A perfect god can not exist?

huh? Yes, they would be partially non-overlapping claims, but,

(1) "All moral truths are relative"

is an instance of

(2) "All truths are relative"

The falsity of (2) logically entails the falsity of (1).

No it doesn't.

That's like saying that since it's false that "all cars have anti-lock brakes" therefore it's false that "all Lexus cars have anti-lock brakes". It isn't false. It's true.

Some properties might be what's called "relational properties" or even "emergent properties"--which is fine with me. But not all properties are relations. I just think about the property of "being human" in terms of my genetic code. Sure, the property of "being human" is defined by the structures and relationships between various proteins and the organization of their parts, so it is an emergent property from these other microstructures which give rise to it. But the definition of "being human" has necessary and sufficient conditions that make humans the way they are. A thing is either a human, or not a human--being human is a non-relational property since it doesn't depend on other non-human properties or things to be the property of being-human which it is. So my being human is not dependent on anything other than having a specific genetic code coming from my parents. But it is still a non-relational property. My parents can die, but I'd still be human. So most properties are monadic properties, not relational ones. All relations are between one or more things, and if one of those things ceases to exist, then that relation no longer holds for those things. Properties are typically intrinsic to things that have them, whereas most relations are extrinsic to things that have them.

Its a bit like the change of your weight if earth would lose some mass, or even the moon, or the sun, or the galaxy...but its far more complicated...and of course there are counter effects that can render some of this null, but they all count for the actual exact state of affairs in the world, and for every particular nature...

The two of you have to be the laziest philosophers I've seen yet. Can you give me objections to that article in the SEP?

The notion of "relative truth" is logically inconsistent and self-refuting. The problem is that any truth which is relative is no longer objectively true--and this is false. And that's what that article shows, namely, "truth is relative" is a self undermining claim. It is has similar worries that the paradox "This sentence is false" does.

Again, that's only a problem with the claim that all truths are relative. Moral relativists are not saying "truth is relative". That would be self-referential because itself is a truth which would be relative. Moral relativists are simply saying "moral truth is relative" which isn't self-referential because itself isn't a moral truth.

Meta-Ethical Relativists say "X is wrong" is true relative to a cultural context. The SEP argues that this is an inconsistency. It is.

My change as a phenomena would be do to world change but ontologically I would be the same...once I have not speak of evolution of what I am, but in a emerging manifestation of what I might conceal now...not being visible until the world around me change itself , thus bringing up this already existing potential in myself...and that was the case I was trying to bring up...

I understand. However, I think you're going to have a problem with the logical law of numerical identity which says everything is identical to itself. So it is self-reflexive notion, but you logic doesn't specify under what those conditions something is identical to itself. So you are going to have to specify with some metaphysical account of in what the continutity of identity (or preservation if identity) consists through changes in time--namely, why you are not your chair, and why your chair is not you. Otherwise, without the account, the entire universe is One thing. Spinoza said that. He thought the entire universe, or everything that existed, was one substance (or thing, which he called "god") and everything in it was merely a modification (or property) of it.

You complain about me being lazy but you won't even address my argument. You're not acknowledging that "all moral truths are relative" isn't itself a moral truth. It's not self-referential like "this sentence is false". It doesn't have the same problem that "all truths are relative" has. Try again.

Well that was an ensemble right above check...:bigsmile:

...I'm just curious how you would go about specifying the conditions for numerical identity within this set-system model.

Any claim that says "such and such kinds of truths are relative" is inconsistent.