A perfect god can not exist?

No, it's not a contradiction because I am believing different things about two different people, myself and Hitler.

So he can't consistently talk about "killing innocent Jews being not-wrong" within Hitler's framework simply because he is not in Hitler's framework. He is talking from within his own framework.

I thought that was the motivation of relativism, the recognition that there is not just one framework but many and each just as valid as any other. To be sure, I am not in Hitler's framework, I am in my own but that doesn't prevent me from recognizing that my framework is not the only framework.

CR is not the same thesis as MMR. CR is just a descriptive thesis that people have different moral beliefs across cultures--and this CAN be meaningfully talked about--and it is true across all cultural contexts. But MMR says that what cultures believe with respect to what is right and wrong is a moral fact, since it expicitly holds that what is really right and wrong is true relative to that culture (hence the alleged "objectivity" thesis it claims to be). Right/wrong are objective terms just as true/false are objective terms for the MMRist. So MMR is a self-refuting thesis.

If "ice cream tastes good" is true for me and "ice creams tastes good" false for you then so can "murder is wrong" be true for me and "murder is wrong" false for you.

Ignore right/wrong. What you just said about "truth" is still the relativist fallacy again. Non-cognitivism doesn't even hold what you just said.

If "ice cream tastes good to you" is true, then that proposition is also "true to me." It is objectively true to everyone whether they know it or not, because it is an objective fact that ice cream tastes good to you. If I said, "ice cream tastes bad to you" I would be saying something false.

I don't say "ice cream tastes good to me". I say "ice cream tastes good" and it does. I taste it and it is good. That is what tasting good means. Therefore "ice cream tastes good" is true for me.

Sorry, that's invalid.

Only the logically and philosophically uneducated say stuff like that. Non-cognitivists don't even say it. I don't even know what "true for you" means.

I have undergraduate credits from Oxford for philosophy, do you?

Ice cream tastes good.

Sorry, that's invalid.

Only the logically and philosophically uneducated say stuff like that. Non-cognitivists don't even say it. I don't even know what "true for you" means.

.

" P is True for X" is ambiguous. It can mean:

1. X believes that P is true. or,
2. P is true in the case of X. ("Milk is good food may be true for you and most people, but it is not true for me, since I have lactose intolerance and it makes me ill")

Since we are talking about relativism it should be obvious that (2) was what I meant.

A logical fallacy? How? That doesn't even make sense. I'm also not endorsing a private language. You haven't even explained why you think that but rather just state it like it's an obvious fact. That's not how you win arguments. You're also being more and more insulting for no reason other than you lack patience to deal with this topic. You say weird things that don't make any sense yet you claim I'm the one that doesn't know what he's talking about.

You can't have it both ways. Either I can say "ice cream tastes good" and it either be true or false, or I can say "ice cream tastes good to me" and "ice cream tastes good to you" and have those either be true or false. Either way you pick, doesn't matter. I can still say "ice cream tastes good" and it be true or I can say "ice cream tastes good to me" and have it be true which means I can also say "ice cream tastes good to you" and have it be true or false.

Truth is a major flash point in discussions of relativism. The traditional indictment of the strong version of truth-value relativism is that it is self-refuting. The claim that truth is relative is, by the relativist's own lights, only true relative to some frameworks and it may be false relative to others. Hence, it is argued, the relativist cannot account for the status of his own claims.

5.9.1 Complete Metastasis

Weak truth-value relativism escapes many of the dangers of self-refutation, since it does not allow one and the same thing to be true in one framework and false in another. But if normative truth-value relativism is intended as a view that is true simpliciter, it metastasizes very quickly. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that truth is relative to a person's (or group's) conceptual framework (for ease of exposition we consider individuals, but the point generalizes easily). Then, the relativist tells us, the very same belief (or sentence), call it p, can be true in Wilbur's framework, W, but false in Sam's framework, S. But if truth is relative in the strong sense, it can also be true in Wilbur's framework W that p is true in W and false in Sam's framework S that p is true in Wilbur's framework W. There is not even any objective fact about what is true in any given framework.
Worse is in store. There could be frameworks in which it is true that Wilbur's current belief has the content that grass is green and other frameworks in which his belief has the content that snow is white. There could be frameworks in which it is true that Wilbur's framework is W and other frameworks in which it is false that Wilbur's framework is W, and so there is no objective fact about what framework anyone has. Furthermore, it may be true in Wilbur's framework that the frameworks W and S are identical (W = S) but true in Sam's framework that W and S are distinct (W ≠S). It may also be true in Wilbur's framework that W itself is a framework and true in Sam's that W is not a framework. It may be true in Sam's framework that there are no frameworks, or that everything is true in every framework, or that nothing is true in any. It may also be true in some frameworks (e.g., ones without concepts of physical objects or persons) that Wilbur and Sam do not exist.
In short, there is no fact about whether there are frameworks, about what frameworks are, about what is true in any particular framework, about what framework anyone has, about what anyone even thinks his own framework is like, or about anything else. It is quicksand all the way down. The metastasis is total. The meltdown is complete.
5.9.2 Damage Control

There seem to be only three hopes for escape.
1. Exemptions?

Champions of relative truth often find it tempting to suppose that their thesis of strong truth-value relativism (perhaps along with a few other things that go along with it) is true in some absolute sense. The doctrine of relative truth is somehow exempt. But why go just this far and no further? No one has ever given any argument that would begin to support the case for such exemptions, and the prospects are dim, because such a strategy is in considerable tension with the general pictures that lead to strong truth-value relativism in the first place.
2. Other Defenses of the Relativist's Framework

The relativist might urge that frameworks in which truth is relative are superior in some way to frameworks in which it is not, then urge that this difference gives us a reason to accept his framework, and with it the thesis of strong truth-value relativism. But the relativist's framework cannot be superior by virtue of containing the truth about relativism (or about anything else) since, according to his view, all truth is relative. Nor is it clear how the relativist's framework could be better justified than the non-relativist's. Among other things, justified beliefs are ones that track truth in some way, and if truth is relative, justification is likely to turn out relative as well. Indeed, the arguments to support the claim that truth is relative in the strong sense are very likely to support the claim that justification is relative as well. The problem is that no one has yet found any good reasons why the relativist's framework should command our allegiance, while his opponent's framework should not.
3. Taking a Stand

The relativist's best hope is to admit that he inhabits a framework and can only speak from within it. He can even acknowledge that his claims are only true relative to it. Still, it's his and his claim is important in it.
It's us, not just me

This strategy will be more compelling if the relativist can convince his interlocutors that their--seemingly objective--concepts and beliefs in fact presuppose the same framework as the relativist's and that the doctrine of relative truth is true in the framework they all share. It's not just that his claim is true in his idiosyncratic framework, but that it's true in the framework that we also inhabit. If the relativist could make such a view plausible, he could then add that his claims are no worse off than most of the other things we hold to be true. In short, The realist's or objectivist's seemingly objective concepts and beliefs presuppose the same framework as the relativist's, and truth is relative in it. And if relativism's claims are as secure as the myriad claims that are on solid ground for us normally, what more can we say? Indeed, the relativist might even attempt to expropriate one response to relativism and argue that frameworks in which his thesis is false are not live options for us.
The project of showing the objectivist that her beliefs depend on a common framework of concepts, standards, and beliefs and that relativism is reasonable according to them would not be easy; in effect it would involve the various sorts of arguments and counterarguments that have surfaced throughout this entry. Furthermore, even if the relativist succeeded, his view would still be at best relatively true. Whether such a position is at all defensible is a matter of debate, but at this juncture things have become more complicated than the simpler versions of Plato's refutation might suggest.
Culture Shock: Non-trivial Differences

The claim that truth is relative in the strong sense does indeed subvert itself, but this doesn't mean that there couldn't be genuine and interesting differences among groups that could quite reasonably be called relativistic. What it does mean is that if these views are to be developed in an interesting way, we must find a way to dissociate them from the strong version of truth-value relativism.

" P is True for X" is ambiguous. It can mean:

1. X believes that P is true. or,
2. P is true in the case of X. ("Milk is good food may be true for you and most people, but it is not true for me, since I have lactose intolerance and it makes me ill")

I've been offering arguments the entire time. Where are yours? No one takes "what is true for me may not be true for you" seriously because it is self-refuting, not to mention makes a logical/linguistic mess. If what is true is true relative to your framework, then it is also true relative to mine. If "milk is good is true relative to your framework" is true relative to your framework, then "milk is good is true relative to your framework" is true relative to mine as well. After all, I am entertaining "what is true for you" from my perspective as well, am I not????

If milk is good is true in one framework it can also be true in another. So "Milk is good" can be true for Bob. "Milk is good" can also be true for Bill. So "truth" is not a relative to frameworks. It is a an objective property of shared propositions. Immediately your view is refuted. Even if you are lactose intolerant, "milk is good" is still true independent of whether it is really good for YOU, because it can be good for Bob and Bill. So "good," in the sense being used here, is relative, truth is not relative. So milk is good for Bob is true. And milk is not good for Ken is true. But it's stupid to say "milk is good is true for bob and not true for Ken."

Question: can you explain to me how,

"Milk is good is true relative to your framework" is true? You can't,--because now you have two notions of truth. One objective, one subjective. So your view that truth is relative to a framework is self-refuting! Why do you think I posted SEP's take on the relativist fallacy earlier?:

"The relativist fallacy, also known as the subjectivist fallacy, is a fallacy committed, roughly speaking, when one person claims that something may be true for one person but not true for someone else. "

Relativist fallacy - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Truth-relativism fallacy. Relativism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy):



---------- Post added 04-27-2010 at 10:21 AM ----------



But (2) just means that "milk is not good for ken" and "milk is good for some other people." P is a proposition, and the variable X are persons and states of affairs, not other propositions. It doesn't mean "milk is good is true for you" and "milk is good is true for some other people". After all, if truth is relative, how do you explain the truth of the proposition: "milk is good is true relative to some frameworks but not others" is true? You can't, because now there are two senses of "truth" you are using. So your meta-view that truth can even be relative to frameworks undermines itself. You are merely presupposing it can be, and as soon as you do, this presupposition undercuts your very own view that truth is relative.

So,

3. "P is true for x" means nothing at all--it is self-refuting.

Read the SEP above.

Truth is a major flash point in discussions of relativism. The traditional indictment of the strong version of truth-value relativism is that it is self-refuting. The claim that truth is relative is, by the relativist's own lights, only true relative to some frameworks and it may be false relative to others. Hence, it is argued, the relativist cannot account for the status of his own claims.

That's only an argument against the claim that "all truths are relative". That has nothing to do with the claim that "all moral truths are relative", which is, after all, not a moral truth.

How can you say that "P is true for x" means nothing at all when you have just explained its meaning? And when I pointed out that another meaning is that x believes that P is true? If it has two different meanings, then how can it mean nothing at all?

For someone who has lactose intolerance milk is not good, not because milk has not the property of being potentially good, but because lactose intolerance has the property of making it wrong...

Truth is Relative does not undercut itself if we consider that a set of different truths may be compatible in a bigger set, actually they may be the fundamental reason for each other having true value by contrast...