rufio wrote:I mentioned wood because everyone has a definition for it, not because everyone has the same definition for it.
If everyone
doesn't have the same definition of "wood," then there is either no definition or else there's no such thing as "wood." Take your pick.
Look at it this way: person A and person B regard the same object. Person A says it is wood, person B says it is not. If the world is divided into comprehensive and mutually exclusive categories "wood" and "not-wood" (as you've divided the world into "good" and "evil,"
rufio), then it is
impossible that both A and B are correct (that's Leibniz's Law of Contradiction). And if person A says "my definition of wood includes that object," and person B says the same thing, then either one or the other is
objectively wrong, or the definitions of "wood" and "not-wood" are identical and thus meaningless, or else there is no such thing as "wood" and
both A and B are wrong.
rufio wrote:Both person A and person B are both right, because as you yourself have pointed out many times before, good and evil are subjective concepts, which exist in one way to one person, and a different way to another.
Wrong. I said
your position establishes that good and evil are subjective concepts. I, on the contrary, believe that good and evil
must be objective, or at least have an objective element.
rufio wrote:Something cannot simply "be good" it must "be good to" or "be good for" someone or something. There are as many definitions as there are people.
Then they aren't "definitions." They are, at best, rationalizations or self-defenses.
rufio wrote:I understand what "circular" means. I was lost in your quagmire of a description of what you thought my argument was.
The quagmire, I assure you, was entirely your creation.
rufio wrote:Basically, it goes like this: Let us define the quality X to be represented by the word "good". Finding that objectives A, B, and C are modified by the quality X, we can consider them "good" as well.
If quality X defines "good," (e.g. "efficaciousness is
the good") then "good"
means something: i.e. it is
not simply a placeholder word, as you previously held.
On the other hand, if quality X doesn't define "good" but is merely described by it, then you still don't have a definition of "good." In that case, "good" is as meaningless in this context as "cake" or "purple."
rufio wrote:Finding that actions D, E, and F are in line with objectives A, B, and C, respectively, we can consider them "good" as well. In simpler terms:
P = Q = R
therefore P = R
There is nothing faulty about this logic.
Not only is it faulty, it's not even logic.
In order to set up the transitive, you need to establish an
identity between P, Q, and R. Now, you stated that "actions D, E, and F are
in line with objectives A, B, and C." "In line with" does not, as far as I know, mean the same thing as "identical to." At most, it means that they share some sort of teleological or causal relationship. Thus, your attempt at showing that P = R is faulty: there is no shared middle term Q when P = Q but Q "is in line with" R.
rufio wrote:You seem to think that the observer in question is observing a person and trying to guess their objectives - what I meant by an observer was someone who observed the objectives themselves and didn't have to guess.
How can someone observe objectives if those objectives are
intentions? If I see you push a pedestrian into the path of an oncoming car, how do I know that your objective was to
save that person (and were unsuccessful in your objective) rather than
harm him (and succeeded in doing so)? I observe only the act and the result: I don't understand how, on the other hand, I can
see the objective.
rufio wrote:I'm using "good" for the sake of ease. It's the same reason that Hume decided to call his Matters of Face "Matters of Fact" and not "Purple Cakes". He could have called them Purple Cakes, but why would he have wanted to?
Hume didn't attempt to create an ontological system based on a question-begging definition of "facts." You, on the other hand, are attempting to create a moral system based on a question-begging definition of "good." BIG difference.
rufio wrote:Good in this case can't be just anything. It's a placeholder for a specific type of thing - mainly, a moral code.
Of course "good" can be anything -- if it's a meaningless placeholder (as you seem to suggest) why
can't it be anything?
And explain how "good" can be a placeholder for a "moral code" if that code doesn't, itself, contain a definition of "good"?
rufio wrote:Wrong... all you have is theory. Which is about as far as this has progressed so far.
No, you're not even close to it.
rufio wrote:Let's have another trip into logic, shall we?
1. Show P -> Q
2. P (???????)
What's this called? Oh, yeah, Assumption, Conditional Derivation. Remember? If you are showing a conditional, assuming the antecendant is not begging the question. If that doesn't make sense to you, you need to go back to school until it does.
Please identify
anything that you've stated so far that falls into that syllogistic form. I haven't seen you make a single conditional statement -- plenty of circular ones, but no conditionals.