@William,
William;75985 wrote:Fascinating James. Please, if you would, explain the implications as a result of the Treaty at Versailles and the attitude of the Germans as a result of that treaty in your opinion. In my opinion, this was not a treaty as I understand the definition of the word. :perplexed:
Thanks,
William
William:
The Treaty of Versailles was not a treaty in the real sense of the word. A treaty is something made with the purpose of ensuring peace between nations, of establishing a contract between victor and vanquished that both must agree with and feel secure in, and magnanimity in victory is the best guarantee of a lasting peace in the future. The Treaty of Versailles was and did none of those things. It was therefore *not* a treaty, I believe, instead it was an excessively punitive series of measures designed to chastise the German people for their part in the bloodshed, between 1914 and 1918. Directly or indirectly, it led to Hitler's rise to power and the Second World War twenty years later, which otherwise might never have been. Versailles imposed many brutal and insuperable demands on the German people: impossible reparations, the demilitarization of the Rhineland, severe limitations on its army and navy, the foundation of a Weimar Republic that proved most unpopular, and later incapable of dealing with the social and political upheavals of the Great Depression (the reasons for its failure are complicated, suffice it to say that one reason was the natural indisposition of the German people to the western ideals of enlightened 'democracy', accustomed as they were to an autocratic system ruled by a semi-despotic kaiser, in which - unlike France or Britain - the bourgeoisie had yet to establish themselves and the 'upper' classes were still the driving political elite. That's a slight simplification for you.) All these things contributed to the Germans' distrust of their neighbours and gave them ever more reason to hate them; their revenge therefore was all but a future inevitability. Many of these terms were later reversed - Germany was allowed to rebuild her Navy, she was given access to the Rhineland, and illegally built up her armed forces in the face of France and Britain but no action was taken to stop her; the burden of payments was eased somewhat during the Depression and the United States offered Germany financial aid - but these did not put a seal on the hatred. Rather, if anything they exacerbated the distrust, because the Germans by the 1930s thought the limitations of Versailles should be removed altogether: they had been unfairly treated and the Allies were amending their policies not out of genuine regret, but out of guilt.
Germany hated Britain somewhat less than France, largely because of her policy of appeasement - it was Chamberlain's government that allowed Hitler to take over Czechoslovakia (the Munich Agreement), unify with Austria, and do nothing while Hitler's forces marched into the Rhineland. Unlike France, Britain disagreed with some of the terms of the Treaty; France was determined to exact her punishment, and the other Allies were unable to moderate her. This explains why Hitler in 1940 wanted to establish a separate peace with Britain, and why he was reluctant (if not altogether unprepared) for Operation Sea-Lion. If you read Churchill's memoirs (the four volume The Second World War I strongly recommend), you'll see that Churchill himself was unsure about Hitler during this time, and that was actually contemplating an alliance of sorts with Nazi Germany - if this sounds unlikely he also shook hands with Mussolini in 1928, because a fascist, to his way of thinking, was the 'lesser of evils' compared to a communist (an attitude that reminds one eerily of American foreign policy in the Cold War, and even today.) Hitler's racial pretensions however left Churchill cold; and Churchill afterwards cast aside his reservations and became one of his most outspoken opponents.
Contrary to popular belief, the German capitulation in the First World War was not due to a straightforward military defeat, but rather to what Hitler, and many other politicians, called 'the stab in the back' back home. This betrayal was instigated by Jews (obviously), by trade unionists, by Communist agitators, and by other unwanted elements, all of whom were persecuted during Hitler's regime. Hitler could not have enacted such sweeping measures without a degree of public support; his designs, sad to say, were not achieved simply through propaganda and brainwashing. Although Hitler's prejudice towards the Jews was unusual in that it had a racial basis, his hatred of the Jews was far from peculiar: many Germans at the time blamed the Jewish population for the supposed 'stab in the back', and because they were prominent, affluent and numerous, and therefore easy to envy and criticize. Communists too were widely hated throughout Europe at this time (the Russian Revolution had happened not long ago), although the Communist and SD movement did gain significant support over the course of the 1930s, due in no small part to the ravages of the Depression. It goes without saying, of course, that Hitler could not have acquired such a following had a great number of Germans not followed him from the start, and agreed wholeheartedly with his policies; certainly they did not meet with unanimous approval, but almost every German believed that the terms of the Versailles had been unnecessarily harsh, that the guilty must pay, and that they had never been truly 'defeated.' All this made for an explosive powder-keg which was sure to erupt at some point.
In the light of the Second World War, it is difficult to find any real sympathy for the German people, considering the atrocities they wrought; but many western historians (and I among them) agree that the Treaty of Versailles was a foolish act of legislation. It did the opposite of what a treaty is supposed to do: it did NOT guarantee peace; it gave the vanquished a good reason to hate the victors even more than they already did; if war had been a possibility before, it made it now even more likely. Whether or not the Second World War would have happened WITHOUT Hitler is one of history's great debates; all we can say is that the peace would probably not have lasted very long, in any case. Hitler and the Nazi Party were able to capitalize on these emotions, hence their rapid rise to power: but for the Treaty of Versailles, the serendipity of the Great Depression, and the abysmal failure of the Weimar Republic, the Nazis would probably have remained a small group of discontented agitators (if they ever existed; Hitler himself didn't actually actually found the National Socialist movement, however), and the dictator himself would have continued eking out a living as a penniless artist in Vienna. Hitler, unexceptional in many ways, was simply the right man in the right place at the right time. But it was he who shaped these strands of chance and circumstance into the war that came.
William, hope that satisfies your question.
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Aedes, your take on the subject of the Treaty of Versailles is intriguing, and I invite you to tell me more. It is a rather different angle on pre-war geopolitical relations in Europe from what I have been taught. Certainly the Treaty was not the ONLY factor for the break-down of European relations from 1930 onwards, and the beginnings of the Second World War - there were, as you suggested, latent social, political and ethnic imbalances in Eastern Europe which must have played their part, and were in fact responsible for the Great War as well - but I don't think Versailles' importance can be overstated. It is cited by most western historians as a major reason, or 'condition', for both Hitler's rise to power and the Second World War.
I admit I don't have a bulletproof knowledge of this subject, and I am always striving to increase my knowledge. I finished University a year ago and achieved a 2.1 degree, but I am always interested to hear more. Different 'angles' and approaches on subjects (like the one you offered before) are always welcome. I agree with you that Enemy at the Gates was not a comprehensive, informative or especially well-made depiction of the Battle of Stalingrad, however it is useful in that it DOES show, quite clearly, the importance of morale and propaganda on the Soviet war machine - and these were, if not decisive, at least important factors! That I don't think you can dispute. The Soviet Union HAD suffered tremendous defeats and crises of morale before Stalingrad, and would continue to do so until almost the end of the war; this battle was merely one 'hinge' on which the whole Eastern Front turned. The word 'pyrrhic' applies quite well, I think, to this victory. I believe it used generally to refer to any battle, or struggle, that is won at tremendous, whether in strategic terms or in terms of human cost. Stalingrad fits the bill in both cases. Many of the battles on the Eastern Front can therefore be described as 'Pyrrhic', even if they were crushing victories, because the Soviet Army (which was often poorly trained and ill-equipped, sometimes even more so than their opponents) suffered catastrophically greater losses than the German Army as a whole. The point I was trying to make here was that ANOTHER crisis in 'morale', at Stalingrad, combined with the ones the Soviets had already suffered at Leningrad, Kiev, and a dozen other cities, might be too great a cumulative blow for the Red Army to sustain. A defeat at Stalingrad, like the capture of Moscow, might not have spelled doom for the Soviet Union in and of itself; but the repercussions would be significant, and affect the course and conduct of the rest of the War. Stalingrad's importance as an industrial city IS overstated, of course - after it had been reduced to rubble it had ceased to be a production center at all, and in those terms it was no longer important to the Soviet war effort. But its position on the Volga WAS important, it was the main aim of Army Group South, and there were other crucial strategic reasons for its defense. Also, Stalingrad DID turn out to be a morale victory for the Red Army, and a humiliating blow to the Germans - the surrender of the Sixth Army and its commander von Paulus, who had just been promoted to Field Marshal, severely weakened Hitler's personal reputation and the historic reputation of the Wehrmacht, which had never lost a Field Marshal in the field before. (Hitler hd promoted von Paulus in the hopes that doing so would encourage his Sixth Army to fight on to the end, even though defeat was certain; the ploy did not work, and compounded Hitler's error with even greater misfortune.) In 20th century warfare, just as in modern warfare, and any form of war conducted throughout history, morale is ALWAYS a key ingredient of success. So many battles have been fought, won or lost NOT along the grounds of superior firepower, or numbers, or tactical advantage, but because the troops are better motivated, or have a motivated and inspiring leader. Henry V at the Battle of Agincourt is a shining example. If historians have since decided that Stalingrad and the propaganda frenzy that attended the battle were 'really not that important', as a sort of revisionist challenge to the widely accepted view that Stalingrad indeed WAS the turning-point of the War, then a lot of Soviet soldiers and officers at the time DID, so did the western spectators (Churchill awarded Stalin with a sword of honour for his victory at Teheran in 1943), so there must surely be a degree of truth in that argument.
Aedes - these are all murky issues, I agree. As for whether or not Hitler had always intended to exterminate the Jewish race - yes, he did speak vociferously about the subject, many years before he brought his words and warnings to fruition. In Mein Kampf he spoke explicitly about the 'scourge' of the Jewish race and the 'great cleansing' that was needed to remove it. However, to my mind there is a big difference between suggesting or talking about doing something - especially something as horrific as the Holocaust - and actually making it a reality. Some people talk about committing murder for years and years before they actually do it; sometimes they are just talking, and it never happens. If every person who has had an occasional violent outburst was arrested in prison, as a potential homicidal maniac (a la The Minority Report), our prisoners would be full of innocent convicted criminals. Hitler did not begin, or attempt, the systematic expulsion or murder of people until he had the means and the power to do so. And perhaps (being unable of course to foresee the future) he did not intend or expect to realize his dreams, when he was writing about them in 1923. The Final Solution was, if anything, the product of a deranged mind, and it is entirely reasonable that Hitler by 1940 was insane, if not even during the early days of his Chancellorship. Simply because Hitler WROTE about the Final Solution in his cell in Munich, did not make it a foregone conclusion that it was going to happen. Otherwise, surely the Allies would have done something to stop him? One wonders how people in Europe in 1930, reading this book for the first time, were not startled and concerned by his insinuations: one can assume that they, too, put them to do the ravings of an insane mind. And furthermore - this is my last argument, and as good as any - if Hitler had intended all along to take over Europe, why did he begin expelling Jews from Germany after 1935 when he meant to kill them all along? Such questions do not have answers, and must raise further questions.
You commented of the Nuremberg Laws,
"No, they had a bigger function than that -- they stripped Jews of political, professional, and economic power, and ultimately stripped them of citizenship". I DID actually say that in my earlier post:
"Their function was to define who was and wasn't a Jew (you were Jewish if you were of the first, second or third generation), strip Jews of their property and civil rights, even of their status as German civilians, and even deny them certain human rights accorded to other (non-Jewish) Germans." Well, it's easy to miss something.
To the books by Beevor and Erikson (I have dipped into Beevor's book, by the way, and I have read his book Stalingrad), might I add a suggestion: read Max Hastings' Armageddon. Hastings has been accused by some of being a journalist than an historian, and indeed there is sort of a 'traveller's guide' feel to his history - at least the books I have read - but Armageddon is a lively and interesting account of the Eastern Front. From what I have gathered reading it, mass-exterminations gathered pace in 1941 and 42, as you yourself pointed out, but this was because these were the years in which the Germans made their greatest gains; afterwards the Eastern Front developed into an impasse, then a free-for-all, and finally a rout as the Wehrmacht in 1943/1944 were steadily pushed back to their home country. Because the invaders were most successful during these two years, in terms of territorial gains, it makes sense that they would be capturing more prisoners; the fact that fewer people were being executed in 1943, 1944 or 1945, while it might point STATISTICALLY to the suggestion that the Holocaust was 'letting off steam', and therefore becoming a less 'important' part of the wider war, this does not mean that the Holocaust was any less a prominent part of Hitler's war policy. I stand by my earlier statement (I do however respect your input) that mass-exterminations were NOT a key feature of Hitler's war policy at the start - true, many millions of people WERE put into concentration camps and killed, long before the Eastern Front became a bloodbath - but it was not initially a planned, coherent policy. After 1942 that began to change, fuelled by Hitler's fury, increasingly irrational judgment, and ill-founded belief that the 'untermenschen' themselves were to blame for the reverse in fortunes. The Wannsee Conference may not have 'authorized' the Final Solution proper - perhaps it was simply a communication of that order from the higher-ups to the forces doing their work - but it represents the point at which the nature of the exterminations began to change, from random, senseless killings into a ruthless, calculated conquest of genocide and enslavement. Henceforth this was a major element and aim of Hitler's Eastern War, but not before.
I invite you to continue this discussion, Aedes.
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---------- Post added 07-09-2009 at 06:56 AM ----------
Aedes;75989 wrote:Thanks for your post, James.
That was a different classification and for a different purpose.
The classification of Jews was discussed at length there according to the transcript that Eichmann took there, as well as his testimony when on trial.
Yes, that's what I said. The formal purpose of this part of the Wannsee conference was to subordinate all activities against the Jews under the SS, as administered by the RHSA (though this changed when forced labor became official policy as well, so the RHSA was not the only involved government organ).
Around 600,000 Jews fled Germany before the war. Many of them were imported from surrounding countries and killed anyway, because the US and Britain were very reluctant to accept Jews.
Correct.
No, they had a bigger function than that -- they stripped Jews of political, professional, and economic power, and ultimately stripped them of citizenship.
I never said anything to the contrary. That is correct.
That's not much of a matter of debate if his speeches and if his writing in Mein Kampf bear testimony to it.
The Wannsee Conference was NOT "authorization of the Final Solution". It was a
communication of this policy to people outside the RHSA and SS.
No they were
NOT Poles!!
While from Sept 1939 until June 1941, Poles were killed in large numbers as part of the ethnic cleansing / lebensraum program, the Jews were not particularly singled out except for ghettoization, and died in relatively small numbers. The
einsatzgruppen killed the Polish intelligentsia, but did not massacre Jews at the time.
But from June 1941 onward, the
einsatzgruppen went into action
in the occupied Soviet Union. The
einsatzgruppen operated in the Baltic States, in Ukraine, in Belarus, and in Russia. Separate actions against Jews took place in Romania and Yugoslavia, but these were mainly carried out by local populations with SS support.
The vast majority of the
einsatzgruppen killings happened before Wannsee ever took place. They are thought to have killed between 1 million and 1.5 million Jews altogether, but most of this was in the beginning months of the war -- later on the einsatzgruppen were disbanded and many of these were incorporated into Waffen SS units or Wermacht formations.
The Polish Jews were killed
en masse AFTER Wannsee, as result of Operation Reinhard, which established an experimental death camp at Chelmno and operational death camps at Treblinka, Sobibor, Belzec, and Majdanek. Between 2 million and 2.5 million Jews died in these camps, nearly all Poles, and nearly all in 1942-1943. The reason 1942 was such a deadly year after Wannsee is that Operation Reinhard started, Auschwitz-Birknau was functional, and the
einsatzgruppen were still operational.
Auschwitz-Birkenau was also a killing center for Polish Jews (two of my grandparents were sent there from Lodz, Poland), but by the time it took over as the main killing center most of the Jews in the "general government" of occupied Poland were dead. Fully 1/3 of the Jews who died at Auschwitz were from Hungary, and imported from elsewhere in occupied Europe (incl Germany).
Then you believe incorrectly. Systematic extermination of the Jews began in 1941. Systematic extermination of Soviet POWs also began in 1941 (3 million dead between June 1941 and Jan 1942). This is not even debatable.
[URL="http://[URL="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Einsatzgruppen""]Einsatzgruppen - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia[/URL][URL="http://</p><p> </p><p><a href="http://[URL="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Holocaust#Death_squads_.281941.E2.80.931943.29"" target="_blank">The Holocaust - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia</a>]Timeline of Holocaust"]
[URL="http://[URL="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Holocaust#Death_squads_.281941.E2.80.931943.29""]The Holocaust - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia[/URL] (linked to a specific section of this article)[/URL]
Nazi crimes against Soviet POWs - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Table of estimated Jewish deaths by year (copied from Wiki):
1933-1940 under 100,000
1941 1,100,000
1942 2,700,000
1943 500,000
1944 600,000
1945 100,000
This adds up to 5.0 million during the war years. Most historians estimate 5.9 million total. Whatever the actual total, 1941 was the second most lethal year of the Holocaust.
I think the evidence suggests that one of the main reasons he waged war
specifically for the slaughter of Jews, partly because he conflated the idea of Jews with that of Bolshevism. His writing and speeches suggest this from as early as the 1920s, and he and Goebbels both prattled constantly about Jews as a plague that needed to be eradicated. In 1937 or 1938 he gave a speech in which he threatened the destruction of the Jews if another war developed.
You're wrong about this. Please look it up.
From the USHMM website:
Stalingrad was symbolically important, but not enough to justify the million people who died in or as a result of that battle. Whether Stalingrad or some other town, the importance was that between the Volga and the Black Sea was the Nazi road to the Caucasus, and somewhere in there the Germans needed to provide security for their expedition to the Caucasian oil fields. If the Germans had walked into Stalingrad uncontested, then the battle would have happened somewhere else.
By the way, I've seen Enemy at the Gates twice, and I don't think it portrays the battle accurately or comprehensively at all. Read "Stalingrad" by Antony Beevor, "The Road to Stalingrad" and "The Road to Berlin" by John Erickson, and read "A Writer at War" (Antony Beevor's compilation of the journals of Vasily Grossman).
It was not a pyrrhic victory at all! It was a major tactical victory and a major strategic victory. (Pyrrhic victories generally mean tactical victories but strategic losses). I mean you're right that the Soviets suffered more casualties, but in the Eastern Front as a whole they suffered 4 times as many as the Germans, but there is no doubt as to who the winners of that war were. The Soviets also suffered more casualties at Kursk and at Moscow.
Stalingrad destroyed the entire German 6th army and much of the 4th Panzer army. Never had Germany suffered a defeat on that scale. Furthermore, the momentum of the victory and the subsequent Operation Saturn threatened to cut off the remainder of Army Group South, which was in the Caucasus and would have been trapped if the Red Army had made it to the Black Sea in time, so Stalingrad created a major gain in territory. The Germans withdrew rapidly (and their withdrawal was costly) from that whole region, and after back and forth exchanges at Kharkov they had only one offensive left in them at Kursk.
The propagandists loved that, but it's just not true. Morale is overrated. When the Soviets lost 600,000 troops to an encirclement at Kiev, THAT was cause for loss of morale. When the Germans began to bomb Moscow (and they had to evacuate Lenin's pickled body from the mauseleum), THAT was cause for loss of morale. When the Germans made it all the way to the Volga and the Caucasus, THAT was cause for loss of morale. Stalingrad, compared with cities like Kiev, Minsk, Riga, Odessa, Sebastopol, and Leningrad, was not all that important.
---------- Post added 07-08-2009 at 06:41 PM ----------
Its role in the eventuality of WWII is grossly overrated.
It was NOT a fair treaty, and it was meant to be punitive and not reconstructive. That is clear. But the use of it as a propaganda weapon is FAR disproportionate to its actual relevance.
Fundamentally, WWII happened because the conflicts that flared in WWI were never satisfactorily resolved. Four empires collapsed in WWI (Kaiser Germany, Tsarist Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Ottoman Turkey). In their wake was left ultranationalist idealogues fighting it out, in a
brutal civil war in the cases of Russia and Spain. Mutually incompatible military powers rose to prominence in the political and economic melee that followed.
If you're interested in this subject, I'd suggest you read "War of the World" by the British historian Niall Fergusson. His thesis is that the first half of the 20th century represented an enormous civil war within Western civilization, in fact a quasi-suicide attempt. He goes into extraordinary detail about factors such as economic changes, mass movement of refugees, and the connectedness of various atrocities such as the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust, Stalin's purges and famines, and the Japanese atrocities in mainland Asia as having common underlying themes.
WWII, and the rise of Naziism, was probably independent of Versailles. No one would have cared about Versailles if Germany had been more prosperous under the Weimar government.
"Its role in the eventuality of WWII is grossly overrated."
See the first part of my earlier post for a more detailed response to this statement.
"It was NOT a fair treaty, and it was meant to be punitive and not reconstructive."
Totally agree with you there.
"But the use of it as a propaganda weapon is FAR disproportionate to its actual relevance."
How could the Treaty of Versailles be anything but relevant? It was this Treaty which humiliated the German people, stripped them of their possessions, denied them an army or navy substantial enough even for the purpose of national self-defense, and made Germany, formerly a progressive, industrial, economically-developed European power, into a greatly weakened international pariah.
As for its use as a 'propaganda weapon' - of course the Nazis did the Treaty of Versailles as a tool to justify their conquest of Europe, and their ideas of a 'Greater Germany.' But they weren't alone in their contempt of Versailles, or of the people and nations who had so humiliated them.
"Fundamentally, WWII happened because the conflicts that flared in WWI were never satisfactorily resolved. Four empires collapsed in WWI (Kaiser Germany, Tsarist Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Ottoman Turkey). In their wake was left ultranationalist idealogues fighting it out, in a brutal civil war in the cases of Russia and Spain. Mutually incompatible military powers rose to prominence in the political and economic melee that followed."
This is an area with which I am not familiar, and so I will have to do some more research on it before I can give an adequate response. However, I do believe that Versailles was not the ONLY contributing factor to the breakdown of European relations post-1919 and the eventual emergence of the Nazi Party.
"If you're interested in this subject, I'd suggest you read "War of the World" by the British historian Niall Fergusson. His thesis is that the first half of the 20th century represented an enormous civil war within Western civilization, in fact a quasi-suicide attempt. He goes into extraordinary detail about factors such as economic changes, mass movement of refugees, and the connectedness of various atrocities such as the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust, Stalin's purges and famines, and the Japanese atrocities in mainland Asia as having common underlying themes."
Having not read Niall Fergusson's book, and knowing less about inter-war socio-political movements in Europe, I am unable to comment on this point. The idea of the Second World War as an '
enormous civil war within Western civilization' is a tantalizing one. But I don't see how it is connected with Stalin's purges or famines. After the Russian Revolution the Soviets did everything in their power to distance and isolate themselves from the Western world, as they wanted no truck with its problems (although they did continue to influence the various communist movements that existed in Germany, in Hungary, in Italy and France that existed at this time.) This is one reason why the Soviet Union was so little affected by the Great Depression, because it had so few economic ties with the West. The Collectivisation famine was brought about by an attempt by Stalin, horribly mishandled, to clamp down on the kulaks, the landed peasants who were resisting agricultural reform, and a much broader effort to revolutionize and modernize the Soviet economy, which was lagging behind its western rivals. The purges were a direct response to the many of the problems in the Soviet Union at this time, no doubt exacerbated by the reforms, to punish and eradicate his political enemies and rivals (some of whom were former early revolutionaries, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks both), and assert and consolidate his own authority within the Party. How this connects with the Armenian genocide, the rise of Nazism and the Holocaust or anything else I don't understand. There might be a connection, but it seems to me that 1930 to 1945 was more simply a terrible era in human history, in which many appalling things happened throughout the world, many of them having little relation to each other; the fact that these things all happened within a close timeframe does not imply a necessary connection.
I will, however, look into Fergusson's book when I have the chance.
"WWII, and the rise of Naziism, was probably independent of Versailles. No one would have cared about Versailles if Germany had been more prosperous under the Weimar government."
As you'll see if you read my earlier post, that runs completely counter to my understanding of the War and why it came about as well as the general consensus of western historians. Perhaps people in America have a different perspective on this matter. But Versailles was absolutely crucial to what happened in the two decades between WWI and WWII. The rise of Nazism could *not* have been independent of Versailles, not by any stroke of the imagination, because the National Socialist movement could never have achieved widespread legitimacy and support were it not for the effect of Versailles on the collective German psyche, Germany's economy, and the belief it fostered among the German people that they had been 'betrayed' in the War and never properly defeated, by subversive elements within their government and society. All these elements combined to form the Nazi movement and make it what it was: reactionary, racist, anti-liberal, anti-progressive, aggressive. Using the same argument, it is possible the Nazi movement would never have rose to power if it weren't for the Great Depression, and the terrible effect of that on the German people. The Nazis naturally drew their supporters from among the disenfranchised, the impoverished, the disaffected - Hitler embodied all those qualities - and the Depression, combined with Germany's already frail economic situation - created poverty, confusion, disenchantment and hostility on a mass scale. Henceforth the National Socialists' roster of supporters, drawn especially from among the unemployed and the working-classes, grew dramatically. If history had been otherwise, the Nazis might well have remained a second-rate reactionary movement, confined to the peripheries of violence and politics, and would never have found itself appointed to power.
"No one would have cared if Germany had been more prosperous under the Weimar government."
Hmm, I'm not sure what to make of this. The point of the Weimar government is that it was a PRODUCT of the Versailles Treaty, and therefore it was tainted by association. Also, the character of the German people ran squarely counter to British, French and American ideas of what constituted the best government. Regardless of whether the Weimar Republic prospered or NOT, it would never find favour; and as things turned out the German Republic proved itself woefully incapable of dealing with the plight that emerged during the 1920s and 30s. Few incompetent governments are ever admired, but as long as they are able to engender the support of the people, they are tolerated. George W. Bush's administration and especially his foreign policy were a hopeless shambles, but for a brief time after 9/11 Bush had the highest popularity rating of any President; it did not matter that Bush had 'won' the first election dubiously, or that he was at least partly to blame for the catastrophe, that he had failed to make adequate preparation or devise a suitable solution, or even that he spoke with all the eloquence and conviction of a ninth-grader. Because Bush was able to convince the American people that he was doing what *they* thought was in their best interests, he was tolerated and even briefly popular while in office. That did not last, of course. But the Weimar Republic had no legitimacy and no support from the get-go, and it could never *make* its legitimate or 'accepted'; it was almost bound to collapse, eventually. The only uncertainty was which government would replace it.