A perfect god can not exist?

You only *think* I am using the terms differently? How so? Perhaps my distinctions are more fine-grained than Stanford's? I certainly wouldn't disagree with it. You still haven't told me why I am wrong.

Subjective/objective--specifies truth-character of moral judgments.
Relative/non-relative--specifies the domain of moral judgments.
Absolute/non-absolute--specifies the context of moral judments.
Realism/anti-realism--specifies the ontology of moral properties.
cognitive/non-cognitive--specifies the content of moral judgments.

These are different distinctions to be made, but I've noticed many philosophers will use them interchangeably.

Subjective Relativism is, by default, not absolute and anti-realist, and can either be cognitive or non-cognitive.

Cultural Moral Relativism, on the other hand, can either be cognitive/non-cognitive, absolute/non-absolute, realist/anti-realist.

Some contend CMR can be objective. I would disagree. Although not explicitly contradictory--it is surely a senselss oxymoron to be making as Amp and myself have pointed out to Kennethamy. So it seems CMR is by default subjective.

Also, some contend CMR is, by default, not absolute. But I think this a confusion between specifying the domain and context of moral judgments made. Both subjectivists and objectivists can be absolutists or non-absolutists. "Absolutism" says that moral principles are never overridable by context. Surely, one can be a Moral Relativist and also an absolutist. Just as one can be an objectivist, and non-absolutist. And I've already pointed out how this works in this thread.

You seem to be trying to talk over the issue hoping it'll go away. The fact remains that you can still be a subjectivist and a relativist. If you think otherwise then you're wrong. You seemed to be claiming just that.

Isaiah 45:7. I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil : I the Lord do all these things.
If it is the biblical god you each are referring to - try reading the bible before debating whether or not this imaginary character is moreso good than evil : In turn, indulge me with your interpretations of said good and evil.
After all - "One man's pleasure is another man's pain".

I never denied subjectivism is consistent with relativism itself, for, after all, subjectivism is a form of relativism.

Conversely, the subjectivist need not be a relativist. Suppose the moral facts depend on the attitudes or opinions of a particular group or individual (e.g., "X is good" means "Caesar approves of X," or "The Supreme Court rules in favor of X" or "God commands X," etc.), and thus moral truth is an entirely mind-dependent affair. Since, in this case, all speakers' moral utterances are made true or false by the same mental activity, then this is not strictly speaking a version of relativism, but is, rather, a relation-designating account of moral terms (see Stevenson 1963: 74 for this distinction).

No it's not. Moral subjectivism is the belief that moral truths are mind-dependent and moral relativism is the belief that moral truths are relative to the utterer.

You can believe in objective relativism. It would be the belief that moral truths are relative to the utterer but not mind-dependent rather mind-independent.

Moral Anti-Realism > Moral subjectivism versus moral relativism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

subjectivism is a form of relativism

You're the one that needs to pay attention. I'm taking issue with this claim...

That is false. I provided a quote that says explicitly that you can be a subjectivist without being a relativist. That means you're wrong and you need to redress this by either arguing that SEP is wrong or changing your position.

That's beside the point, Mr. Red-herring.

I don't care if it's critical to the point you're trying to make or not. It's untrue so you shouldn't keep repeating it.

subjectivism is a form of relativism

A logical fallacy? How? That doesn't even make sense. I'm also not endorsing a private language. You haven't even explained why you think that but rather just state it like it's an obvious fact. That's not how you win arguments. You're also being more and more insulting for no reason other than you lack patience to deal with this topic. You say weird things that don't make any sense yet you claim I'm the one that doesn't know what he's talking about.

You can't have it both ways. Either I can say "ice cream tastes good" and it either be true or false, or I can say "ice cream tastes good to me" and "ice cream tastes good to you" and have those either be true or false. Either way you pick, doesn't matter. I can still say "ice cream tastes good" and it be true or I can say "ice cream tastes good to me" and have it be true which means I can also say "ice cream tastes good to you" and have it be true or false.

Truth is a major flash point in discussions of relativism. The traditional indictment of the strong version of truth-value relativism is that it is self-refuting. The claim that truth is relative is, by the relativist's own lights, only true relative to some frameworks and it may be false relative to others. Hence, it is argued, the relativist cannot account for the status of his own claims.

5.9.1 Complete Metastasis

Weak truth-value relativism escapes many of the dangers of self-refutation, since it does not allow one and the same thing to be true in one framework and false in another. But if normative truth-value relativism is intended as a view that is true simpliciter, it metastasizes very quickly. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that truth is relative to a person's (or group's) conceptual framework (for ease of exposition we consider individuals, but the point generalizes easily). Then, the relativist tells us, the very same belief (or sentence), call it p, can be true in Wilbur's framework, W, but false in Sam's framework, S. But if truth is relative in the strong sense, it can also be true in Wilbur's framework W that p is true in W and false in Sam's framework S that p is true in Wilbur's framework W. There is not even any objective fact about what is true in any given framework.
Worse is in store. There could be frameworks in which it is true that Wilbur's current belief has the content that grass is green and other frameworks in which his belief has the content that snow is white. There could be frameworks in which it is true that Wilbur's framework is W and other frameworks in which it is false that Wilbur's framework is W, and so there is no objective fact about what framework anyone has. Furthermore, it may be true in Wilbur's framework that the frameworks W and S are identical (W = S) but true in Sam's framework that W and S are distinct (W ≠S). It may also be true in Wilbur's framework that W itself is a framework and true in Sam's that W is not a framework. It may be true in Sam's framework that there are no frameworks, or that everything is true in every framework, or that nothing is true in any. It may also be true in some frameworks (e.g., ones without concepts of physical objects or persons) that Wilbur and Sam do not exist.
In short, there is no fact about whether there are frameworks, about what frameworks are, about what is true in any particular framework, about what framework anyone has, about what anyone even thinks his own framework is like, or about anything else. It is quicksand all the way down. The metastasis is total. The meltdown is complete.
5.9.2 Damage Control

There seem to be only three hopes for escape.
1. Exemptions?

Champions of relative truth often find it tempting to suppose that their thesis of strong truth-value relativism (perhaps along with a few other things that go along with it) is true in some absolute sense. The doctrine of relative truth is somehow exempt. But why go just this far and no further? No one has ever given any argument that would begin to support the case for such exemptions, and the prospects are dim, because such a strategy is in considerable tension with the general pictures that lead to strong truth-value relativism in the first place.
2. Other Defenses of the Relativist's Framework

The relativist might urge that frameworks in which truth is relative are superior in some way to frameworks in which it is not, then urge that this difference gives us a reason to accept his framework, and with it the thesis of strong truth-value relativism. But the relativist's framework cannot be superior by virtue of containing the truth about relativism (or about anything else) since, according to his view, all truth is relative. Nor is it clear how the relativist's framework could be better justified than the non-relativist's. Among other things, justified beliefs are ones that track truth in some way, and if truth is relative, justification is likely to turn out relative as well. Indeed, the arguments to support the claim that truth is relative in the strong sense are very likely to support the claim that justification is relative as well. The problem is that no one has yet found any good reasons why the relativist's framework should command our allegiance, while his opponent's framework should not.
3. Taking a Stand

The relativist's best hope is to admit that he inhabits a framework and can only speak from within it. He can even acknowledge that his claims are only true relative to it. Still, it's his and his claim is important in it.
It's us, not just me

This strategy will be more compelling if the relativist can convince his interlocutors that their--seemingly objective--concepts and beliefs in fact presuppose the same framework as the relativist's and that the doctrine of relative truth is true in the framework they all share. It's not just that his claim is true in his idiosyncratic framework, but that it's true in the framework that we also inhabit. If the relativist could make such a view plausible, he could then add that his claims are no worse off than most of the other things we hold to be true. In short, The realist's or objectivist's seemingly objective concepts and beliefs presuppose the same framework as the relativist's, and truth is relative in it. And if relativism's claims are as secure as the myriad claims that are on solid ground for us normally, what more can we say? Indeed, the relativist might even attempt to expropriate one response to relativism and argue that frameworks in which his thesis is false are not live options for us.
The project of showing the objectivist that her beliefs depend on a common framework of concepts, standards, and beliefs and that relativism is reasonable according to them would not be easy; in effect it would involve the various sorts of arguments and counterarguments that have surfaced throughout this entry. Furthermore, even if the relativist succeeded, his view would still be at best relatively true. Whether such a position is at all defensible is a matter of debate, but at this juncture things have become more complicated than the simpler versions of Plato's refutation might suggest.
Culture Shock: Non-trivial Differences

The claim that truth is relative in the strong sense does indeed subvert itself, but this doesn't mean that there couldn't be genuine and interesting differences among groups that could quite reasonably be called relativistic. What it does mean is that if these views are to be developed in an interesting way, we must find a way to dissociate them from the strong version of truth-value relativism.

"Metaethical Moral Relativism (MMR). The truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons." Moral Relativism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Therefore, you are committed to believing the mass genocide of 6 million Jews in the context of WWII Germany was Right since the culture believed that it was.

Right to them but not me. I'm not part of their culture.

It's like when I say "ice cream tastes good to me" which is true and perhaps you might say "ice cream taste bad to me" which could also be true. That's because it's relative. The same goes for moral relativism. It's not that I am forced to think ice cream tastes bad just because you do. I can still think ice cream tastes good to me and tastes bad to you.

And of course "You like ice cream" is true. Just as "I don't like ice-cream" is true.

In the same way, genocide is wrong to me and right to Hitler.

But what Hitler did cannot be both right and wrong--that is a contradiction.

That is a contradiction but there is no contradiction in saying that what he did was right to him but wrong to me.

If MMR is true, then, yes, there is a contradiction, because you are saying that the same fact, killing innocent Jews, is both wrong and not-wrong.

The MMR proponent claims: For Hitler, "Killing 6 million innocent Jews is not wrong" is true.

But the MMR proponent can also easily believe: For me, "Killing 6 million innocent Jews is wrong" is true.

But if does, then he believes that the the same fact of the matter has two contrary characteristics, that killing innocent Jews both is wrong and is not-wrong. So he believes a contradiction.