Conscience or superego?

I only conceded that in the case of a feral child who displayed no interest in human activity that it might be difficult or impossible to determine innateness of a moral sense.

In other words, you don't know.

I read your description of "naturalistic fallacy" and I have to admit I didn't understand it. Perhaps I'm stupid, but it seems obvious to me that if I claim that morality has a utilitarian purpose, it is not a logical fallacy. Morality regulates human behavior so that we don't kill each other off. It is always possible to ask what is the purpose of not allowing us to kill each other off, and so on, ad infinitum. Eventually, you end up asking what is the purpose of life, or some similar metaphysical question.

No. Lying may confer a temporary advantage to an individual in specific situations. However, in general, lying is not advantageous to society.

I am not defining innate, I am speculating as to why morality might be innate. "Innate" in this context means "inborn".

I am suggesting a reason why it might be innate and universal. I could be wrong. It might be a purely learned behavior, in which case one could argue that it is not innate.

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IFeelFree wrote:

OK, then I'm a moral relativist because right and wrong in part depends upon the "ethical rules of the relevant societies."

In part? Which part?

Those behaviors regulated by the laws of that society.

I read parts of it but it seems wrong to me. For example, under the section "1. To the extent that moral relativism is moral, it is not relative.", the following statement is made:

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...moral relativism rests on an objective set of beliefs: most importantly is the belief in some level of respect for others. Under moral relativism, X cannot impose his beliefs on Y because it would be immoral to do so, yet that presupposes that there is at least one moral precept (i.e. respect for others) that is not relative.

How does moral relativism require that "X cannot impose his beliefs on Y because it would be immoral to do so"? If Y believes its OK to kill others, than X may prevent him from doing so, irrespective of what Y believes. My "moral relativism" doesn't require me to respect the beliefs of others under all circumstances. If that is not moral relativism, then I'm not a moral relativist.

IFeelFree wrote:

I only conceded that in the case of a feral child who displayed no interest in human activity that it might be difficult or impossible to determine innateness of a moral sense.

But feral children may be the only ones we can test for this "innate" moral sense. If they provide no answers, then it is likely no answer is possible.

IFeelFree wrote:

In other words, you don't know.

No, I don't know. But then again, neither do you.

IFeelFree wrote:

I read your description of "naturalistic fallacy" and I have to admit I didn't understand it. Perhaps I'm stupid, but it seems obvious to me that if I claim that morality has a utilitarian purpose, it is not a logical fallacy. Morality regulates human behavior so that we don't kill each other off. It is always possible to ask what is the purpose of not allowing us to kill each other off, and so on, ad infinitum. Eventually, you end up asking what is the purpose of life, or some similar metaphysical question.

If morality has the purpose of giving us an evolutionary advantage, then it follows that "the good" is equivalent to "conducive to survival." But "good" cannot be equated with some aspect of "good," such as "conducive to survival," since the two are not the same. We can always ask: "is that which is conducive to survival good?" and come up with an answer other than "yes." So "conducive to survival" is not an adequate definition of "good." See this link for a fuller explanation.

Then no one would adopt the general rule. If lying were advantageous in some situations but disadvantageous in general, people would still have an incentive to gain the advantages of lying in the hopes that everyone else wouldn't. That's a variation on the free rider problem, and is predictable on the basis of game theory.

IFeelFree wrote:

I am not defining innate, I am speculating as to why morality might be innate. "Innate" in this context means "inborn".

Of course it does. I just wonder what it means when you use the word.

IFeelFree wrote:

I am suggesting a reason why it might be innate and universal. I could be wrong. It might be a purely learned behavior, in which case one could argue that it is not innate.

If it is a learned behavior, then I can't imagine how someone could argue that it was innate.

IFeelFree wrote:

Quote:

IFeelFree wrote:

OK, then I'm a moral relativist because right and wrong in part depends upon the "ethical rules of the relevant societies."

In part? Which part?

Those behaviors regulated by the laws of that society.

Is that because it is right that all people obey the law?

IFeelFree wrote:

I read parts of it but it seems wrong to me. For example, under the section "1. To the extent that moral relativism is moral, it is not relative.", the following statement is made:

Quote:

...moral relativism rests on an objective set of beliefs: most importantly is the belief in some level of respect for others. Under moral relativism, X cannot impose his beliefs on Y because it would be immoral to do so, yet that presupposes that there is at least one moral precept (i.e. respect for others) that is not relative.

How does moral relativism require that "X cannot impose his beliefs on Y because it would be immoral to do so"? If Y believes its OK to kill others, than X may prevent him from doing so, irrespective of what Y believes. My "moral relativism" doesn't require me to respect the beliefs of others under all circumstances. If that is not moral relativism, then I'm not a moral relativist.

Correct. If you still want to impose your moral beliefs on someone else, then you can't be a moral relativist. And so we are gradually eliminating all the things that you aren't; on the other hand, we still haven't quite figured out what you are (besides confused).

Interesting thread, echi. but in a perfect world, would you still fear about whether the kids would be 'alright'

This is beginning to feel like a waste of time.

IFeelFree wrote:

This is beginning to feel like a waste of time.

Then let me summarize: you think abstract moral principles are "innate," but you aren't quite sure what "innate" means. It could be that those moral principles are the product of common social and environmental factors, or it could be that they are inborn. You also think that morality has a purpose, even though it may be innate. You contend that morality confers an evolutionary advantage and that's why people chose to adopt morality, despite the fact that they may not have chosen it at all.

Let me summarize from point of view: I think that the moral impulse, and possibly moral ideals, are innate, in the same sense that the capacity for love, jealousy, compassion, etc. are innate -- they are traits expressed my most humans but to different degrees. Morality, like any other human trait, is shaped by social and environmental factors. Morality has a purpose (to further our survival as a species), just as sex, love, etc. have a purpose, and that is why humans evolved with those capacities. Morality confers an evolutionary advantage, and people adopt moral behavior because we're wired to do so, in the same way that we're wired to have sex, bond emotionally with others, care for our young, etc.

The "innate capacity for morality" is about as meaningful as the "innate capacity for riding a bicycle."

Sure, it seems pretty clear that people have the capacity for acting morally, since it's pretty clear that lots of people actually do act morally.

But so what? If the actual principles of morality are the products of socialization, rather than the expressions of an innate moral code, then any innate capacity for morality is largely irrelevant.

In more concrete terms, if I believe that it is immoral to lie, it really doesn't matter that I also have the capacity to believe that it is immoral to lie. That's because my capacity for that belief doesn't guide my actions, only the moral code does. And if I tell a lie despite my belief that it is immoral to lie, my capacity to believe that it is immoral to lie is completely irrelevant to my moral blameworthiness for lying.

I don't see why they're not meaningful. If I was born without arms or legs, I would not have the "innate capacity for riding a bicycle."

Similarly, we can imagine a person, perhaps a psychopath, who lacks the "innate capacity for morality." He has no idea why people don't lie or cheat or kill when it is advantageous to them and they can get away with it. He knows the rules of behavior in his society but doesn't care. You can try to teach morality to him, but he would just be learning a bunch of rules with no inner sense of right or wrong. Most people feel bad when they act immorally. Is that a learned reaction, or is it "innate"? I suspect it is innate, but I don't know if I can prove it.

I don't concede that the principles of morality are the product of socialization. They may be, I'm just not convinced of it.

The moral code may guide your actions, but if it is not in harmony with your inner sense of right and wrong, you will probably have some difficulty adhering to it.

IFeelFree wrote:

I don't see why they're not meaningful. If I was born without arms or legs, I would not have the "innate capacity for riding a bicycle."

Sure you would. You would have as much innate capacity for riding a bike as a psycopath has innate capacity to act morally. The fact that you and the psychopath either do not or cannot act in accordance with that innate capacity doesn't mean the capacity doesn't exist. Unless, of course, you're arguing that only some people have the innate capacity to act morally. Is that your position?

IFeelFree wrote:

Similarly, we can imagine a person, perhaps a psychopath, who lacks the "innate capacity for morality." He has no idea why people don't lie or cheat or kill when it is advantageous to them and they can get away with it. He knows the rules of behavior in his society but doesn't care. You can try to teach morality to him, but he would just be learning a bunch of rules with no inner sense of right or wrong. Most people feel bad when they act immorally. Is that a learned reaction, or is it "innate"? I suspect it is innate, but I don't know if I can prove it.

If you can't prove it, why are you so confident that it is true?

IFeelFree wrote:

I don't concede that the principles of morality are the product of socialization. They may be, I'm just not convinced of it.

Well, here's what you wrote:

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No, the rules are not innate. The abstract moral ideals seem to be, however. That is my whole argument.

Now you're saying that morality may be innate? Make up your mind.

IFeelFree wrote:

The moral code may guide your actions, but if it is not in harmony with your inner sense of right and wrong, you will probably have some difficulty adhering to it.

How would you know that your moral code is in conflict with your innate sense of right and wrong?

You say that a person born without arms and legs still has an innate (i.e., inborn) capacity to ride a bike? That just doesn't make sense to me.

I believe a lot of things that I can't prove objectively, such as the universality of love, that life has meaning and purpose, that there exists a higher power, etc. The evidence for these things rests largely on my subjective experience. I wouldn't expect my subjective experience to convince you, but it is convincing to me. When I look inside myself, I feel a moral sense that doesn't seem to be only the result of social conditioning. I could be wrong but that is what I feel.

I would be very dubious if you told me that you only believe that for which you have objective evidence.

It should be clear. The moral codes are man-made. The moral sense and, quite possibly, the abstract moral principles or ideals appear to be innate.

I would feel it.

Let's say that a person born limbless is fitted with artificial limbs, and thereafter learns how to ride a bike. Would you say that he had an innate capacity to ride a bike? Or would you say that he was born without any capacity to ride a bike and just learned it?

IFeelFree wrote:

I would be very dubious if you told me that you only believe that for which you have objective evidence.

Why is that so hard to believe?

What exactly is an "abstract moral principle?"

IFeelFree wrote:

I would feel it.

That pretty much sums it all up.