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The Problem of Consciousness

 
 
richrf
 
  1  
Reply Fri 4 Sep, 2009 09:26 am
@salima,
salima;88028 wrote:
if you cant find any stimulus in the brain or in the environment, doesnt it make sense to start looking further away? like really far away?!


Yes, I agree. What is the impetus? The beginning? What made the neuron go this way instead of that way? This, whatever it is, is what chooses the direction to go.

Rich
0 Replies
 
paulhanke
 
  1  
Reply Fri 4 Sep, 2009 10:19 am
@salima,
salima;88028 wrote:
i think i know what you mean-i used to dismiss everything neurology said about how the brain worked, for instance if you can probe a part of the brain mush and get a spiritual experience, i thought-'great, where is the problem? so that is how we have one of those experiences...how does it make it any less spiritual?" in other words, I saw the neuronal activity as being the way the brain reacts to us having a particular experience, not the cause of it.
so now I am looking closer being as unbiased as I can be. but I still dont see how we can consider brain activity to be the cause of all experience-because if you do not probe someone's brain and they have that activity...what is the stimulus that is causing it? if you cant find any stimulus in the brain or in the environment, doesnt it make sense to start looking further away? like really far away?


... but if you can also artificially stimulate mirth with a brain probe, does that mean we should also start looking far, far away for mirth? ... or does it make more sense to say that derivative experience comes from within? ... e.g., a person taking a fall does not produce mirth - the mirth arises from our interpretation of the situation (it's a Charlie Chaplin movie) ... so why does a spiritual experience need to be any different in this respect than a mirthful experience? ...
TickTockMan
 
  1  
Reply Fri 4 Sep, 2009 11:35 am
@Pathfinder,
Pathfinder;87997 wrote:
Tick Tock, you might want to leave that other Corona in the fridge bud, its killin waaay too many brain cells, lol.


Nonsense. My brain cells are regenerating faster than I can kill 'em off.

Pathfinder;87997 wrote:
The WE,I,US ETC., is all ways to describe the form we use at this time, we identify with our bodies for the sake of identifying our individuality. Its hard to be just another apple in the barrel and we need to be able to distinguish our loved ones from the rest of the apples somehow.


So when our consciousness is untethered from our physical body and goes floating off into the ether, how does it identify itself and others? I would think that in order to travel, whether in the spiritual plane or the physical plane, an identity of some sort would be a prerequisite.

Pathfinder;87997 wrote:
But that doesn't change the fact that what many are trying to define as self or soul does not exist the way they suppose that it does.


By saying that something does not exist one way, or in a certain way, are you not also implying that it could exist in another way?

Pathfinder;87997 wrote:
Higher consciousness is not another consciousness, or to mean that one has a lower AND higher consciousness, it is one and the same consciousness being evolved to a higher degree.


That horrible grinding sound you are hearing is a paradigm trying to shift without a clutch.

Pathfinder;87997 wrote:
What you are doing is supposing that because we must use this body to interact with our environment that we must therefore have a permanent identity within it.


Quick question: Does consciousness have a permanent identity?

Pathfinder;87997 wrote:
It is that thinking that creates the theories of souls passing on to heaven and the like.


Such as reincarnation? A consciousness passing on to inhabit the physical body of an individual biological organism and imbue it with a sense of self for ease of identification, but which is actually a false sense of self?

Pathfinder;87997 wrote:
If there is one thing that we are sure of it is the very certain fact that this body of ours is dying and very impermanent.


Well yeah. This absolute acceptance of mortality, the undeniable knowledge that we will die is one of the keys to achieving freedom. Or so some say.

Pathfinder;87997 wrote:
The name we call the body has nothing to do with the consciousness we attain. And the consciousness we attain is not bound to the biological function of the brain as I have pointed out.


So consciousness is just a "Ghost in the Shell" then.

Pathfinder;88007 wrote:
No of course we do not have a choice,


So Determinism it is then. Excellent. I'm glad we've got that settled and out of the way then!

Pathfinder;88007 wrote:
"WE" are these bodies that carry our consciousness. In order to find individuality and identity while we are using them, we identify with them personally and intimately, and rightly so. The "US" that is separate from our biological body is simply that 'life force' where our consciousness resides. It is not an identity, or self, or soul, that is bound to the individual we are at this time, but instead the continuing conscious life force that brought us here in the first place, has done so in the past in past incarnations, and will do so again in the future ones. This is what I meant by At THIS TIME.


Forgive me if I sound quarrelsome, Pathfinder, but I'm really struggling here to understand how consciousness can be a continually evolving force that does not have an identity, a self, or a soul. It just flat-out doesn't make sense to me. It seems akin to going into a garage and telling the mechanic there that I'd like a better engine installed in a vehicle that doesn't exist, or asking him to re-paint my invisible car . . . .

For what it's worth, and despite how it may come across, I mean no disrespect toward you or your ideas, and am looking forward to continuing this dialog.


Regards,
SoberTock
0 Replies
 
salima
 
  1  
Reply Fri 4 Sep, 2009 12:36 pm
@paulhanke,
paulhanke;88055 wrote:
... but if you can also artificially stimulate mirth with a brain probe, does that mean we should also start looking far, far away for mirth? ... or does it make more sense to say that derivative experience comes from within? ... e.g., a person taking a fall does not produce mirth - the mirth arises from our interpretation of the situation (it's a Charlie Chaplin movie) ... so why does a spiritual experience need to be any different in this respect than a mirthful experience? ...


because the mirthful experience still has to have an outside stimulus-then we interpret it as funny and laugh. the spiritual experience would have no outside stimulus even though it could be replicated by probing the brain. and i am sure there are other examples, but offhand i cant think of any right now. the way i stated it was that if we find no stimulus happening in the brain (the doctor's probe) or in the body (fever, drugs etc) or in the environment (being in the middle of a highly charged prayer meeting with everyone getting mass hysteria) and there comes an unexplainable experience-that is where we have to start looking beyond the physical for the stimulus.
paulhanke
 
  1  
Reply Fri 4 Sep, 2009 03:03 pm
@salima,
salima;88073 wrote:
because the mirthful experience still has to have an outside stimulus-then we interpret it as funny and laugh. the spiritual experience would have no outside stimulus even though it could be replicated by probing the brain.


... can't both mirthful experiences and spiritual experiences have outside and inside stimuli? ... e.g., for example, laughing out loud at a random thought (in a serious meeting - and then getting glared at by all the wrinkled brow mucky mucks); or having your breath taken away (by a newborn or the view into an abyss from a high cliff) ...
Pathfinder
 
  1  
Reply Fri 4 Sep, 2009 05:39 pm
@BrightNoon,
Hey Tick Tock,

who said any of it had to make sense? And conscoiousness does not have a permanent identity until it reaches its highest form at which point the whole process becomes final.
salima
 
  1  
Reply Fri 4 Sep, 2009 05:46 pm
@paulhanke,
paulhanke;88110 wrote:
... can't both mirthful experiences and spiritual experiences have outside and inside stimuli? ... e.g., for example, laughing out loud at a random thought (in a serious meeting - and then getting glared at by all the wrinkled brow mucky mucks); or having your breath taken away (by a newborn or the view into an abyss from a high cliff) ...


i would agree, but what i was singling out for investigation are the experiences that have no accounted for stimulus. even something as seemingly insignificant as the urge to get up from the pc and get an oreo cookie when i am not hungry and i havent seen or thought of anything associated with either food, hunger or oreos. where did it come from?

i am not necessarily looking for something spiritual-just something that occurs in the brain via a stimulus that is untraceable and unexplainable in biological or neurological terms.
jeeprs
 
  1  
Reply Fri 4 Sep, 2009 06:38 pm
@BrightNoon,
KaseiJin;87207 wrote:
Consciousness, as the sum of all subjective experience by vertebrates, and especially primates, is in relationship with the real world, as part of the real world, within the enclosure and domain of a translating process on behalf of the body which it is working on by the brain.


Going back to this initial response, and in light of subsequent discussion about neural imaging, I have some questions with regards to the analysis of consciousness in terms of neural activity.

I refer to the papers on the analysis of the neural correlates in response to stimuli. Now obviously I have not read all of these papers and certainly don't wish to take issue with the substance of them. But I still think there are valid questions of interpretation that can be asked on the basis of the information presented.

To quote the abstract of the study by Poggio and Hung, who

KaseiJin;87951 wrote:
showed pictures of cars, faces, and other objects to macaque monkeys while recording the activity of neurons in their inferior temporal cortex (an area for identifying objects). In a kind of 'blind testing' study, they found that they could determine which object a monkey was looking at from just the activity of a few recorded cells.


Now as regards the statement 'they could determine'. I presume this act of determination requires interpretative skill, does it not? You won't see an image on the screen that literally looks like car or face represented in neural patters. You might be able to determine that 'car' produces this pattern of response, and 'face' that one. But what does this actually show you? Without your interpretative ability, and of course the scientific appartus to capture this neural activity and turn it into some kind of visual representation, you have no data. But by the time you consider the significance of all of the interpretive ability, and of the apparatus, you are again quite a few removes from the 'basic data of consciousness' once again, aren't you? It has already been translated into a matrix of meaning and interpretation which makes it possible for the observer to say that he is seeing 'this' or 'that' object. So this is not what you could call 'raw data', is it?

So the question still remains as to whether you are seeing what is 'really there'. Another way of putting it: in what sense is this pattern of neural data really 'a car' or 'a face'? What does 'represent' mean here? In the absence of the interpretive framework provided by the experimenter and their intentional acts, what would you really have?
salima
 
  1  
Reply Fri 4 Sep, 2009 06:49 pm
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;88152 wrote:
Going back to this initial response, and in light of subsequent discussion about neural imaging, I have some questions with regards to the analysis of consciousness in terms of neural activity.

I refer to the papers on the analysis of the neural correlates in response to stimuli. Now obviously I have not read all of these papers and certainly don't wish to take issue with the substance of them. But I still think there are valid questions of interpretation that can be asked on the basis of the information presented.

To quote the abstract of the study by Poggio and Hung, who



Now as regards the statement 'they could determine'. I presume this act of determination requires interpretative skill, does it not? You won't see an image on the screen that literally looks like car or face represented in neural patters. You might be able to determine that 'car' produces this pattern of response, and 'face' that one. But what does this actually show you? Without your interpretative ability, and of course the scientific appartus to capture this neural activity and turn it into some kind of visual representation, you have no data. But by the time you consider the significance of all of the interpretive ability, and of the apparatus, you are again quite a few removes from the 'basic data of consciousness' once again, aren't you? It has already been translated into a matrix of meaning and interpretation which makes it possible for the observer to say that he is seeing 'this' or 'that' object. So this is not what you could call 'raw data', is it?

So the question still remains as to whether you are seeing what is 'really there'. Another way of putting it: in what sense is this pattern of neural data really 'a car' or 'a face'? What does 'represent' mean here? In the absence of the interpretive framework provided by the experimenter and their intentional acts, what would you really have?


Laughing i wonder how the monkeys confirmed 'they' got it right? maybe they gave 'them' bananas for a reward?
0 Replies
 
paulhanke
 
  1  
Reply Fri 4 Sep, 2009 07:25 pm
@salima,
salima;88138 wrote:
i would agree, but what i was singling out for investigation are the experiences that have no accounted for stimulus. even something as seemingly insignificant as the urge to get up from the pc and get an oreo cookie when i am not hungry and i havent seen or thought of anything associated with either food, hunger or oreos. where did it come from?


... one model from the realm of artificial intelligence that may be relevant here is the multi-agent system model of mind - that mind can be modeled as being comprised of many subconscious agents actively talking in parallel and vying for the attention of the serializing executive agent that is consciousness ... perhaps you're engrossed in a project on your PC, the shout of a "work" agent having alerted the consciousness of a pending deadline and consciousness taking off from there and orchestrating the loud din of a large number of other agents needed to get the project done ... meanwhile, other agents are continuing to operate in parallel - e.g., a "sweet tooth" agent is monitoring your blood sugar; a "potty" agent is monitoring your bladder ... the "sweet tooth" agent detects a drop in your blood sugar and says in a small voice "I wanna cookie" ... amidst the ongoing din, the voice goes unheard ... time passes, and your blood sugar continues to drop ... the "sweet tooth" agent's voice gets a little louder - "I wanna cookie!" ... still, it goes unheard ... more time passes, and you finish up the project ... by this time, the "sweet tooth" agent's voice is even louder - "I WANNA COOKIE!" ... amidst the quieting din, that voice is now clear as a bell ... your conscious experience is "Boy! - I'm glad that's over with! - I think I'll have a cookie!!!" ... obviously, as a model this is a vast simplification of the exapted evolutionary kludges we call brain and mind ... and while it has been a useful model in developing artificial intelligences, it has yet to be demonstrated to be representative of human intelligence ...
0 Replies
 
KaseiJin
 
  1  
Reply Fri 4 Sep, 2009 09:08 pm
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;87989 wrote:
I am writing on a computer. You can know all there is to know about this computer, be you a chip scientist from Intel or a Mac software engineer, but that won't necessarily mean that you can make sense of what is being written on here. You could also probably zoom in on the hard drive and find the actual bytes which represent this particular text, on the drive of a server. But then, if they are not interpreted by the operating system, displayed on a screen, and read by another human, how can they actually said to mean anything? Of course every conscious act has a neural correlate. But can the neural correlate be said to constitute a conscious act? That is the question.


I appreciate your taking the time to put together that analogy, jeeprs; it shows seriousness, care, and inquisitive attitude. (things which are to be greatly respected) As is often the case, as I have so far found it to be, analogies in this realm, like some of the thought experiments one finds, miss the mark in a number of possible ways, however. (and computer to brain analogies are not as 'hip' today as they once were [in the more scientific method works. . . though still used in explanation from time to time [not as an analogy, per se])


jeeprs;87989 wrote:
You could also probably zoom in on the hard drive and find the actual bytes which represent this particular text, on the drive of a server. But then, if they are not interpreted by the operating system, displayed on a screen, and read by another human, how can they actually said to mean anything?


Here, again, we find the matter of translation. What we can say has essentially occured, is a translation of information into another format, which can be translated back out of that format by an understander of it, into the original format once again. Of course, we know that the hard drive system and details of how it works and what's basically happening and all, was developed, designed and built by humans, and in that sense, again, is very much like your saying something in English and my transalting it into Japanese amongst others who do not understand Japanese. They may dissect the individual sounds, try to find correlations with English sounds, syllables, and so on, but with just one go at it (or a few even), will not be able to find any meaning. The person who understands Japanese will have to put it back into English.

Of course, if you, the person who had spoken the original English sentence had known that I had been simply translating your English sentence into a Japanese sentence, (and trusted my Japanese proficiency) wouldn't have to think twice about it--you would know (to that degree of trust) that the Japanese is carrying the same information as your English. So when one of those who don't know Japanese asks you what I had said (information content), you'd answer in English (information content correlate) and that party would know that the English event and the Japanese event said the same thing. (1)

Here, I would be the reporter (2), and you would be the investigator. The infomation content of the Japanese would be the information content in the spiking patterns of neuron maps (or assemblies), and the English translation would be the otherwise already known information pattern (such as would be the case when a test subject is looking at a known-to-all object--a certain face, a key, etc.). In this way, the 'gap' (so to speak) between the subjective test subject and the subjective-but-objectively-viewing investigator, would only be the spiking pattern.

Then, in that it is known that to a very high degree the brain of all H. sapiens are going to be the same in structure layout and connection, and too a fairly high degree (as seen by test results) the same in processing sensory information and forwarding into (and getting feedback from) higher extended consciousness-related cortical regions, it is secure enough an understanding that what's happening in the brain of the investigator and of the subject, is very much the same. For that reason, therefore, when the neurons are recorded as firing in these situations, we can rest assured that the information content is a translation of the 'external-object-sourced' sensory input, and in that way, to that degree, can say that these spiking patterns correlate the external object, and are most certainly very similar to those in the brain of the investigator.

jeeprs;87989 wrote:
Of course every conscious act has a neural correlate. But can the neural correlate be said to constitute a conscious act? That is the question.


Therefore, (and this is based on a greater range of data than on just the above) the word 'have' may be getting in the way here. Neural activity is, essentially, a state producing activity. Not all neural activity is cognized with acknowlegment in the state of consciousness--much of the brain (brain) is active below that range of conscious which we usually acknowledge as being within the range that we call consciousness The second question, then, appears to be unanswerable--because, for example, when association cortex works in tandem with the amygdala, it is not an act so nearly described by a conscious (in the sense of being a state of 'consciousnessly' willed activity) command. However, in reasoning on what that second question may have been trying to ask, I'd answer by saying that as far as can be determined at the moment, backed by the better of the average of evidence, every neural spiking pattern has information content--which is (beyond a certain threshold) what consciousness becomes aware of.

So, as I have tried to amplify above, when we know the information content going into the brain via sensory input, and see the neural activity that can be focused down to having been because of that (and there is always effort to block out, screen, and account for noise) input, we can know that that neural activty is the translation of that original information content input, and we can know that that will be what is very much happening in H. sapien's brain (considering normal brain build) when that specific information content is presented.




jeeprs;87989 wrote:
. . . is a video interview with Alva Noe . . . And here's a question: during the interview, he denies he is a [8-letter word, begins with 'v']. But based on what he says after denying it, I think this denial might be questioned. What is it that he denies, and why might this be questioned?


He denied being a vitalist, and I do not gather from what he said afterwards that he is presenting any evidence that he is anything otherwise. He did mention that computationalist attempt to draw the computational aspect of consciousness out of the biological aspect of consciousness, is one outlook in the field, but he was not applying to his opinion actually, only mentioning it. I did notice that he did not really answer the question, "What could possibly be part of consciousness that is not represented in some way by neural or brain activity/" After that, they kind of got sidetracked a little bit. I did notice that the professor expressed the following, which is an important point, viz.: '...living beings, whether they are cells or siimple organisms,...' It was a good clip, but as is so often the case (and the problem with such) a full thought is not completed...they always leave scattered points which can lead to misrepresentations and 'out-of-context' applications. He did manage, but did not have to room to anywhere nearly fully explain his sense of consciousness being worked on. (which might be good PR, maybe, making folks feel the need to have to read the book? hee, hee, hee...[not serious here folks]

OH BOY...in clicking the 'Preview Post,' as I often do when creating a post, I noticed newer incoming posts...I'll have much to answer towards???



1. Therefore, one who knows the whole PC thing inside and out, while perhaps not being able to see what the physical bytes mean when looking at them in the absence of any other information or translation equipment, will know the content those charged spaces correlate with in the event that they know it translates what you had typed into the PC.

2. As touched on in passing in that video clip, it is true that the reporter is a weak link (if not THE weak link), however through the volume of tests and research, the weakness of that link is very immaterial, and to actually question that, in refusal to accept honest subjective report in methodologically correct testing, is simply hardheaded.
0 Replies
 
jeeprs
 
  1  
Reply Fri 4 Sep, 2009 09:23 pm
@BrightNoon,
in many respects your answer above has addressed a lot of points I raised in the second post. Maybe I should have waited. Anyway I think this does cover a lot of the same territory. Thanks.
0 Replies
 
jeeprs
 
  1  
Reply Fri 4 Sep, 2009 11:32 pm
@BrightNoon,
Incidentally, I agree...Noe denied vitalism, but then seemed to affirm it by talking about the irreducible quality which 'aliveness' seems to bring to everything from the single cell, up to and including consciousness. But I agree with the point, and have always rather admired vitalism, even though I know it is not intellectually respectable any more. Viva le Bergson, I say.
TickTockMan
 
  1  
Reply Sat 5 Sep, 2009 12:09 am
@Pathfinder,
Pathfinder;88135 wrote:
Hey Tick Tock,

who said any of it had to make sense? And conscoiousness does not have a permanent identity until it reaches its highest form at which point the whole process becomes final.


If none of it makes sense, are we just along for the ride? Are we but pawns, just bits & bytes in some cosmic game program being played by forces that are so vast and alien and so utterly beyond our comprehension that we have named them as gods whose will cannot be questioned or denied?

I'm sorry, but I'm seeing little, if any, room for free will in this worldview, this view of consciousness.
Precious little room for the individual as well.

And what do you mean by the whole process? And what happens when the process is finalized, when consciousness reaches its highest form? Does everything just end? And how does consciousness know when it has reached its highest form?

These are the questions that trouble me still.
I'm hoping that you, or others who share your philosophy, can help me out without resorting to some sort of Deus ex machina device.

Ponderingly,
Tick
Pathfinder
 
  1  
Reply Sat 5 Sep, 2009 12:47 am
@TickTockMan,
TickTockMan;88202 wrote:
If none of it makes sense, are we just along for the ride? Are we but pawns, just bits & bytes in some cosmic game program being played by forces that are so vast and alien and so utterly beyond our comprehension that we have named them as gods whose will cannot be questioned or denied?

I'm sorry, but I'm seeing little, if any, room for free will in this worldview, this view of consciousness.
Precious little room for the individual as well.

And what do you mean by the whole process? And what happens when the process is finalized, when consciousness reaches its highest form? Does everything just end? And how does consciousness know when it has reached its highest form?

These are the questions that trouble me still.
I'm hoping that you, or others who share your philosophy, can help me out without resorting to some sort of Deus ex machina device.

Ponderingly,
Tick



Tis right my friend we are just along for the ride.

Who knows what ultimate plan might be unfolding? I mean look at whats out there man, imagine what else could be going on.

We aint talkin free will here tick tock, were talkin process, just like the biological processes that we know about there are other processes that we know very little about. Do ya really think we know everything there is to know about the entire universe/creation?

Its all supposition of couirse, but after years of lookoin at this from evetryu point of view, this just makes more selnse to me.

we already are pretty certain there is an evolution of biological force taking place in some way. We also know that we have had life brought into this existence from somehwere. And we know that there is some further mystery left untouched regarding the human consciousness.

Given my reasoning around the wise man/oaf gap and it not being possible to breach in one lifetime I see many lifetimes being a reasonable suggestion.

Many lifetimes equals something to traverse them and voila we are looking at the human consciousness.

if all of the litle intricasies surrpounding these premises are considered thoughtfully, it is logical to lean in my direction. But that is why you have those two coronas in your handsa sisnt it,
paulhanke
 
  1  
Reply Sat 5 Sep, 2009 06:15 am
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;88199 wrote:
Incidentally, I agree...Noe denied vitalism, but then seemed to affirm it by talking about the irreducible quality which 'aliveness' seems to bring to everything from the single cell, up to and including consciousness. But I agree with the point, and have always rather admired vitalism, even though I know it is not intellectually respectable any more. Viva le Bergson, I say.


... emergence is how irreducible qualities arise quite naturally - no vitalism necessary ...
0 Replies
 
jeeprs
 
  1  
Reply Sat 5 Sep, 2009 07:11 am
@BrightNoon,
There is a lot implied in the use of the term 'naturally' here. When you are talking about causation on this level, it needs to be unpacked.
richrf
 
  1  
Reply Sat 5 Sep, 2009 08:24 am
@Pathfinder,
Pathfinder;88203 wrote:
Many lifetimes equals something to traverse them and voila we are looking at the human consciousness.


Yes, I think this is a key idea for everything to begin to fall into place. It removes the absurdity of life and allows us to connect our present to our past. Without this concept, then it would be like living day to day without any connection to what we created yesterday.

Rich

---------- Post added 09-05-2009 at 09:25 AM ----------

jeeprs;88233 wrote:
There is a lot implied in the use of the term 'naturally' here. When you are talking about causation on this level, it needs to be unpacked.



Yes, for me naturally can either me likened to a punt, sweeping it under the carpet, or a place holder for something that is not yet understood. The next stop, naturally, is to explore what is meant by naturally.

Rich
0 Replies
 
paulhanke
 
  1  
Reply Sat 5 Sep, 2009 03:37 pm
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;88233 wrote:
There is a lot implied in the use of the term 'naturally' here. When you are talking about causation on this level, it needs to be unpacked.


... are the properties of water reducible to the properties of hydrogen atoms and oxygen atoms? ... if not, do the properties of water require a vitalist explanation? ... or can they be explained as naturally emerging from a specific organization of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom and the collective dynamics of many such molecules? ...
0 Replies
 
jeeprs
 
  1  
Reply Sat 5 Sep, 2009 04:13 pm
@BrightNoon,
jeeprs;87989 wrote:
You could also probably zoom in on the hard drive and find the actual bytes which represent this particular text, on the drive of a server. But then, if they are not interpreted by the operating system, displayed on a screen, and read by another human, how can they actually said to mean anything?'


KaseiJin;88180 wrote:
'What we can say has essentially occured, is a translation of information into another format, which can be translated back out of that format by an understander of it, into the original format once again'.


Ah, but can we? I think this misses the point. The bytes might exist on the hard drive - it is after all just binary code - but the point I was making is that these bytes don't mean anything at all until they are interpreted. Remember, we are talking of the nature of conscious experience here; not just the transfer of information. I think you would like to believe that these are somehow equivalent; but I don't think they are. To say that they are equivalent is to assume what you are setting out to prove.

The bytes on the hard drive do not convey meaning until they are interpreted, first by the operating system, and then by the human subject. And both these operations are external to the binary code that 'represents' the text. In other words, the meaning of the message, which is essential to its nature, is not inherent in the binary code as such. The code is, after all, just zeros and ones. And without the operating system and the subject reading it, nothing meaningful can be said to exist on the hard drive.

So the analogy of 'translation' is not appropriate. Translation between Japanese and English assumes that the hearers are already able to interpret and understand the meaning of the phrase that is being translated. But what we are considering here is whether the actual elements of conscious experience can somehow be reproduced in electrochemical form, using the storage of bits on a computer as an analogy for this. To say, then, that 'conscious experience' can be regarded as 'neural activity' or 'proteins' is not a matter 'translation' because this already assumes that what we are discussing can be represented in symbolic form or, in fact, reduced to 'information'. So you are talking of 'transformation' rather than 'translation'. The conception is that of the transformation of one type of thing - namely 'interpretation of meaning' - into another - namely 'proteins encoded in cells'. But these two kinds of thing exist on a different level. By saying they are translatable, you are assuming equivalence. So, as noted above, you are assuming what you are setting out to prove.

KaseiJin;88180 wrote:
Not all neural activity is cognized with acknowlegment in the state of consciousness--much of the brain (brain) is active below that range of conscious which we usually acknowledge as being within the range that we call consciousness. The second question, then, appears to be unanswerable--because, for example, when association cortex works in tandem with the amygdala, it is not an act so nearly described by a conscious (in the sense of being a state of 'consciousnessly' willed activity) command. However, in reasoning on what that second question may have been trying to ask, I'd answer by saying that as far as can be determined at the moment, backed by the better of the average of evidence, every neural spiking pattern has information content--which is (beyond a certain threshold) what consciousness becomes aware of.


This seems to be saying that some amount - perhaps a considerable amount - of neural activity does not qualify as 'conscious'. Perhaps this might correspond to that activity which psychologists have designated 'unconscious' or 'subconscious'? The key question then is, if all of this 'unconscious' and 'subconscious' component is going on, how do you model this part of the activity? Even if you can map a representation of an image as a neural pattern, what of all the distributed activity that is happening elsewhere in the brain, and even in the rest of the body, for that matter, which may not be an explicit aspect of the particular mental event in question - consciousness may not be aware of it - but which nevertheless may be an implicit component of the mental operation?

In other words, where in the nuerological model of consciousness is the unconscious and subconscious represented?
 

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