Philosophy of Evil

Heliotrope:

I don't know about those "facts". Philosophers have been debating those things for ages, and if it were that simple, I'm sure it wouldn't have been an ongoing debate since the time of Socrates.

"There is no objective reality. Everything is linked in a quantum mechanical fashion and relies upon the observer for it's existence. This is not some kind of weird philosophy is it a deep physical reality and was as much a surprise to the investigating physicists as it was to me."

Reality may be altered slightly by my presence, but it doesn't look any different to me than it does to you.

"There is no such thing as good or evil. Both of these rely, for their definitions, on the viewpoint of the person doing the defining."

Precisely. But that doesn't mean that those veiwpoints aren't real. And the same for # 3.

"We have no way to interact with them and thus the precepts and physical laws are different in them which gives rise to other viewpoints which are ALL equally valid no matter what they say. Thus no universal truth or one single corect viewpoint, therefore no universality."

Where have I ever said that there was one correct veiwpoiont? And there is something that is universal - logic. Logic doesn't depend on physical laws, or on anything at all. It has its own rules. The physical laws of this universe exist as premises, which are not fixed - I can just as easily reason about a universe where the sky is purple and where there is no gravity.

Joe:

"If everyone doesn't have the same definition of "wood," then there is either no definition or else there's no such thing as "wood." Take your pick."

That's an interesting opinion. I guess, since I don't share it, it must not exist.

"And if person A says "my definition of wood includes that object," and person B says the same thing, then either one or the other is objectively wrong, or the definitions of "wood" and "not-wood" are identical and thus meaningless, or else there is no such thing as "wood" and both A and B are wrong."

True. But everyone has a different definition of good and evil. That's the difference.

"I, on the contrary, believe that good and evil must be objective, or at least have an objective element."

And how do you propose that we define good and evil, Almightly One?

"Then they aren't "definitions." They are, at best, rationalizations or self-defenses."

Maybe for you. But for others, they are real.

"If quality X defines "good," (e.g. "efficaciousness is the good") then "good" means something: i.e. it is not simply a placeholder word, as you previously held."

X, like in most mathematical equations is a placeholder here. I don't mean efficaciousness, either. I mean, Twyvel thinks that goodness means being nice to people and not hurting them, for instance. That is an example of a value that can be inserted for X.

"In that case, "good" is as meaningless in this context as "cake" or "purple.""

No ****, Sherlock, that was the point of my last post. I used the word good because I intended moral codes to be substituted for it.

The actions that are "in line with" objectives are so because they follow the same principles. They are effectively the same, except that they are actions not objectives.

I have to go now... I'll get back to the rest later.

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"How can someone observe objectives if those objectives are intentions?"

I did say "if" there were an observer so gifted. Actually, that is a real-life situation - people announce their moral objectives all the time, whether people want to hear them or not.

"If I see you push a pedestrian into the path of an oncoming car, how do I know that your objective was to save that person (and were unsuccessful in your objective) rather than harm him (and succeeded in doing so)?"

If you were really curious, you would ask and I would tell you.

Look at this sentence, Joe.

Yesterday, the cat ______ the dog.

That's a placeholder, with no meaning at all, but only a certain type of thing can fill that place. Do you see that? This works the same way. I have defined good as a placeholder that can only hold a certain type of thing.

"Please identify anything that you've stated so far that falls into that syllogistic form."

Certainly.

P = (Insert definitions here.)
Q = (Insert first post of thread here.)

P -> Q

Naturally, it's a bit more complicated, and there's a proof in there too, but that's the overall structure of the thing.

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rufio wrote:

That's an interesting opinion. I guess, since I don't share it, it must not exist.

It's not an opinion. It's logically necessary.

rufio wrote:

True. But everyone has a different definition of good and evil. That's the difference.

No, that's not a difference at all. First of all, you said: "I mentioned wood because everyone has a definition for it, not because everyone has the same definition for it." So even you don't see that as a difference.

Secondly, if everyone had a different definition of "wood," the same logical problems that I identified above would exist. Either someone's definition is objectively wrong, or the definitions are meaningless, or there is no such thing as "wood."

rufio wrote:

And how do you propose that we define good and evil, Almightly One?

Let's try to figure out what you are trying to say first, rufio, then we can worry about my position. After all, it's your thread.

rufio wrote:

Maybe for you. But for others, they are real.

So what?

rufio wrote:

X, like in most mathematical equations is a placeholder here. I don't mean efficaciousness, either. I mean, Twyvel thinks that goodness means being nice to people and not hurting them, for instance. That is an example of a value that can be inserted for X.

To what end? Why bother with all this "placeholder" nonsense? If you mean to say that "good" and "evil" are entirely subjective, then why not just say so? This "placeholder" business is completely pointless.

rufio wrote:

No ****, Sherlock, that was the point of my last post. I used the word good because I intended moral codes to be substituted for it.

Answer this: how can you have a "moral code" that doesn't already contain within it a definition of "good"? How can "good" act as a placeholder for a concept that defines "good"?

rufio wrote:

The actions that are "in line with" objectives are so because they follow the same principles. They are effectively the same, except that they are actions not objectives.

Rubbish. If A (an action) and B (an objective) are distinct, and A "follows the same principles" as B, then A and B are, by definition, not identical -- they're not even "effectively" identical.

rufio wrote:

I did say "if" there were an observer so gifted.

You most assuredly did not. Here's what you wrote: "A person observing someone and his actions can make the distincition about whether or not the objective, and therefore its efficacious acheivement, is good. To the person who has the objective, the objective is always good." Geez, rufio, don't you even read your own stuff?

rufio wrote:

Actually, that is a real-life situation - people announce their moral objectives all the time, whether people want to hear them or not.

And people also lie about their objectives all the time.

rufio wrote:

If you were really curious, you would ask and I would tell you.

And how could I determine if you were telling the truth?

rufio wrote:

Look at this sentence, Joe.

Yesterday, the cat ______ the dog.

That's a placeholder, with no meaning at all, but only a certain type of thing can fill that place. Do you see that? This works the same way. I have defined good as a placeholder that can only hold a certain type of thing.

Quite true. In that sentence, the blank acts as a placeholder that can only be filled with a verb. Until the placeholder is filled, however, the sentence is incomplete -- it makes no sense.

On the other hand, rufio, you want to make "good" a placeholder and still have a complete system of morality. That, I contend, is impossible.

rufio wrote:

Certainly.

P = (Insert definitions here.)
Q = (Insert first post of thread here.)

P -> Q

Naturally, it's a bit more complicated, and there's a proof in there too, but that's the overall structure of the thing.

No, it isn't. But I'm willing to revise my opinion, if you can simply state, in the syllogistic form "P -> Q: P," your position.

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rufio wrote:

PS:

Yes, I am talking about semantics. The reason what I am saying works is because you can define good and evil however you like.

I say what I mean. If you choose to take other meanings out of it, than fine, but if I didn't say it, I didn't mean it.

I meant abnormality in terms of people who for whatever reason are missing a chromosome or a gene that everyone else has. Don't you think that makes more sense with the rest of my post?

I didn't know biology classes had been transplanted to the sociology department as well. This is news to me.

"Culture isn't inherited genetically."

Congratulations on answering your own question.

words are not solid things, I don't know what statements you're trying to make. Maybe you should use the information that everyone is misinterpreting you as a reason to strengthen your communication skills.
Mutations generally occur in genes. If somthing accidental and unplanned happens to the genes for whatever reason, a wacky enzyme or whatever, that is a mutation. Lack of a gene where you should have one would also be a mutation.
Not classes, biology concepts. Namely, evolution. Scholars likes that one, not everyone applies it correctly.

I don't think you read the rest of my answer. I said that culture was not inhereted directly, but that individual personalities shape culture, and personality is influenced by genetics. Say, in a family unit (a smaller social group having a smaller culture than, say, America) you and your mom like math. You talk about math, read math journals. You probably inhereted mathmatical capabilities from your mom, and expressed them because of interaction with your mom. There is a combination of what you've got to work with, and the opportunities you come across. Your body is what you've got to work with. The nature of being a human - in a human body - shapes our culture. Differently than, say, wolves. Collectively and individually we come across unique sets of benefits and problems related to our physical selves. Social interaction takes place in order to benefit biological functioning.

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"I've got wood." How many interperetations of that statement are there kicking around? Laughing

rufio, after sifting through all this, I might consider switching philosophies. Think "collective consciousness" rather than "universal morality" if you really want to define and focus your philosophy.

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joefromchicago
and rufio back and forth:

Quote:

"If quality X defines "good," (e.g. "efficaciousness is the good") then "good" means something: i.e. it is not simply a placeholder word, as you previously held."

X, like in most mathematical equations is a placeholder here. I don't mean efficaciousness, either. I mean, Twyvel thinks that goodness means being nice to people and not hurting them, for instance. That is an example of a value that can be inserted for X.

"In that case, "good" is as meaningless in this context as "cake" or "purple.""

No ****, Sherlock, that was the point of my last post. I used the word good because I intended moral codes to be substituted for it.

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Joe, what you're saying is that if people don't all have the same opinion, none of those opinions actually exist, simply because they aren't universal. That's not logic, that's bullshit.

"No, that's not a difference at all. First of all, you said: "I mentioned wood because everyone has a definition for it, not because everyone has the same definition for it." So even you don't see that as a difference."

I never implied that everyone didn't have the same definition of what wood is. I suppose we could go into some much more in-depth form of psychology of perception here to prove otherwise, but I don't see the point. For all intensive purposes, wood is to you as it is to me, as it is to everyone else. That's just not the reason I carried on that example.

"So what?"

So if you don't aknowledge that the world appears differently to others, you'll never be able to understand how their minds work, let alone their morals, which is the current topic of discussion.

"If you mean to say that "good" and "evil" are entirely subjective, then why not just say so?"

I have, many times. I don't see what this has to d with the structure of the argument.

"Answer this: how can you have a "moral code" that doesn't already contain within it a definition of "good"?"

A moral code is just another term for a personal definition of good.

"How can "good" act as a placeholder for a concept that defines "good"?"

Better than it can act as a placeholder for anything else. Normal language, normal words that you are using right now, are placeholders that stand for their respective definitions. Otherwise, we couldn't communicate. Good is just a word that has a different definition for each person as opposed to the same one.

The good actions are being qualified by the same thing as the good objectives. They are thus termed the same way.

"You most assuredly did not. Here's what you wrote: "A person observing someone and his actions can make the distincition about whether or not the objective, and therefore its efficacious acheivement, is good. To the person who has the objective, the objective is always good." Geez, rufio, don't you even read your own stuff?"

I appologize if I was unclear. I meant that assuming the observer knew the objective.

"And people also lie about their objectives all the time."

True, but those false objectives can still be judged. But this is beside the point.

"And how could I determine if you were telling the truth?"

I guess you would have to take my word for it. But whatever I say, you can still cast judgement on it.

"On the other hand, rufio, you want to make "good" a placeholder and still have a complete system of morality. That, I contend, is impossible."

I don't want a complete system of morality as in a moral code. I already have one of those and I don't consider it worth my time to try and explain it to everyone all the time. I am constructing a model that works for all moral codes, not just mine.

"No, it isn't. But I'm willing to revise my opinion, if you can simply state, in the syllogistic form "P -> Q: P," your position."

I see, you're just having an issue with conditional derivation. In the case above, P is an assumption, nothing more. It doesn't exist outside the derivation, it is only there to help show that a conditional relationship exists between itself and Q. Another way to write P -> Q is "given P, than Q". So you have to be given P to prove that this works. Once the conditional is proven, P ceases to exist, until it is proven some other way that it does.

In other words, goodness doesn't have to be your moral code. But assuming that it is, the rest of what I am saying would be true.

PS - I don't beleive that personality has anything to do with genetics, and I have yet to find a study that proves otherwise that is not statistically or experimentally flawed or biased. I would love to discuss this later, but in a different thread, if we may. There really aren't many facts on the subject, though, so it will basically come down to personal experience.

Cav, I don't think "collective consciousness" is a very useful concept here. Maybe you could use it to describe a colony of ants, or if you wanted to do an in-depth study of mob mentality, but it doesn't help to describe individual human moralities. This is not a universal morality, this is a universal model.

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*Yawn*

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fresco wrote:

Quote:

The issue of "set boundaries" was apparant from the start. The point being that the self (small s) is defined/reflected with respect to its transient relationships with alternative membership groups. Hence "moral conflicts" only perhaps to be resolved by a transcendent non-temporal Self.

Then the significant question is this Self with its qualities of global compassion involved in "action" at all ?...."logically" no...but we have left "logic" down there...and I now spot the influence of a discussion of "the trinity" from another thread where maybe "the Son" (selves) is the material manifestation of the Father (Self)...hmmm.

Yes, fresco,

Re: boundaries+self

There's no such thing as non-local. There's no transient self moving from group to group only appearance of one. So the self is not involved in action, it IS the action.

Meaning there is no transcendence except transcendence from appearance or mirage.

There's movement with no mover. Or, The mover is the movement.

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rufio, I think you might be selling the concept of "collective consciousness" short there, or more precisely, "collective unconscious." Brush up on your Jungian psychology, you might just find it completely relevant to the concept of individual morality.

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I don't do psychology, cav, could you explain a little better what you think would be relevant here?

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truth
A funny story that applies here: A zen master encountered two monks deeply engaged in metaphysical debate. One argued that the wind is flapping the flag; the other that the flag is flapping the wind. When asked to arbitrate, the master informed them that their minds were flapping. Laughing

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Good one JL.... Laughing

How many Zen masters does it take to change a light bulb? Two, one to change the light bulb, and one to not change the light bulb.

rufio, here is a basic primer on Jung, I would prefer you draw your own conclusions, as it is your philosophy, but I'll pipe in if you can't see some connectivity:

http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/gthursby/fonda/jung03.html

Also, ignore the bias of the author. The theories are laid out pretty consicely, and it seems tough to find unbiased info regarding Jung on the 'net, and I can't lend you my books through the computer. Razz

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twyvel wrote:

If X = everything that is considered good, "good" is already defined or it is meaningless. If it's not already defined how would you know what to place in it? If it is already defined it is closed.

That is absolutely correct.

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rufio wrote:

Joe, what you're saying is that if people don't all have the same opinion, none of those opinions actually exist, simply because they aren't universal. That's not logic, that's bullshit.

Nice try, rufio, but you can't play this kind of semantic "hide-the-pea" game with me.

I never said anything about "opinions," and neither did you. We were talking about "definitions." If someone's definition isn't universal, then it isn't a definition. I offer no opinions about "opinions."

rufio wrote:

I never implied that everyone didn't have the same definition of what wood is.

Yes you did.

rufio wrote:

I suppose we could go into some much more in-depth form of psychology of perception here to prove otherwise, but I don't see the point. For all intensive purposes, wood is to you as it is to me, as it is to everyone else. That's just not the reason I carried on that example.

Well, from your perspective, I can see why you don't want to "carry on" the example: you suggested that not everyone had the same definition of "wood," and now you say that everyone does have the same definition. You pile one inconsistency upon another -- it must get tiresome trying to keep track of them all.

rufio wrote:

So if you don't aknowledge that the world appears differently to others, you'll never be able to understand how their minds work, let alone their morals, which is the current topic of discussion.

I am quite content to concede that people have subjective perceptions. I would even concede that people have subjective perceptions of "morals," just as much as people have subjective views of, for example, the Statue of Liberty. That doesn't mean, however, that "morals" are any more subjective than the Statue of Liberty is subjective.

rufio wrote:

"If you mean to say that "good" and "evil" are entirely subjective, then why not just say so?"

I have, many times. I don't see what this has to d with the structure of the argument.

Because you've injected a number of extraneous elements into your argument that have confused the subject.

rufio wrote:

A moral code is just another term for a personal definition of good.

Then, as twyvel pointed out, you can't have "good" act as a placeholder for "good." Either "good" means something or it means nothing. You, on the other hand, want it to mean both.

rufio wrote:

Better than it can act as a placeholder for anything else. Normal language, normal words that you are using right now, are placeholders that stand for their respective definitions. Otherwise, we couldn't communicate. Good is just a word that has a different definition for each person as opposed to the same one.

Let me offer a hypothetical:

Person A says that his action is "good." Person B says that A's action is "not-good." How are we to determine who is correct?

rufio wrote:

The good actions are being qualified by the same thing as the good objectives. They are thus termed the same way.

Nonsense. You are defining "good" by something that is defined as "good." Classic question-begging.

rufio wrote:

I appologize if I was unclear. I meant that assuming the observer knew the objective.

Nice save.

rufio wrote:

True, but those false objectives can still be judged. But this is beside the point.

It's not beside the point according to your position.

rufio wrote:

I guess you would have to take my word for it. But whatever I say, you can still cast judgement on it.

And how could anyone determine if my judgment was correct?

rufio wrote:

I don't want a complete system of morality as in a moral code. I already have one of those and I don't consider it worth my time to try and explain it to everyone all the time. I am constructing a model that works for all moral codes, not just mine.

So, in other words, you want a universal system of morality based on subjectivity.

rufio wrote:

I see, you're just having an issue with conditional derivation.

No, I'm having an issue with you continually evading the issue.

rufio wrote:

In the case above, P is an assumption, nothing more. It doesn't exist outside the derivation, it is only there to help show that a conditional relationship exists between itself and Q.

Complete nonsense. You have absolutely no clue what you're talking about.

rufio wrote:

Another way to write P -> Q is "given P, than Q". So you have to be given P to prove that this works.

Absolute rubbish. P is a premise. If the premise fails, there is no Q. You can't prove Q by assuming P.

rufio wrote:

Once the conditional is proven, P ceases to exist, until it is proven some other way that it does.

To call this nonsense is to insult nonsense. A premise continues to exist even after the conditional is satisfied. If all men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, then mortal men do not "cease to exist" once it is shown that Socrates is a man.

rufio wrote:

In other words, goodness doesn't have to be your moral code. But assuming that it is, the rest of what I am saying would be true.

This is simply incomprehensible.

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Twyvel, that's exactly right. "Good" in the model is meaningless - it's merely a place to fill in a deinition of what makes good things good. If you don't know what you should put there, than this doesn't apply to you, since it only works with specific moral codes.

Joe:

The definition of good can only be an opinion, since it isn't universal. Here, this may help you understand it a little better. Lets make some new adjectives. We have, for instance, the adjective good-rufio, the adjective good-joefromchicago, the adjective good-twyvel. Each of these adjectives refer to the definitions of "good" of the various people mentioned. They're each universal. Assuming that we knew each other's morality, good-rufio, good-joe, and good-twyvel would universally mean the same thing, no matter what the context is. However, they are also separate adjectives with separate meanings. So one action may be good-joe, but not good-twyvel. The model basically uses the general opening "good-____" where the blank can be filled by a name. Do you see?

If you think I said that we all had different definitions of "wood" you must have been mistaken, because I never meant to say anything of the sort. That did not even enter the discussion, so I don't know where you got it from. If you think the objectivity of wood is going to have any usefulness in this discussion, kindly explain why you think that is.

You are talking about two different things - subjective perceptions of objective things, and perceptions of things that are themselves subjective. I am not talking about perceptions at all. I am talking about the things themselves.

"you've injected a number of extraneous elements into your argument that have confused the subject."

Like what? There's nothing extraneous here. If you tell me what's confusing you, perhaps I can explain it.

I am not defining "good" by classifying actions as "good". I am taking something, that, by the definition of good, is good, and calling it good. If you have a definition of "red" and find something, that's according to your definition of red, is red, than you would call it red.

"It's not beside the point according to your position."

Would you like to explain that, since you seem to think you know my position better than I do?

"And how could anyone determine if my judgment was correct?"

Why would anyone else need to? This is about you, not them. Of course, someone else could always judge your decisions based on their moral code, as well. It's rather pointless to explain this back and forth. We could on forever, and the answer would still be the same.

"So, in other words, you want a universal system of morality based on subjectivity."

And on the universal nature of individual morality.

"No, I'm having an issue with you continually evading the issue."

What issue am I avoiding? If you'd mention it, I'd be happy to address it.

"Complete nonsense. You have absolutely no clue what you're talking about."

So how would you derive it?

"You can't prove Q by assuming P."

That's only true if ~(P -> Q). And that's what I'm proving is not the case in this instance. You can't assume ~(P -> Q) until you've shown it, just like you can't assume P -> Q until you've shown it.

P is not exactly a premise, it's an antecedant. The Socrates argument goes (in simplified form) P = Q. Q = R. .: P = R. P = Q and Q = R are necessarily true because they are premises. My argument goes (in simplified form) .: P -> Q. There are no premises. P and Q are much more complicated than simple sentences, but one you express them correctly, the truth of the statment is self-evident no matter what premises you start with. In any case, the existance of mortal men is not an essential part of the Socrates argument, and, for that matter, neither is the existence of Socrates. All that the premises necessarily say is that Socrates is a man and that men are mortal. It could be that nothing is mortal and there are no men, but the premises would still hold true. Take, for example this phrase - if the grass is red, than the sky is green. It hardly matters whether it is the case that either of those things is true - if there is a logical connection between the grass being red and the sky being green, than the conditional is true. Here's another more obvious example. If men had wings, than they would fly. That's probably true. That doesn't mean that men necessarily have wings. In order to determine whether or not men would fly if they did have wings, you would first have to assume hypothetically that they did. Perhaps, once you have done that, you'll find that there is no possible construction of a wing that would make it possible for men to fly. In that case, it's not true. But you have to hypothetically think the antecedant before you can infer that the consequent does or doesn't necessarily follow. My antecedant is that goodness is a moral code held by a person.

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rufio wrote:

The definition of good can only be an opinion, since it isn't universal.

If it's a definition, it must be universal. If it's not universal, it isn't a definition.

rufio wrote:

Here, this may help you understand it a little better. Lets make some new adjectives. We have, for instance, the adjective good-rufio, the adjective good-joefromchicago, the adjective good-twyvel. Each of these adjectives refer to the definitions of "good" of the various people mentioned.

OK, so far.

rufio wrote:

They're each universal.

Ooooh, you were so close -- and then you blew it. A subjective "definition" of good can't be universal, at least not in any meaningful sense of the word.

rufio wrote:

Assuming that we knew each other's morality, good-rufio, good-joe, and good-twyvel would universally mean the same thing, no matter what the context is.

Are you suggesting that, though everyone's morality is subjective (i.e. unique to each individual), that everyone's morality is identical? You'll have to explain that one a little better. As it stands, it's preposterous.

rufio wrote:

However, they are also separate adjectives with separate meanings. So one action may be good-joe, but not good-twyvel. The model basically uses the general opening "good-____" where the blank can be filled by a name. Do you see?

Yes. "Good" is a meaningless prefix. The real definition is located in the modified subject. So "good" is identical for everyone, because it is equally meaningless for everyone.

Of course, this only pushes the definitional problem from "good" to the individual subjects. Which means that you still haven't defined "good" (in the sense of something which is the opposite of "evil" and which you have posited exists in some non-trivial fashion -- as opposed to "good" which is a meaningless prefix and which is, in your system, indefinable).

rufio wrote:

If you think I said that we all had different definitions of "wood" you must have been mistaken, because I never meant to say anything of the sort. That did not even enter the discussion, so I don't know where you got it from. If you think the objectivity of wood is going to have any usefulness in this discussion, kindly explain why you think that is.

I didn't introduce the wood example into this discussion, rufio, you did. If anyone should explain its significance, it should be you.

rufio wrote:

You are talking about two different things - subjective perceptions of objective things, and perceptions of things that are themselves subjective. I am not talking about perceptions at all. I am talking about the things themselves.

What "things" are you talking about? Morality? Good? Evil? How are these objective "things"?

rufio wrote:

Like what? There's nothing extraneous here. If you tell me what's confusing you, perhaps I can explain it.

The notion of a "placeholder" is extraneous because it's both meaningless and significant: meaningless because it represents nothing, and significant because you want it to represent something. You started by dividing the world (or at least all actions in the world) into "good" and "evil." Now you say that "good" is a placeholder term. Are you then concluding that all actions are divided into "a meaningless placeholder" and "another meaningless placeholder"? If so, then why expend any energy on this project at all? Your argument is simply meaninglessness piled on top of meaninglessness -- it's the philosophical equivalent of multiplying everything you say by zero.

rufio wrote:

I am not defining "good" by classifying actions as "good".

Funny, I thought that was exactly what you were doing. As you mentioned earlier: "Good ... only refers to an action that is not [sic] the correct one to take to acheive a certain goal." All along, you've been defining "good" (to the extent that you've been defining anything in your argument) by classifying actions as either "good" or "evil."

rufio wrote:

I am taking something, that, by the definition of good, is good, and calling it good. If you have a definition of "red" and find something, that's according to your definition of red, is red, than you would call it red.

You want to have "good" without actually defining "good." If you take something "that, by the definition of good, is good," then you must have a definition of "good." And if the definition of "good" is subjective, then anything that is described as "good" is equally subjective. As such, you cannot say that an action X is "good," you can only say that "a certain person Y holds that an action X is good."

rufio wrote:

Would you like to explain that, since you seem to think you know my position better than I do?

Sure. In response to my comment that people lie about their objectives, you said: "True, but those false objectives can still be judged. But this is beside the point." Yet if, as you previously stated, "the objective is not right or wrong - the objective merely determines whether the actions were right or not," then the objective is never beside the point. Indeed, the reality or falsity of the objective is the central question in determining if something is good or not.

rufio wrote:

Why would anyone else need to? This is about you, not them. Of course, someone else could always judge your decisions based on their moral code, as well. It's rather pointless to explain this back and forth. We could on forever, and the answer would still be the same.

If "good" is purely subjective, then there is no point in describing any action or objective as either good or evil, since there is no standard by which an observer could judge the action or objective. In other words, if person A says "I wish to kill that stranger, and the most effective means of doing so would be to shoot the stranger with this rifle," there is no way that observer B could deem either the objective (killing the stranger) or the action (shooting the stranger) as "good," except in the trivial sense of displaying B's approval or disapproval of A's objective and action according to B's own moral code. In that case, "good" for B really means "I approve of that" rather than any kind of objective judgment.

Which brings me back to the question I asked earlier and that you refused to answer, rufio. For your convenience, I'll repeat it: Person A says that his action is "good." Person B says that A's action is "not-good." How are we to determine who is correct?

rufio wrote:

And on the universal nature of individual morality.

How can individual morality be universal?

rufio wrote:

What issue am I avoiding? If you'd mention it, I'd be happy to address it.

See above.

rufio wrote:

So how would you derive it?

This isn't about me, rufio. It's your system, you defend it.

rufio wrote:

That's only true if ~(P -> Q). And that's what I'm proving is not the case in this instance. You can't assume ~(P -> Q) until you've shown it, just like you can't assume P -> Q until you've shown it.

But you still haven't put any of your arguments in this syllogistic form. So you can't "prove" anything by what you've just said, unless you're attempting to prove Q, which, at this point, is merely the letter that comes after P.

rufio wrote:

P is not exactly a premise, it's an antecedant. The Socrates argument goes (in simplified form) P = Q. Q = R. .: P = R.

Nope. In the classic syllogism "all men are mortal: Socrates is a man: therefore Socrates is mortal" there is no middle term. Rather, it is "if P then Q; Socrates is P; therefore Socrates is Q" (in your version, "Socrates" is the first term, which is a distortion of the syllogism I put forward).

rufio wrote:

My argument goes (in simplified form) .: P -> Q. There are no premises.

Your argument has no premises and starts with a "therefore"? That's not logic, that's question-begging.

rufio wrote:

P and Q are much more complicated than simple sentences, but one you express them correctly, the truth of the statment is self-evident no matter what premises you start with.

Nonsense.

rufio wrote:

My antecedant is that goodness is a moral code held by a person.

You want to have a "moral code" that exists independently of the notion of "good." Yet a moral code is nothing if it doesn't already contain within it a notion of "good." But perhaps you could explain how a moral code can dispense with the notion of "good" and still be a moral code.

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"A subjective "definition" of good can't be universal, at least not in any meaningful sense of the word."

I see what you mean. Like, if Jack and John both look at the Statue of Liberty, and Jack things it looks like a man, and John thinks it looks like a woman. It's not universally true that it looks like a man, and it's not universally true that it looks like a woman, and it's not even universally true that it looks like a statue. But it is universally true that Jack thinks it looks like a man, and that John thinks it looks like a woman.. See? I'm looking at the universality of things that people are thinking, not what they are thinking them about.

"Are you suggesting that, though everyone's morality is subjective (i.e. unique to each individual), that everyone's morality is identical?"

Sorry that was a bad way to put it. I meant, that no matter what, good-twyvel doesn't change, and good-joe doesn't change, etc., not that they were equal to each other.

"Which means that you still haven't defined "good""

I have. "Good" represents moral values, what any given person thinks of as "good". It's what makes "good-twyvel" different from "what-the-statue-of-liberty-looks-like-twyvel".

The wood - I brought it up as an example of something that you have a definition for and can identify. Nothing to do with universality at all - just something that you have a definition, that you know what it is.

The placeholders, as I said, aren't meaningless. They are specific things that differ for each individual. It's like a gene, for instance. We all have a gene that determines what color our hair is. It's different for everyone, but it serves the same purpose - to color our hair. So we have something like a goodness gene (please no one get confuse here - I am not in any way suggesting that any of this is in any way, shape or form, determined by biology) that is different for everyone, but which serves the same purpose.

I was starting by defining good in less abstract terms so it would be easier to understand. Good is what is determined by the person. Goals that are good, according to that person, are that person's objectives. Actions that fulfill those objectives are good actions. I believe we were talking about actions at that point, which is why I brought up the actions.

"And if the definition of "good" is subjective, then anything that is described as "good" is equally subjective. As such, you cannot say that an action X is "good," you can only say that "a certain person Y holds that an action X is good.""

Exactly. And the fact that Y thinks that X is good is universally true.

"In response to my comment that people lie about their objectives, you said: "True, but those false objectives can still be judged. But this is beside the point." Yet if, as you previously stated, "the objective is not right or wrong - the objective merely determines whether the actions were right or not," then the objective is never beside the point."

We've moved from that point in the conversation from talking about actions based on objectives to objectives based on moral codes. I was at the time talking about when an action could be considered good based on whether or not it was fulfilling its objective. So, by extrapolation, it would also be a good action to whoever considered the objective to be a good objective.

Judging objectives is a whole other thing entirely. In order to have an objective, you must believe it is good. I think you'll agree that there's no other option there. In order to judge an objective, all you have to know is what it is. It could belong to me, it could belong to twyvel, it could belong to no one at all, and you can still pass judgement on it. It's another one of these conditionals. On condition that someone has this objective (and therefore believes it to be good), they are right/wrong.

"If "good" is purely subjective, then there is no point in describing any action or objective as either good or evil, since there is no standard by which an observer could judge the action or objective."

Yes there is. Every observer has a moral code. It's primarily used to judge and monitor the goodness of one's own actions, but it is often (all too often) used to judge the objecrtives and sometimes the actions of those around them.

"In that case, "good" for B really means "I approve of that" rather than any kind of objective judgment."

That's exactly what I mean. I do happen to believe that there is a universal good and evil, but I haven't given enough thought on that to speculate what it might be right now. That is why I am starting with things like this, which allow for individual differences and subjectivity.

"Person A says that his action is "good." Person B says that A's action is "not-good." How are we to determine who is correct?"

I had answered that one, but a bit indirectly. They are both correct. Person A is saying, this action is good-A. Person B is saying, this action is not good-B. They are not mutually exclusive.

"This isn't about me, rufio. It's your system, you defend it."

Assuming the antecedent is a logical strategy used for deriving conditionals. If you think you have a better way of deriving a conditional, I want to hear about it.

"But you still haven't put any of your arguments in this syllogistic form."

If you want me to do that, I can. It would take a while, and I'd have to learn more about all and some first, but I could do it if you are really interested. What I can say now is that the argument would have the form P -> Q. Meaning that P and Q may be any combination of sentences, connectors, expressions, etc, but the main connector would be a conditional. As I said, P represents my assumed usages of the term good and Q represents my argument. I am attempting to show Q given P.

Actually the Socrates argument isn't a conditional, it's an "all". And like I said, I don't really know "all" yet, so I can't exactly express it. It's not saying "if there are men, than they are mortal" it's saying "all men are mortal". I guess you could transform it into a conditional by changing it to be "if Socrates is a man, than Socrates is mortal: Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal". It would still have two premises.

P: Socrates is a man.
Q: Socrates is mortal.

P -> Q. P. .: Q

There are many logical arguments that don't start with premises. Such as:

.: P -> P
.: ~(P ^ ~P)
.: (P ^ (P -> Q)) -> Q (this is actually a rephrasing of the above mentioned Socrates argument)

These are called theorums. They do not need premises to be true.

"You want to have a "moral code" that exists independently of the notion of "good.""

Again, this is not a moral code. It is a model to moral codes can be applied.

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premise
Terry, perhaps you should read my post again. The last paragraph is not the premise.

I did read your post. Are you saying that what you wrote is not what you meant? Here's what you said (emphasis added):

rufio wrote:

It's sort of a premise that I'm trying to base a story around, The theme of this story is the nature of evil, as I understand it. There's been a great deal of ideas about what evil is and what it's purpose is, and why good hasn't simply destroyed it, or whether it even exists. I want to show through the course of this why it exists, and why it is necessary, and why it is misunderstood.

If a good person always makes the right choices, it would them be impossible for there to exist a good person, even hypothetically, since there would be no choices at all, right or wrong. So, good actions can exist independantly of evil ones, but good people cannot.

This theory is a little different. It states that evil is a conscious active force, but that it is natural and harmonious with goodness and its goal is to generate good people, or to make bad people good. First and foremost, it causes people to think seriously about what they are doing. Evil and good work hand in hand - the work of good is to create a good action and reward those who do it, and the work of evil is to create an evil action and punish those who do it, and send them back out to try making the choice again.

As I said before, your stated premise is that evil is necessary in order for people to be able to make choices to prove that they are "good."

You have yet to explain why this force/entity cares whether people are good.

There are many problems with your theory:

1. "Good people cannot exist without evil." Of course they can. If evil is defined as deliberately harming others, there would still be plenty of choices to make without any evil urges.

2. "Evil is a conscious active force." So prove that it exists, is conscious, and has the power to interact with human beings. Actions judged as evil can be shown to have biological and sociological roots without recourse to some mythical force.

3. "Good and evil have goals." No, they are not entities with the attributes of sentience or even consciousness. People have goals which may be judged as good or evil.

4. "Evil causes people to think seriously." So people only think when they have the urge to kill someone? Good people consider the effect of their actions on others. "Evil" people don't care.

5. "Good rewards good actions and evil punishes evil actions." Please explain how your postulated forces/entities could interact with people, and what standards they use to judge whether an action is good, evil, neutral, or somewhere along a continuum of morality. People reward and punish themselves and each other based on their own judgments of right and wrong.

6. There is no reason to think that the universe/nature/god/evil cares whether human beings are good or evil. People care, and IMO should be working to develop a society in which all children are nurtured and educated so they can grow up without becoming sociopaths.

Even if your mythical evil force existed, it would still need a universal definition of good and evil in order to determine whether an action should be punished.

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rufio wrote:

I presented my case rationally and was attacked by people. So I responded accordingly.

I don't know where you got the idea that you were being attacked. You weren't. What did you expect, that everyone here would applaud your ideas instead of pointing out their deficiencies?

rufio wrote:

"If you had actually read my post, you would know that I gave examples of evil"

Don't worry, I know you did. You're very concerned with force-feeding everyone else your ideas of what is evil and what is not.

You have no idea what my motivations are. If anyone is trying to force-feed ideas here, it is you.

rufio wrote:

"the gist was an objective definition of evil: harm to others. I never even mentioned hell, nor did I condemn anyone."

That's your definition - a subjective definition, not an objective one.

As usual you ignored what I actually said and evaded taking responsibility for your mistakes. Please quote whatever you think that I said about people being condemned to hell. "Harm to others" IS objective and is quantified by civil courts.

rufio wrote:

"we disagree with you because your ideas are illogical"

Would you like to derive that one for me?

Certainly.

rufio wrote:

That if you have an objective, there is always a better way to accomplish it, and a worse way. That's my definition of good and evil here - how effective an action is at reaching a predetermined goal.

This is a general definition based on the fact that whatever people consider to be good they are going to make their objective. Whatever action best accomplishes whatever objective you chose would be a good action, and whatever didn't would be an evil action. Universally.

Any choice he makes that fulfills that objective is a morally good choice for person A [B,C]

a good action will always be whatever causes a person's objective to come about. That is universal.

The actions are termed good and evil only on condition that they are associated with a similarly termed objective.

Good actions are defined as acheiving a pre-determined objective. Bad actions are defined as not acheiving that objective.

In other words, a priest who succeeds in molesting boys is "good" if that was his objective. A mass murderer is "good" if he achieves his objective to kill twenty people. No matter how much pain and suffering you cause to others, you are "good" if it was your objective to hurt people, and "bad" if it was NOT your objective, but was due to unforeseen circumstances.

That is about as illogical as you can get.

And after countless reassertions of your notion that anyone who achieves their objectives is "good" you have the audacity to judge Hitler's choices and castigate his motives!

rufio wrote:

[Hitler] was acting out of anger and bitterness. He was hunted down by his own troops. He chose this course of action as a result of his past failures, his past bad choices. He is an example of where evil failed. He made bad choices, but instead of realizing that they were wrong, for him and his life, he continued to do things out of hatred and his feelings of inadequacy. He was never trying to help the German people. He was trying to make up for his past. His actions accomplished neither.

So do you think that Hitler's actions were "good" for the many years that he was accomplishing his objectives? Suppose that Germany had won the war, would that make him "good"?

rufio wrote:

"I never said that God was good, nor that Hitler was evil according to your definition of the term."

Then why did you bring Hitler up as an example of evil in my thread? What does he have to do with my definition?

Hitler was an example of why the freedom to make evil choices is unethical: it denies choices to others (dead victims have no choices, slaves and abused children have little choice), and it is not fair to give evil people more choices than the innocent.

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