@BrightNoon,
BrightNoon;87136 wrote:For the purpose of debate in this thread, consciousness will henceforth be defined as follows.
While I will conform to the definition of consciousness as "the sum of all experience", I will also add that that definition is quite ambiguous. For instance, I would interpret "the sum of all experience" as that which I am currently experiencing. Whether it be my perception of "real, physical" things or my memory of said things, or even my feelings or fantasies of these real things (real things as that which is generally excepted as "being in front of me as an actual existing object or the potential of being a real, existing object). It has been argued that one also perceives "essences" of objects (read: Husserl)
However, my argument here is against your definition of consciousness. I currently involved in working out the text of Husserl's Ideas I. In it there is the basic principle of "intentionality", not an idea coined by him, but one that relies on.
Intentionality is our conscious relationship to the objects of experience (be they "real" objects or "essences" of real individual things). Consciousness is always consciousness-of something. Thus there is always a correlation between the
act of conscioussness and the
content of that act. For, there can be no act without content, nor content without an act. This correlation is fundamental anything and everything that we experience (ooh, Experience is such a heavy word. It's impossible to talk about experience without giving a full defense of one's idea of what experience is.).
So, what is the relationship between consciousness and the real world: In order to
experience the 'real world', the objects of the real world have to be correlated with an act of the consciousness of the individual person having that experience.
In answer to question 2:
Quote:
Why do we make that assumption, namely, that there is something 'real' which we experience the sensation of.
We shouldn't make that assumption. When any philosophy does, that assumption immediately undermines their entire philosophy. Why? Because it is an assumption.
Quote:, when all we actually experience is the sense itself
Hefty claim. How can you experience "the sense itself" when sensing requires an act and content? Experience "the sense itself" would be experiencing the sense of seeing, not what is seen.
[p.s. I didn't proof read this, I must be too lazy. Oh, and I apologize is this, or something similar, has already been said]