed properties in a given type of interaction or relationship and nothing more. Reality is not an independent property of the world at large.

Reality exists whether or not people have any conception of it, or whatever their conception of it is.

According to Kant, objects of which we are sensibly cognizant are merely representations of unknown somethings-what Kant refers to as the transcendental object-as interpreted through the a priori or categories of the understanding. These unknown somethings are manifested within the noumenon-although we can never know how or why as our perceptions of these unknown somethings are bound by the limitations of the categories of the understanding and we are therefore never able to fully know the "thing-in-itself". Kant was arguing, in part, that the categories of the understanding are required for our sensible understanding of things-in-themselves, the pre-existence of which is a requisite for the function of these categories

What is a construction is our belief about reality, not reality. Whether electrons or germs exist depends on whether electron theory or germ theory is true. We cannot observe electrons directly, and we could not, for a long time, observe germs directly. Now we can observe germs directly (at least through a microscope) but we cannot observe electrons directly. But, except for that, there is no difference. And, of course, both electrons and germs are mind-independent. There were electrons in the Middle Ages when no one had ever conceived of them; and there were also germs in the Middle Ages. Otherwise, how do you suppose that the Black Death spread?

Mirages have certain perceived properties, etc. But mirages aren't real.

I wonder why some find it so difficult to distinguish between the concept of X and X itself, and continue to confuse the two. This confusion is especially egregious in the case of reality. People talk about reality as being a construction when they actually mean that our concept of reality is a construction. Reality exists whether or not people have any conception of it, or whatever their conception of it is. In fact, reality exists, and has existed whether or not people existed to have a conception of it. How could reality be its own conception?

Our sensations are as real as our conceptions. Our conceptions can be an attempt to provide a story . . ., er, explanation of our sensations. These stories...,er, expanations can be veri-fied by experiments; that is, if the story is valid, it will "account" for future observations, that is future sensations.


They are real mirages. Our conception, er . . . story of what they represent may be incorrect, but the sensations are real.


The "X itself" is just as much a "construction" as other concepts we may have about the "X." The word "itself" involves an story, er. . .presumption that X has a self, which is a conception about "X." We may look in a certain direction and have a set of sensations that we interpret as being those corresponding to what we have learned to call a "tree." The sensations are real and our interpretations are real. "I see a tree" corresponds to "I am experiencing a set of sensations that seem to be similar to those that I have learned to call a 'tree'." On closer examination we may find that it is an artificial "tree," which is another type of "construction," but that's another story!

The "X itself" is just as much a "construction" as other concepts we may have about the "X." The word "itself" involves an story, er. . .presumption that X has a self, which is a conception about "X." We may look in a certain direction and have a set of sensations that we interpret as being those corresponding to what we have learned to call a "tree." The sensations are real and our interpretations are real. "I see a tree" corresponds to "I am experiencing a set of sensations that seem to be similar to those that I have learned to call a 'tree'." On closer examination we may find that it is an artificial "tree," which is another type of "construction," but that's another story!

I admit, my brain is not as adept as some in juggling certain philosophical terms and concepts, but it seems to me that longknowledge is casting doubt even upon his own physical existence as anything more than just another construction. If this is the case, I wonder whose construction he thinks he is, and how something that is just a conception is able to have sensations?

I don't find it difficult to distinguish between the concept of X and X itself, but I am confused by longknowledge's story.

the real sun is a construction. What to I mean by that? Referring to the quote from Kant, above, what I mean by that is that the brain creates sun and names it by organising the sensory input it receives and orientating it around a concept (which we all share as we all have the same structure of consciousness). You will say 'yes, but that is only an image, which corresponds with the real sun'. Kant is saying, the 'real sun' is forever unknowable, it is the noumenon. What we know is the phenomenon, not the thing in itself.

Now I think why you find this 'egregious' is because we generally derive our sense of reality from the idea of objectivity. This is very much the bedrock of the modern outlook and I am not trying to belittle it, only subject it to philosophical analysis.

But, leaving that aside, am I correct in saying that this was Kant's view of the matter?

OK then. Perhaps you would like to consider Kant's distinction between Noumenon and Phenomenon, and his idea of the unknowability of the thing-in-itself (Ding an sich). I believe it has some bearing on this point.