Can you doubt you exist

I don't think there are any things that do not exist. So I do not see how things that do not exist can be composed of anything.

Perhaps you have in mind not things that do not exist (since, as I pointed out, there are none) but the concepts or the ideas of Santa Claus, or of mermaids, or of, as another example, centaurs. The idea of a centaur can be said to be composed of the ideas of a man's head conjoined to a horse's body. But, since there are no centaurs, there are no men's head conjoined to the bodies of horses.

It is important to keep separate the idea of something from the something itself. Ideas of centaurs there are. But centaurs there are none.

Can we doubt we exist?

Well, there are things that do not exist. You make the example of centaurs, which do not exist. The idea of a centaur is composed of real things, a man's head and a horse's body, but creatures with the head of a man and the body of a horse do not exist.

Sure, we can conceive of these things. But these things we conceive of, which do not exist, are composed of real things that do exist.

We can think of Santa, ect, but we will never meet him because he does not exist. He is a composition of real things, arranged in the mind in a particular fashion, but that arrangement will not be found anywhere else.

Just as a point of information: Res from which we get our word reality, means Thing. To say things not real exist is false. If they do not exist they are not things, and are not real. Look at all of the moral concepts we try to breath some meaning into. Does it not strike you as strange that no one ever stands up in court and says: I am going home? Justice is not real, and no example of it can be shown, and for that reason blind justice is always pictured weighing air. The greatest effort of our lives and the balance of our thoughts is spent in trying to give meaning to moral concepts that few enough give any physical reality to. It is more non sense than humanity deserves.

Well, there are things that do not exist. You make the example of centaurs, which do not exist. The idea of a centaur is composed of real things, a man's head and a horse's body, but creatures with the head of a man and the body of a horse do not exist.

Sure, we can conceive of these things. But these things we conceive of, which do not exist, are composed of real things that do exist.

We can think of Santa, ect, but we will never meet him because he does not exist. He is a composition of real things, arranged in the mind in a particular fashion, but that arrangement will not be found anywhere else.

We? . I can doubt existence.

Santa Claus is not a thing (or person). After all, to say that Santa Claus does not exist, is not to say that there is something called Santa Claus that does not exist, That would be self-contradictory.

So, when we say that Santa does not exist, we are not talking about someone called, "Santa", because there is no one called "Santa" to talk about. After all, if it is true that Santa does not exist, then how could there be a Santa? It would make no sense. So the question is, what are we saying when we say that Santa does not exist. We are, I think, saying that a certain concept, namely the concept of a jolly old elf who brings Christmas presents to good little girls and boys; that that concept has no referent. So, when we say that Santa does not exist, we are not talking about someone called "Santa", for, as I already pointed out, there is no one called "Santa" to talk about. Rather, we are talking about a certain concept (or idea, if that pleases you more), and we are saying about that concept that it has no referent (or object).

Of course, as I already pointed out, Santa cannot be composed of anything, since Santa does not exist. But, the idea or the concept of Santa can (in a manner of speaking) be composed of other ideas, like the idea of a jolly old elf, etc.

There is no Santa, but there is the idea or the concept of Santa. And those, of course, are different. Just as the idea or the concept of an elephant is different from an elephant, In the case of the idea of an elephant, of course, that idea (concept) has a referent (object). But, in the case of the idea (concept) of Santa, that idea (concept) has no referent or object.

But, the question seems to me to be whether it is possible rationally to doubt that we exist. And that is a very different question. The answer seems to be, no. Since for me to doubt I exist is self-refuting, since in order for me to doubt that I exist, I must exist. So the doubt refutes itself, and thus is a doubt, all right, but not a rational doubt.

The concept of Santa Claus is of a thing, of a person. The concept is not a thing, but the concept is of a thing. There is a concept, Santa Claus, of a thing that does not exist.

Just as I can imagine a giant flying spaghetti monster that rules the universe, I can imagine Santa Claus. Neither exist.



And concepts are something. Surely concepts cannot be nothing, otherwise we would not have them.

When we say Santa Claus does not exist, we mean that the thing Santa, of which I can conceive, does not exist. If we say Santa (concept) does not exist, we are obviously wrong. Only Santa (thing) does not exist.



Semantics aside, it seems we generally agree.

Though I will say that Santa (concept) does refer to real things (object). The concept of concepts (like Santa) are derived from real things (like the color red, and human being, and the emotion jolly).



"in order for me to doubt that I exist, I must exist" Sure, if you are doubting, you exist. But isn't there room to doubt whether or not you are doubting? Sure, there is doubt, and something to recognize that doubt, but we still have room to ask what is doing the doubting.

That there is doubt removes any reasonable ability to doubt that something exists. But that there is doubt still leaves many questions unanswered, enough questions that I think we can reasonably doubt whether or not we (the individual I) exists.

That's right. Santa Claus does not exist (there is no Santa Clause) but the concept of Santa Claus exists. Therefore, there is no Santa to be composed of anything. And, of course, as I just said, the concept of Santa Claus exists, but since there is no Santa Claus, the concept of Santa Claus has no referent in the world. That doesn't mean that there is no concept of Santa Claus, it means there is no Santa Claus. The concept exists, but what it is a concept of, does not exist. And since there is no Santa Claus, the concept of Santa Clause does not refer to anything at all.
The concept is composed of (perhaps) other concepts, like the concept of being jolly.

It is true that if I doubt that I exist, then I must exist. Let's get that settled.
Now you ask whether I can doubt that I am doubting. Yes. But if you doubt that you are doubting, then, of course, you must be doubting. Isn't that true, for you are doubting that you are doubting. So, doubting that you are doubting is also self-refuting, for if you doubt that you are doubting, then, you must be doubting.

What are the questions by which one can reasonably doubt when one exists. You say there are some, but you do not mention what they are.

But it is clear that doubting that one exists is self-refuting, and doubting that one doubts is self-refuting. So, if the question is whether one can rationally doubt that one exists, the answer seems to be, no.

Right, and so what we conceive of as Santa Claus references reality. The concept of something Santa Claus is composed, essentially, of somethings we are familiar with. Jolly being an example thereof.



But to begin with the premise that I am doubting, only to conclude that I exist is circular. It's the same as saying 'red cars are the best cars, so red cars must be the best cars'.

I think the questions stem, primarily, from one question - what is doubting? As best we can tell, there is doubt. We have to ask what is doubting. Generally we like to say I am doubting, referring to some individual self, and this tendency may be on target. But it might just as easily be misguided.



We can doubt that one doubts, that's the point. We cannot doubt that there is doubt, nor can we doubt that something exists. But we can question the nature of what exists and what is doubting.

I don't think it true that Santa Claus references reality. I don't think I really know what that means. There is no Santa Claus. (Even it that makes you cry ). There is the concept, or the idea, or the thought, of Santa Claus. And of course, the proper noun, "Santa Claus". But the proper noun, "Santa Claus" does not refer to anything, for, as we both know, there is no Santa Claus. "Santa Claus" (the proper noun) is like the proper noun, "Easter Bunny". There is nothing to which either refer. But you may be thinking of a different noun phrase, namely, "The concept of Santa Claus". Now, like the noun phrase, "The concept of the Easter Bunny" it does have a referent. Its referent is, of course, the concept of Santa Claus. So we have to make the distinction between the proper noun, "Santa Claus" which has no referent; and the noun phrase, "The concept of Santa Claus" which does have a referent. And we should not mix them up, and think that because the noun phrase, "The concept of Santa Claus" has a referent, that the proper noun, "Santa Claus" also has a referent. After all, some nouns, and noun phrases have referents, and some do not. "Elephant" has a referent, and "unicorn" and "mermaid" do not. Both "the concept of elephant" and "elephant" have referents (but, of course, not the same one!); but although "the concept of unicorn" does have a referent, "unicorn" does not. The main thing is not to mix up concepts and what they are concepts of (if anything).

I don't see what is circular about the argument, I think, therefore I exist. No more than the argument, I walk, therefore I exist. (Or even, I walk, therefore I have legs). It is not analogous to your red car argument, which is of course, circular. I don't see why you think it is.

We have to keep separate questions separate. Don't you agree?

But the concept Santa Claus is composed of concepts that refer to reality. Jolly, for example, is grounded in reality, as with every other quality ascribed to the concept Santa Claus. Of course there is no Santa Claus apart from the concept, but that concept is derived from reality. Even unicorn and mermaid are grounded in reality. A mermaid (concept) is composed of a human being, which is real, and a fish, which is real.

I'm just echoing Hume's arguments regarding the origin of what is imagined. Do I need to reread his Enquiry?



Because it begins with the assumption that you exist, "I think" and concludes that I exist. The argument's premise assumes self, and then concludes that self exists. That is the definition of circular.



Do trees have leaves? Do trees have branches? These are separate questions, yet closely related. Why separate them? They boil down to one question - what is a tree? Just like our question - what is doubting? From that question, we can raise many others.

From the Buddhist point of view their is no self, so in that philosophy you don't exists in you're own right. The reason being that every thing is impermanent and reliant upon cause and effect. At one point you didn't exist, and at another you wont. so your existence is not inherent and their by not truly reality.

Can we doubt we exist?

I think I wrote that, in a manner of speaking, the concept of Santa Claus is composed of other concepts. But I thought that you said that Santa Claus, and not the concept of Santa Claus, was composed of something or other, and I pointed out that must be false because there is no Santa Claus, and so, there is nothing that Santa Claus can be composed of. I think I am right in saying that you had not distinguished between Santa Claus and the concept of Santa Claus. Hume, of course, made that distinction, and although I have qualms about saying that even concepts are composed of this or that, what I think you now mean is right. But talk about objects is one thing; and talk about concepts, even concepts that refer to objects, is a different thing, and we should not confuse the concept with the object, particularly when the object does not exist, as in the case of Santa Claus. Even at the end of your present post you say that a mermaid (concept) is composed of a human being. But that cannot be correct. What you must mean is that the concept of a mermaid has, as one of its components, the concept of a human being. Isn't that right?

So, in the first premise, nothing is being assumed about whether there is a self. In the second premise, there is no assumption about what "I" refers to. Descartes, it is true, later on, does seem to assume that "I" refers to what you call a "self". But that assumption is not necessary to the argument. The personal pronoun, "I" may simply refer to utterer of those words, " I think" or, "I am", leaving it quite open what or who it is that is the utterer. It need not be a "self" (whatever that is). The words are uttered, and therefore there must be an utterer. That is all there is.

Trees have leaves and branches, and those are connected. Yet, one can just consider the branches and the leaves quite separately. I don't know how accurate your analogy is. But even if two different things are connected, that does not mean that they cannot, and should not be, considered separately as well. And it may very well be that the connection (whatever it is) cannot be adequately understood unless what are connected is first considered separately. If I go to a physician with a cut on my finger, it is true that my finger is a part of my hand, but the physician might well believe that he can treat my finger without being concerned with the hand. How about that analogy? One has to pick the appropriate analogy.