@Alan McDougall,
That site is incorrect according to a number of academic estimates I have read. I'm looking back through some journal articles I have saved and the
highest estimate I can find for Gulag mortality is 20 million, and that article has come under a lot of criticism. The NKVD did not keep meticulous records of mortality, and there are discrepancies between prisoner arrivals and departures, and they did not always discriminate in their records between death from "natural" causes (being worked to death or death from disease) versus summary execution. But in reality most academic sources I've read seem to place the death toll
much lower than 20 million (in the Gulag).
It is beyond question that Stalin did not summarily kill anywhere close to 43 million. His kind of atrocity was different than that of Hitler, Pol Pot, Bagosora, i.e. rapid and systematic industrial death. The Rwandan death toll was 800,000, less than Treblinka alone, yet never in human history have so many people been systematically murdered in such a short time. The only thing in the CV of Hitler or Stalin that matches that was the Nazi action against the Hungarian Jews in the summer of 1944. In a span of just 2 months or so, 700,000 Hungarian Jews were deported to Auschwitz and 470,000 killed. They were killing up to 14,000 a day. This is a different sort of death machine than, say, the Ethiopian famine (which was a man-made catastrophe).
Imperial Japan's occupation of mainland Asia is often left out of these discussions, but from what I recall their own systematic brutality cost up to 10 million people their lives.
Comparing crimes against humanity is in a way a stupid endeavor. They're all superlative examples of how low we can go, and often time it's only circumstance that determines the final tally -- I mean imagine if Hitler had forced an armistice with the Soviet Union based on the front position in the winter of 1942. Hitler would have had YEARS to execute his policies in the occupied territories.
By disagreeing with the figure you link, I'm not in any way diminishing the importance of Stalin's crimes, just questioning the accuracy of their numbers. Methodology has a lot to do with it. With a 30 year reign, I have no doubt that
attributable mortality to both murder and stupid policies accounted for tens of millions. Making estimations of attributable mortality is dicey enough -- laying the blame for it is even dicier.
Quote:Hitler was no incompetent man.
Yes he was, and his own generals thought so. The
best battlefield tactician in Nazi Germany, Heinz Guderian, almost got himself arrested because he was so fed up with Hitler's blundering.
Here are some examples of his incompetence:
1) Hitler
specifically chose to bomb civilian targets in the Battle of Britain rather than military targets, esp airfields. This killed and terrorized people, but proved tactically useless and did nothing but expose the Luftwaffe to the RAF reprisals. After the Battle of Britain had ended, Germany had no chance of EVER having air superiority over Western Europe again
2) The invasion of the USSR in the summer of 1941 was hubris of the highest order. Many even within the Nazi Party opposed it. Hitler was insane to think that he could win a Blitzkrieg war over such vast distances, yet that is exactly what he thought. Stalin's failure to anticipate it (despite receiving 80 separate warnings of an impending attack) allowed the Nazis to penetrate so deeply into Russia that they became impossible to supply by the time the winter came around. When the Wermacht got stopped in front of Moscow that winter, there was no chance of ever recovering -- because Germany could not sustain a war of attrition against Russia (as Speer knew).
3) Hitler's declaration of war against the US following Pearl Harbor made no sense. Instead of the US fighting a war exclusively in the Pacific, he effectively invited them to Europe.
4) The Atlantic Wall was a near carbon copy of the Maginot Line, which Hitler had easily bypassed in 1940. Sure, the invasion of Normandy was brutal, but even Omaha Beach had been reduced by noon on D-day and the other 4 beaches were captured within the first couple waves. Hitler disdained the idea of mobile reserve units poised to deploy to the site of the invasion and counterattack, and preferred Rommel's idea of a static fortified defense.
5) Stalingrad. Need I say more? They started the battle by bombing the city into rubble (killing 40,000 people in the process), which made it impossible for the German tanks to penetrate. The army of Blitzkrieg was not built for street-to-street fighting in a foreign city in winter. Furthermore, the Wermacht failed to take the east bank of the Volga before the battle, and they thus had no way to prevent supply of the Russian soldiers in the city or anticipate the counterattack. Once the German 6th Army had been surrounded, Hitler refused to divert troops to break them out, and more than 300,000 troops were lost (800,000 in the battle on the German side, 1.2 million on the Soviet side).
6) Kursk (summer 1943). Need I say more? Hitler attacked a Red Army salient
knowing (he admitted it!) that it was an obvious point of attack and that Stalin was preparing for it. Hitler pulled out of the battle, but by then he had lost so many tanks and so many planes that he wasn't able to launch another significant offensive until the Bulge roughly 18 months later.
7) The SS diverted so many resources and troops for operating death camps and labor camps, guarding ghettos, and shooting "partisans" in Russia that it consumed a major part of the German military personnel, budget, and especially rail transport system.
8) Despite urgings to do so from Guderian and others, Hitler
refused to let Germans retreat to consolidate forces. Thus, for the last 6-12 months of the war, the Red Army just ran over them because there was no concentration of mass. By the time the Red Army got to Berlin, Hitler only had teenagers and old men to throw into the battle.
9) The V2 rocket program was an ill-conceived terror weapon that was never used tactically. Some have pointed out that this could have been used tactically against the invading forces on D-day, but it never was.
10) The Battle of the Bulge was not only a hopeless venture, but it was effectively a kamikaze mission on Hitler's part. The Wermacht was
done as a fighting force after this battle. The war lasted another 5 months only because Hitler was able to trade distance for time.