rufio wrote:But it is universally true that Jack thinks it looks like a man, and that John thinks it looks like a woman.. See? I'm looking at the universality of things that people are thinking, not what they are thinking them about.
Congratulations,
rufio, you have now rendered the notion of "universality" meaningless. If our interest is in determining whose viewpoint is correct, then noting that both observers "think" is not establishing any "universality of things," it's merely stating an obvious and trivial fact. And, in the context of morality, noting that people
universally "think" is just as obvious and trivial.
rufio wrote:The placeholders, as I said, aren't meaningless.
No, you said that they
are meaningless: "
Good" in the model is meaningless - it's merely a place to fill in a deinition of what makes good things good." I know it's difficult to keep abreast of all these inconsistencies,
rufio, but at least show a little effort.
rufio wrote:So we have something like a goodness gene ... that is different for everyone, but which serves the same purpose.
There's your teleological element again. How can you prove that "goodness" is: (1) shared by everyone; and (2) purposive?
rufio wrote:Exactly. And the fact that Y thinks that X is good is universally true.
"Universally true" in what sense? Universally true for Y?
rufio wrote:Judging objectives is a whole other thing entirely.
Why?
rufio wrote:In order to have an objective, you must believe it is good. I think you'll agree that there's no other option there.
No, I strongly disagree. Are you saying that people never act against their own interests (i.e. akratically)?
rufio wrote:In order to judge an objective, all you have to know is what it is. It could belong to me, it could belong to twyvel, it could belong to no one at all, and you can still pass judgement on it. It's another one of these conditionals. On condition that someone has this objective (and therefore believes it to be good), they are right/wrong.
No. According to your position,
no one can pass judgment on
anything, or, at least, no one can pass judgment on anything that amounts to anything more than personal approval or disapproval.
rufio wrote:That's exactly what I mean. I do happen to believe that there is a universal good and evil, but I haven't given enough thought on that to speculate what it might be right now.
Well,
rufio, that is quite possibly the first thing that you've said that I can actually agree with. Clearly, you
want there to be some sort of universal notion of good/evil, but it is equally clear that you haven't given this subject enough thought.
rufio wrote:"Person A says that his action is "good." Person B says that A's action is "not-good." How are we to determine who is correct?"
I had answered that one, but a bit indirectly. They are both correct. Person A is saying, this action is good-A. Person B is saying, this action is not good-B. They are not mutually exclusive.
As I've mentioned before, this result violates the Law of Contradiction. A thing cannot simultaneously be X and ~X. Consequently, if A and B contradict each other but both, nevertheless, are deemed to be correct, then one of the following must be true: (1) one or the other is
objectively wrong; (2) their definitions of X and ~X are identical and thus meaningless; or (3) X does not exist and
both are mistaken. There is, however, another possibility.
Let's say that person A is standing next to an object that is six-feet tall, and A states "this object is six-feet tall." Person B, located a mile away, looks at the same object and states "that object is one-inch tall." Now, can both A and B be correct?
Speaking objectively, A is correct and B is incorrect, since the object is most definitely six-feet tall (B's error can be explained by the effects of perspective and distance). Yet if we say that the object that B
perceives is one-inch tall, then it's possible to say that both A and B are correct: the object that A perceives is six-feet tall, the object B perceives is one-inch tall. In that case, however, A and B are clearly not talking about the
same object. Rather, they are talking about two distinct objects: object A (the object
as perceived by A) and object B (the object
as perceived by B). And since they are not making statements about the same object, they can both be right.
In the same way, if A says his action is"good" and B says A's action is "not-good," then the only way that both can be right (as you argue,
rufio) is if they are talking about
different actions: action A (the action
as perceived by A) and action B (the action
as perceived by B). This avoids the Law of Contradiction, since we are no longer discussing a single object (which cannot simultaneously be both X and ~X), but rather two objects (which are free to be, respectively, X and ~X). This, I believe, is the result that you want to arrive at,
rufio.
Unfortunately, you arrive at a dead-end. Since A and B are, in effect, talking about entirely different things, there is no possibility of coming to any conclusions about A's action. Indeed, there is no possibility of coming to any conclusions about
anything. For just as A's perception of "good" is subjective, so is A's perception of "action," "objective," and even "A." If A says "my action is good," B could then respond "that was not an action, that wasn't a good thing, and you're not A." And, according to you,
rufio,
both A and B would be correct. Your position, then, ultimately leads to a kind of ethical solipsism, where everything is subjective, including subjectivity.
I won't address your digression on conditionals. Suffice it to say that I disagree with you.