Once again, I'll try to keep the quotations to a minimum.
rufio wrote:Can you think of an impulsive action that had the effect that was intended? I can't.
If you define "impulsive" as "lacking intention," then no, I can't think of one either. If, on the other hand, an "impulsive" action can be "intentional" (e.g. a husband who impulsively murders his wife's lover), then there are lots of impulsive actions that have their desired effects.
rufio wrote:It's all the same idea. It's just different thoughts about what that constitutes. Or, we can go back to SAT analogies. Good-A is to A as good-B is to _____. Hmmm, what could that be? They are the same part of different people. It's like, my eyes are hazel, and your eyes are blue (or whatever), so they're different, but their all eyes. A's morality is different from B's morality, but they're both moralities.
Here's the real nub of the problem,
rufio, and I think I'll use this as my point of departure from this increasingly uninteresting thread.
Using your analogy to eye color, we can only say that there are differences if we agree on: (1) a definition of "eye"; and (2) a definition of "color." And those definitions are
objective, in the sense that they apply equally to all "eyes" and all "colors." So if you were to say "my eyes are hazel" and I responded "no, your eyes are not hazel," then we could
objectively determine who was right and who was wrong. On the other hand, if I can't say
anything about your eye color, because both "eye" and "color" are
subjective concepts, then there's really no point in discussing either your eye color or my eye color or
anybody's eye color.
Now, it looks as if you want me to confine my remarks solely to
my eye color. But you can't restrict a definition to a single person -- which is what you apparently
want to do with your notions of "good-A" and "good-B." For if "good-A" is only applicable to A, then "good-A" is not a
definition of anything. Rather, it is a meaningless concept, since it is a definition that defines only what A wants it to define, and no one is in a position to say that A is wrong, regardless of what A says: it is, consequently, as arbitrary as Humpty Dumpty's syntax.
As it is for "eye color," so it is for "good," or "morality," or "objective." If "good," for instance, is entirely subjective, then there's no point in discussing the concept of "good." There's no point in even discussing the
word "good," since its definition is unique to each individual. At most, we can be curious as to why people are deluded enough to think that there is some sort of objective sense of a word that everyone uses subjectively. But that's more of a question for psychologists than philosophers.
The same can be said for "objectives" (for the sake of clarity, I'll substitute the term "goals" here).
Rufio, you want to maintain that "goals" determine what is "good," such that an action which is most effective at reaching a particular "goal" is to be considered "good." But if "good" is subjective, how can "goal" be
objective?
You want to insert an objective element into your position, because it's the only way that you can make a non-trivial argument. Yet there is no logical reason for maintaining that "goals" are objective while still holding that "good" is subjective. You simply haven't provided an answer, and I am thoroughly convinced that you cannot.
On the other hand, if you sincerely believe that "goals" are objectively ascertainable, then why can't we also ascertain the "best means" or "most effective means" of achieving those goals? And if the means are objectively ascertainable, then certainly it follows that "good" is objectively ascertainable too.
rufio wrote:Because when objecitves exist objectively, they exist unconnected with people or moralities.
No more so than "eyes" or "colors" exist unconnected to people. Yet we are certainly capable of objectively ascertaining eye colors.
rufio wrote:For instance, I might focus on personal freedom as good, and Terry would focus on not harming others. So we might both look at an offensive newspaper article, and I would say, "that's free speech," and she might say "that's harming someone." That doesn't contradict what I said at all. If we didn't like each other much (which I suspect is the case), than we wouldn't bother to explain, and we'd just say "good" and "not-good". But that's what we'd mean.
Certainly, if two people do not hold the same definition of a term, then they cannot be said to contradict each other when they disagree over the meaning of that term. But then that makes their argument trivial (like arguing whether an action is good or purple), while it makes the definitional problem all the more important. If we simply say that A and B don't have the same definition of "good," and that's why they disagree, then we haven't said anything that's particularly meaningful. At that level, we are truly left with two people who are talking past each other rather than to each other. If that's how we want it to stand, then there's nothing more to say. If, on the other hand, we want to say something
meaningful about the notion of "good" (as, I suspect, you
want to do,
rufio), then we can't simply throw up our hands and say: "well, we can't agree on a definition, let's all go home."
And with that, I'm throwing up my hands and saying: "well, we can't agree on
anything, I'm going home."