Re: Who decides? The state or the individual?
Thomas wrote:Holding someone at gunpoint is force, and that's not a broad interpretation of the term "force". What the state forces Boss to do by holding him at gunpoint is irrelevant to it being force.
I don't understand how someone can be "forced" to do anything by a metaphor, but I'm convinced that this point has become so tangential as to merit no further discussion.
Thomas wrote:Yes, it is still force, because the amount of violence threatened in case of non-compliance is the same. On the other hand, I doubt employer and worker have a work contract in this case, as there is no consideration on Boss's part. If Boss is unhappy with anything Worker does, contract law does not oblige the state to enforce anything on behalf of Boss.
I'm sure a contract of indentured servitude was enforceable by the courts in the eighteenth century.
Thomas wrote:I've never heard you quote Ronald Reagan before. Are you feeling alrightl?
(1) I don't know what you're talking about, and (2) I feel fine.
Thomas wrote:Anyway, Rawls himself made this point about how the legal rules produced by his social contract would target economic inequality. My copy of Rawls (1971) is in hiding, so I can't back this up with a quote. Failing that, I Googled for "'John Rawls' 'Minimum Wage'". The first hit that came up was a PBS interview between Ben Wattenberg and two philosophy professors about Rawls. Their testimony is consistent with my reading of Rawls and inconsistent with yours.
I'm not entirely sure why a minimum wage law that obligated employers to pay their employees a certain wage is more objectionable than a general tax that obligated everyone to supplement the employee's wage, but perhaps Rawls, if he had actually participated in that discussion, might have explained the difference.
In any event, there's the possibility that Rawls was wrong. A Rawlsian society would have certain attributes (e.g. democratic government, social welfare programs) that are
necessary in any society based upon the foundation of "justice as fairness." On the other hand, the particular forms taken by those attributes (e.g. whether it is a parliamentary or presidential democracy), would be optional. We may call the former "first order" attributes and the latter "second order" attributes. Now, from the interview excerpt you posted (but did not link), it appears that Rawls believed that a "minimum income" constituted a "first order" attribute -- i.e. that a society could not be "just" if its citizens did not have some minimum amount of income. And I think that's a correct interpretation of Rawls. Whether the
form of that minimum income is equally a "first order" attribute -- in other words, whether a society can be "just" if it has a minimum wage law as opposed to some other form of wage/income assistance -- is less clear.
If income assistance is a "second order" attribute of a just society, then we cannot say that a minimum wage law that accomplishes the same goal is unjust, because the form taken by a "second order" attribute is not
necessary. And if Rawls thought that it was, then he was wrong.
Thomas wrote:Independent of that, I'm curious: Do you seriously believe that if workers get disemployed by minimum wage laws, they receive non-pecuniary benefits as attractive as the pecuniary raise the other workers are getting? I'd like to know what you imagine them to be.
As I've mentioned before, any society that did not provide some form of assistance to those laborers who were adversely affected by a minimum wage law would be doing them a disservice.
As for the non-pecuniary benefits, it seems clear to me that any kind of income assistance is, at its base, a form of ransom paid by the upper classes to keep the lower classes content and complacent. If large income disparities, unalleviated by any form of wealth redistribution, causes civil unrest, then the non-pecuniary benefits of wealth redistribution, in whatever form (and a minimum wage law is nothing but a form of wealth redistribution), flow to everyone in society, regardless of social class. Bismarck certainly recognized that.
Previously, Thomas wrote:The permissible use of this violence is constrained (...) according to Locke: He says natural law, in a state of nature, allows Worker to thwart any attempts of Boss to actively kill him. But it allows him no more retaliation than is necessary to protect his "life, health, liberty, and possessions" (Second Treatise, sections 6 and 7). Boss's low-wage job offer does not transgress against any of these. Worker can either take the offer and be better off, or he can leave it and be off the same as before. Either way, Boss does not violate any of Worker's rights. Hence, the law of nature gives Worker no rightful power to retaliate against Boss's low-wage job offer in a state of nature. When Worker leaves the state of nature and subjects himself to a government, he surrenders to it all rightful power of punishment that he had in the state of nature (Section 130). But he cannot surrender to government any righful powers that he didn't previously have (section 135). Summing up, Boss violated none of Worker's natural rights by making him a low-wage job offer; Worker had nothing to rightfully punish Boss for. Because Worker had no such right, he couldn't transfer it to government when he left the state of nature. It follows that under Locke's Natural Law, government cannot rightfully punish Boss for not paying worker a minimum wage.
I said that I'd have to think about this a little while longer, and now I have.
I think that's a fair summation of the Lockean perspective. I'm not about to re-read the Second Treatise to make sure that it is accurate, so I'm willing to accept it, if only for the sake of argument. Of course, that doesn't mean that I accept Locke's argument, but I accept your summary of it.