joefromchicago wrote:IFeelFree wrote:No, the rules are not innate. The abstract moral ideals seem to be, however. That is my whole argument.
Well, as you point out, there's no way that you can determine if those abstract moral ideals are innate. Which leaves one to wonder just why you're so convinced that they
are innate.
I only conceded that in the case of a feral child who displayed no interest in human activity that it might be difficult or impossible to determine innateness of a moral sense.
Quote:IFeelFree wrote:There is no distinction, in my opinion. Moral ideals are based on utility. If not, what are they based on?
Philosophers have been debating that question for centuries.
In other words, you don't know.
Quote:IFeelFree wrote:I don't see why its a fallacy. I say that morality has a purpose. You say it doesn't. Its not apparent to me why one position is obviously correct.
If morality had a purpose, then there would have to be something that was "supra-moral." The question, then, would be: is
that thing "moral?" And that is the kind of open-question fallacy that G.E. Moore described as a
naturalistic fallacy.
I read your description of "naturalistic fallacy" and I have to admit I didn't understand it. Perhaps I'm stupid, but it seems obvious to me that if I claim that morality has a utilitarian purpose, it is not a logical fallacy. Morality regulates human behavior so that we don't kill each other off. It is always possible to ask what is the purpose of not allowing us to kill each other off, and so on, ad infinitum. Eventually, you end up asking what is the purpose of life, or some similar metaphysical question.
Quote:IFeelFree wrote:I might ask, for example, why would morality arise in human populations if it didn't confer an evolutionary advantage? Wouldn't it be weeded out since it places such demands on human behavior? No, it seems obvious to me that societies that have some kind of morality have an advantage over those that are lawless and chaotic. Therefore, morality has the "purpose" of maintaining a society's evolutionary advantage.
Actually, many ethical rules would seem to be evolutionarily disadvantageous, or at least evolutionarily neutral. A blanket prohibition against lying, for instance, doesn't seem to confer any particular evolutionary advantages on humans, and, in some cases, may be distinctly disadvantageous.
No. Lying may confer a temporary advantage to an individual in specific situations. However, in general, lying is not advantageous to society. Accurate information is needed to conduct the business of providing for our needs efficiently. Also, lying tends to breed mistrust which disrupts the cohesiveness of society. Humans are better able to survive when they are able to bond with others and work together. Lying inhibits that.
Quote:IFeelFree wrote:I'm saying they are innate because of the commonality of the human condition. Perhaps this is just semantics. By innate, I don't mean that it was ordained by God, or an inescapable condition of individuality, but that it is imposed by the demands of living as a human being with others on this planet. We have to have some kind of morality to survive as a species. Otherwise we might kill each other off. Since the demands of life are similar for all humans, moral principles are, to some extent, universal.
That's not what "innate" means.
I am not defining innate, I am speculating as to why morality might be innate. "Innate" in this context means "inborn". I am suggesting a reason why it might be innate and universal. I could be wrong. It might be a purely learned behavior, in which case one could argue that it is not innate.
Quote:IFeelFree wrote:OK, then I'm a moral relativist because right and wrong in part depends upon the "ethical rules of the relevant societies."
In part? Which part?
Those behaviors regulated by the laws of that society.
Quote:IFeelFree wrote:My argument was that moral relativism has a compelling logic to it -- right and wrong are situational.
On the contrary,
moral relativism has no logic, compelling or otherwise.
I read parts of it but it seems wrong to me. For example, under the section "1. To the extent that moral relativism is moral, it is not relative.", the following statement is made:
Quote:...moral relativism rests on an objective set of beliefs: most importantly is the belief in some level of respect for others. Under moral relativism, X cannot impose his beliefs on Y because it would be immoral to do so, yet that presupposes that there is at least one moral precept (i.e. respect for others) that is not relative.
How does moral relativism require that "X cannot impose his beliefs on Y because it would be immoral to do so"? If Y believes its OK to kill others, than X may prevent him from doing so, irrespective of what Y believes. My "moral relativism" doesn't require me to respect the beliefs of others under all circumstances. If that is not moral relativism, then I'm not a moral relativist.