A perfect god can not exist?

wouldn't one have to hold such a position to 'legitimately' counter the arguments presented against thus far??

I agree. But remember, there are some who contend (a la Quine) that to say that all mathematical truths are necessarily true is false. So one has to appeal to likelihoods in order to justify what appear to be necessary truths.

"Happiness is better than misery" I also take to be necessary a priori.

Nah, I just mentioned it because you mentioned relativism.

Take a look at -> Meta-ethics - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I'm a non-cognitivist. What you're calling relativism is listed there as ethical subjectivism which is a cognitivist theory. That's why I'm not worried about it. I'm not a cognitivist.

what makes ethical statements special that they aren't considered propositions exactly?

If I said "ice cream tastes good" is that something that is either true or false? Why?

what makes ethical statements special that they aren't considered propositions exactly?

I tried to argue from a similar perspective about statements concerning the future and this was rejected by you

as stated on the wiki page: "If killing an innocent human is always wrong, and all fetuses are innocent humans, then killing a fetus is always wrong." Most people would consider such an utterance to represent an analytic proposition which is true a priori. However, if ethical statements do not represent cognitions, it seems odd to use them as premises in an argument, and even odder to assume they follow the same rules of syllogism as true propositions."

Well, that depends on whether those who think like Quine are correct. If there are no a priori necessary truth then all truths are empirical (I suppose). But is radical empiricism true? Or even likely?

I don't think that the happiness of a murderer caused by his getting away with his crime is better than his misery would be if he were caught and punished. Do you? In that case, it seems to me that misery is better than happiness. And so do those who try to apprehend him, I suppose.

is that an ethical statement? Because I would classify it as an opinion

If I said "ice cream tastes good" is that something that is either true or false? Why?

I think ethical statements are opinions too. The question is, why do you classify it as an opinion?

I know. I was only over-preparing with an example from mathematics for a possible response of what appeared to be the implicit principle that only what can be subjected to empirical testing has a truth-value; hence, moral judgments don't have a truth value.



That's not the same proposition. "Happiness is better than misery" is still necessarily true regardless of exceptions to the possible (utilitarian) moral rule "Happiness always ought to be pursued instead of misery." This first is a value judgment. The latter is a moral judgment. See the difference?

And how do you decide what is and is not an ethical statement and therefore not a proposition?

is the statement, "I will not wear a shirt tomorrow to school" an ethical statement and therefore not a proposition or is it not an ethical statement and therefore a proposition?

That's lame, right?. Statements (seen as assertive declarations about a given state of affaris) always express propositional truth-valuable content.

And how do you decide what is and is not an ethical statement

That's lame, right?. Statements (seen as assertive declarations about a given state of affaris) always express propositional truth-valuable content.

No. I don't. It seems to me clear that some happiness is not better than some misery. And I appeal to Kant as my authority. His reply to hedonism was that undeserved happiness is not a good, but an evil.

sheesh. The proposition is not "Happiness in all times and cases is better than misery." The proposition might be better expressed "the intrinsic value of happiness is, in some cases, more valuble than misery." I don't think you need to be making it into a universal generalization about all times and cases.

And still, how you are citing Kant seems to be still construing ti as a Kantian Moral judgment, which I don't think it is.

"seeking happiness is right" is not a proposition, apparently, and therefore is neither true nor false

is stating something is better than something else an ethical statement or a proposition? Just curious

Because if it's a proposition I propose the proposition, "It is always the case that raping someone is worse than not raping them" <---this would therefore be necessarily true or false and therefore would have something meaningful to say about morality

That's vague. If you mean to say "Everyone always ought to be pursuing happiness" then it is a moral proposition with a truth-value (if you're not a non-cognitivist). Or if you mean to say "Happiness is more valuable than misery" then that is a value judgment with a truth value (if you're not a non-cognitivist).

What's your point?

The point is I think it is possible to state an ethical statement in the form of a proposition which would then fall under the principle of bivalence and therefore prove that morals are not relative.