AHMADINEJAHD WINS AGAIN!!!!

It's the same sort of thing people say 'bout us here in America; that the Corporate overlords will run everything no matter who gets put in. But, in small ways, I think it does make a difference.

There have been some reports that the senior clerical leadership are fighting with each other right now; this adds legitimacy to the concept that a change in power on the 'official' level may indicate a change in posture on the clerical one, re: the US and other international relations.

Cycloptichorn

One of my good facebook friends is an Iranian ex-pat living in Germany. I've been getting great links/info through him. I read this morning that Twitter's been making a huge difference in getting news out of Iran.

Another benefit of technology eh.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/cyber-revolution-gets-a-hand-from-canada/article1184881/

No, not really. Mousavi and the two other opponents were vetted by the Guardian Council before they were allowed to campaign, and that made four candidates out of more than 400 applicants. In the end, Kicky is essentially correct, the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council make the substantive decisions. Ahmedinejad is just the public bulldog. He has some authority in domestic governance, but he can be hauled up short, there, too, if he offends the Supreme Leader or the Guardian Council, or violates approved policy.

This formulation depends on the 'Guardian Council' acting as a unified force. If there is dissent within that group, power struggles over the public face of the leadership of the country could be indicative of a different faction gaining prominence.

I've read reports that Mousavi was not believed to have a chance in hell of winning, and was mostly allowed to run in order to add the perception of legitimacy to the election; when things didn't go according to plan, they were forced to steal the thing in a heavy-handed manner.

While I do doubt this will lead to large differences in Iranian-foreign country relations, it may lead to small ones.

Cycloptichorn

None of that, if true, alters the essentially figurehead character of the office of President of the Islamic Republic. None of that, if true, alters that the only true power is held by the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council. The Guardian council is appointed half by the Supreme Leader, and half by election by the Majlis.

Yup, he'll still be a figurehead no matter what.

Cycloptichorn

If he's only a figurehead and nothing more, why are people dying in the streets?

They are dying because ultra-religious-conservative militia members are killing them. They are dying because they want change, and they were denied it.

But could a figurehead bring change?
Do Iranians (or Persians, if you will) believe he could?

I agree the President is not the full leader of Iran, but I think it is inaccurate to say he is a figurehead. The President appoints a large number of civil service positions around the country. Ahmadinejahd has installed a lot of hard liners in basic bureaucratic positions where they can increasingly impact everyday life. Addtionally, the President is the external face of Iran. Ahmadinejahd has used this role to buff his revolutionary credentials, but at the expense of Iran's world standing. Clearly the people of Iran feel that the position is important to put their lives at risk. The Supreme Leader feels it is important enough to risk his position and prestige to fix the election. They're probably on to something.

You might go back and note that i acknowledged that the office of President has some power in purely domestic matters. For our purposes, there is no difference between being a figurehead and holding this office. For the Persians, though, the difference can matter.

His Constitutional duties include the authority over the budget. The AUthoritative Assembly,, will take his secular leadership on the admin of the budget. Neither the Authoritative Assembly, nor the Supreme Leader symbolically soils their hands in the budgetary tasks.

Didn't we voice support for the Hungarian revold in 1956? I'm sure we implied we would support the Shia in and around Basra at the time of the Gulf War. The support turned out to be more moral than substantive. We should be careful about "voicing support", in case it be taken more literally than ever intended.

Finn wrote:

The Council has announced they may allow recounts in disputed districts, but I would be very surprised to see the results overturned or a new election decreed.

More likely that they will do a more subtle job of rigging the election, the second time around.

I saw a former Iranian political prisoner on the tube. He's suggesting that a revolution is a real possibility, but I think his may be wishful thinking. He did make the point that it is essential for any chance of democratic reform that the West - and particularly the US - voice their support for the protestors.

I can appreciate the argument that to do so enables the regime to cast the protests as evidence of foreign inteference in Iranian affairs, but I expect they plan on doing so in any case.

However, I think there is vitually no chance that "engagement" with the regime will bear any positive fruit and so I don't know that we have all that much to lose.

Here is the rest of Bolton's article--It presents alternatives in light of Iranian actions.

Consider the most-often mentioned Iranian responses to a possible Israeli strike:

1) Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz. Often cited as Tehran's knee-jerk answer -- along with projections of astronomic oil-price spikes because of the disruption of supplies from Persian Gulf producers -- this option is neither feasible nor advisable for Iran. The U.S. would quickly overwhelm any effort to close the Strait, and Iran would be risking U.S. attacks on its land-based military. Direct military conflict with Washington would turn a bad situation for Iran -- disruption of its nuclear program -- into a potential catastrophe for the regime. Prudent hedging by oil traders and consuming countries (though not their strong suit, historically) would minimize any price spike.

2) Iran cuts its o wn oil exports to raise world prices. An Iranian embargo of its own oil exports would complete the ruin of Iran's domestic economy by depriving the country of hard currency. This is roughly equivalent to Thomas Jefferson's 1807 embargo on American exports to protect U.S. shipping from British and French interference. That harmed the U.S. far more than the Europeans. Even Iran's mullahs can see that. Another gambit with no legs.

3) Iran attacks U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some Tehran hard-liners might advocate this approach, or even attacks on U.S. bases or Arab targets in the Gulf -- but doing so would risk direct U.S. retaliation against Iran, as many U.S. commanders in Iraq earlier recommended. Increased violence in Iraq or Afghanistan might actually prolong the U.S. military presence in Iraq, despite President Barack Obama's current plans for withdrawal. Moreover, taking on the U.S. military, even in an initially limited way, carries enormous risks for Iran. Tehran may believe the Obama administration's generally apologetic international posture will protect it from U.S. escalation, but it would be highly dangerous for Iran to gamble on more weakness in the face of increased U.S. casualties in Iraq or Afghanistan.

4) Iran increases support for global terrorism. This Iranian option, especially stepping up world-wide attacks against U.S. targets, is always open. Assuming, however, that Mr. Obama does not further degrade our intelligence capabilities and that our watchfulness remains high, the terrorism option outside of the Middle East is extremely risky for Iran. If Washington uncovered evidence of direct or indirect Iranian terrorist activities in America, for example, even the Obama administration would have to consider direct retaliation inside Iran. While Iran enjoys rhetorical conflict with the U.S., operationally it prefers picking on targets its own size or smaller.

5) Iran launches missile attacks on Israel. Because all the foregoing options risk more direct U.S. involvement, Tehran will most likely decide to retaliate against the actual attacker, Israel. Using its missile and perhaps air force capabilities, Iran could do substantial damage in Israel, especially to civilian targets. Of course, one can only imagine what Iran might do once it has nuclear weapons, and this is part of the cost-benefit analysis Israel must make before launching attacks in the first place. Direct Iranian military action against Israel, however, would provoke an even broader Israeli counterstrike, which at some point might well involve Israel's own nuclear capability. Accordingly, Iran's Revolutionary Guards would have to think long and hard before unleashing its own capabilities against Israel.

6) Iran unleashes Hamas and Hezbollah against Israel. By process of elimination, but also because of strategic logic, Iran's most likely option is retaliating through Hamas and Hezbollah. Increased terrorist attacks inside Israel, military incursions by Hezbollah across the Blue Line, and, most significantly, salvoes of missiles from both Lebanon and the Gaza Strip are all possibilities. In plain violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, Iran has not only completely re-equipped Hezbollah since the 2006 war with Israel, but the longer reach of Hezbollah's rockets now endangers Israel's entire civilian population. Moreover, Hamas's rocket capabilities could easily be substantially enhanced to provide greater range and payload to strike throughout Israel, creating a two-front challenge.

Risks to its civilian population will weigh heavily in any Israeli decision to use force, and might well argue for simultaneous, pre-emptive attacks on Hezbollah and Hamas in conjunction with a strike on Iran's nuclear facilities. Obviously, Israel will have to measure the current risks to its safety and survival against the longer-term threat to its very existence once Iran acquires nuclear weapons.

This brief survey demonstrates why Israel's military option against Iran's nuclear program is so unattractive, but also why failing to act is even worse. All these scenarios become infinitely more dangerous once Iran has deliverable nuclear weapons. So does daily life in Israel, elsewhere in the region and globally.

Many argue that Israeli military action will cause Iranians to rally in support of the mullahs' regime and plunge the region into political chaos. To the contrary, a strike accompanied by effective public diplomacy could well turn Iran's diverse population against an oppressive regime. Most of the Arab world's leaders would welcome Israel solving the Iran nuclear problem, although they certainly won't say so publicly and will rhetorically embrace Iran if Israel strikes. But rhetoric from its Arab neighbors is the only quantum of solace Iran will get.

On the other hand, the Obama administration's increased pressure on Israel concerning the "two-state solution" and West Bank settlements demonstrates Israel's growing distance from Washington. Although there is no profit now in complaining that Israel should have struck during the Bush years, the missed opportunity is palpable. For the remainder of Mr. Obama's term, uncertainty about his administration's support for Israel will continue to dog Israeli governments and complicate their calculations. Iran will see that as well, and play it for all it's worth. This is yet another reason why Israel's risks and dilemmas, difficult as they are, only increase with time.

Mr. Bolton, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, is the author of "Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad" (Simon & Schuster, 2007).

Well, once again, i've already noted his domestic powers, as opposed to his foreign image. However, i don't think i buy your "soil their hands" thesis, given the the Islamic Republic is, essentially, a corporate entity, and the corporate board is filled with the Mullahs currently in favor. Many foreign financial observers describe Iran as a kleptocracy. (An expression taken up and much favored by opponents of the Mullahs' regime in exile.)

Some people are worried about the situation in Iran. I am not. The President of the United States--Barack Hussein Obama--has told us--

When I see violence directed at peaceful protestors, when I see peaceful dissent being suppressed, wherever that takes place, it is of concern to me and it's of concern to the American people," Obama said. "That is not how governments should interact with their people.".

That's good enough for me. HE IS CONCERNED!!!!

Does the Senile Setanta know about the stated belief system of the idiot, Ahmadinejad? If Setanta does know, he is keeping very quiet about it. WHY?

Note:

president paves the way for arabs' imam return
Nov 17, 20o8




His call for the destruction of Israel may have grabbed headlines abroad, but it is President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's devotion to a mystical religious figure that is arousing greater interest inside Iran.

In a keynote speech on Wednesday to senior clerics, Ahmadinejad spoke of his strong belief in the second coming of Shi'ite Muslims' "hidden" 12th Imam.

According to Shi'ite Muslim teaching, Abul-Qassem Mohammad, the 12th leader whom Shi'ites consider descended from the Prophet Mohammed, disappeared in 941 but will return at the end of time to lead an era of Islamic justice.

"Our revolution's main mission is to pave the way for the reappearance of the 12th Imam, the Mahdi," Ahmadinejad said in the speech to Friday Prayers leaders from across the country.

"Therefore, Iran should become a powerful, developed and model Islamic society."

"Today, we should define our economic, cultural and political policies based on the policy of Imam Mahdi's return. We should avoid copying the West's policies and systems," he added, newspapers and local news agencies reported.

Ahmadinejad refers to the return of the 12th Imam, also known as the Mahdi, in almost all his major speeches since he took office in August.

A September address to the U.N. General Assembly contained long passages on the Mahdi which confused Western diplomats and irked those from Sunni Muslim countries who believe in a different line of succession from Mohammed.

This fascination has prompted wild stories to circulate.

Presidential aides have denied a popular rumor that he ordered his cabinet to write a letter to the 12th Imam and throw it down a well near the holy city of Qom where thousands of pilgrims come each week to pray and drop messages to the Imam.

But what really has tongues wagging is the possibility that Ahmadinejad's belief in the 12th Imam's return may be linked to the supposed growing influence of a secretive society devoted to the Mahdi which was banned in the early 1980s.

Founded in 1953 and used by the Shah of Iran to try to eradicate followers of the Bahai faith, the Hojjatieh Society is governed by the conviction that the 12th Imam's return will be hastened by the creation of chaos on earth.

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CHAOS ON EARTH???? Could that be Nuclear Warfare?

More from Freep, I dont suppose that you read the Iranian?
What makes Freep the most quoted secondary source of "news and information" by the A2k conservatives and libertarians?