dlowan wrote:So....is a consequentialist like a utilitarian? If not, how do they differ?
Utilitarianism is a type of consequentialism. Utilitarians specifically focus on the utility of an act as the standard of moral value. A utilitarian is a consequentialist, but a consequentialist is not necessarily a utilitarian. I have no idea what
agrote's standard of value is, so at most I can say that he is a consequentialist, not a utilitarian.
dlowan wrote:Can you explain your objections to act consequentialists?
An act consequentialist evaluates the morality of an action by that action's consequences. Every action, therefore, must be judged independently. There are two significant problems with act consequentialism: (1) since it is not always (or even often) possible to evaluate all of the consequences of a given action at the time of the action, it is impossible, in many instances, to say whether an action is moral or immoral
at the time of acting; (2) more importantly, since act consequentialism doesn't admit of any rules for determining whether an act is
per se moral or immoral, it is
always impossible to determine if an act is moral or immoral
before the time of acting.
Because of these problems, act consequentialism has absolutely no predictive value. One cannot say: "if you do this, it would be wrong." At most, an act consequentialist can say: "if you do this, we'll eventually find out if it's wrong." For the act consequentialist, then, the answer to every ethical question is: "it depends." That's rather unsatisfactory as a method by which one might actually attempt to
live a moral life, which is why almost no one is a genuine act consequentialist -- and
agrote is certainly not among them.
Rule consequentialism is designed to remedy act consequentialism's significant defects, which is why almost all consequentialists are rule consequentialists.
Agrote claims to be an act consequentialist, but he still wants the kinds of rules and rights that act consequentialism abjures. In short, he wants the definiteness that is offered by rule consequentialism while, at the same time, enjoying the freedom to decide every case on its own merits that is offered by act consequentialism. He wants to say "
this action is immoral" while still reserving the right, whenever it suits him, to say "but in this case, it's not." It's an intellectually dishonest position, which is why it is pointless to discuss it with him.